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CHAIRMAN OLLIE SPERAW:

We're about ready to start.

Senator Diane Watson that said she would be attending.

We had a letter from
I was delaying to see if she

would make it, but I know that everyone here to testify has a busy schedule and time
is important, so we won't delay .any further.
I am Senator Ollie Speraw, Chairman of the Select Committee on Anatomical Transplants.

With me is Senator Robert Presley.

I might add that Senator Presley has been

a supporter of this committee and carried the bill last year that changed the law so
that coroners were able to authorize the release of eye tissue in the absence of dissent
on the part of any next of kin, which was just a reversal of the role -- instead of
having to obtain consent, if there wasn't any dissent there, they were able to release
it.
That bill, at this point in time, has accommodated about half of the people who
were awaiting cornea transplants -- about 1,000 people.
about 2,000 at that time.

There was a waiting list of

Hopefully, within the next few months, the entire backlog

will be cleared up and all these people will have a normal quality of life restored.
Of course, this means not only has joy been brought to their lives, but also to the
lives of the taxpayers since most of these people have to rely on some social assistance.
Senator Diane Watson is Chairman of the Health and Human Services Committee so that
you will know when she arrives what her interest in this is.
With regard to some of the past work of this committee, we generated a bill which
was to place heart transplant benefits under Medi-Cal.

Since there would be about a

$7 million expense connected with that, and the Legislature has been very cost-conscious
of late, we explored possible sources of revenue to offset this cost.

We discovered

that when people who have been using wheelchairs, pacemakers, etc., and all the other
types of equipment, pass away, this equipment just becomes part of their estate; it
does not revert back to the State of California.

As a result, there is approximately

a $10 million expense per year for these types of health aids.

So we included in the

bill a provision that at time of death this equipment would revert back to the state.
The Health and Human Services Department felt that part of the bill was

cumbetson~

and they wouldn't be able to implement it; however, they dropped their active opposition at the last moment and the bill was passed and is in front of the Governor now.
I have been informed by Secretary Swoap of the Health and Human Services Department that they have the administrative capability to authorize payment of heart transplants under Medi-Cal without SB 1967 and they are asking the Governor to veto the bill
because they feel it is an administrative nightmare trying to keep track of all the
health aids and equipment that are dispersed around the state.
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In any case, they are

authorizing heart transplants for Medi-Cal, irrespective of whether the bill is vetoed.
This is the fifth hearing that this committee will have held in the past year.
is also the last one.

It

We will deal exclusively today with the question of brain death.

I might add that our first witness is responsible for this hearing being held on this
subject.
Dr. Boyd Stevens is the Chief Medical Examiner and Coroner of the County and City
of San Francisco.

I have worked with him for three years through a nonprofit group

called the Anatomical Transplant Association of California in which he and other coroners
have been quite active.
I am not going to spend a lot of time addressing a subject on which I am certainly
not an expert as are few other lay people.

I will leave it to Dr. Stevens to set the

ground for why we are here today and what his concerns are, including the fact that
determination of brain death is not uniform throughout our fifty states and the problems
generated when brain-dead bodies cross state lines.

Dr. Stevens, if you would please

start the testimony.
While he's coming up, I would like to announce that we have additions to the agenda.
First, Dr. Lawrence Pitts will be represented by Dr. John Wagner of UC, Davis, and
attorney Jay Hartz of Weissburg and Aronson, Inc., of Los Angeles.

We also have received

letters from Brian Broznick, Organ Procurement Coordinator of the University of Pittsburgh; Dr. Albert Jonsen, Professor of Ethics at the University of California, San
Francisco; Dr. Thomas Raffin, Assistant Chief of Medicine at Stanford University Medical
Center; Dr. Philip Calanchini of the Pacific Medical Center; and Dr. David Ogden of the
National Kidney Foundation, that will be included as part of the record.
One additional introduction is the chief counsel to this committee, Kathleen Norris,
on my right.
Doctor, It's all yours.
DR. BOYD G. STEVENS:

Thank you, Senator.

Good morning, Senator Presley and

Miss Norris and ladies and gentlemen.
I won't go back into the history, since I know you've already done this, of transplantation and the benefits that can be reaped by that.

But I would like to just simply

aadress one th±ng---and tha-t --±s-the- aspect-s-o-f the- -issue- ef ~ae~oroners

and their involvement in sudden unexpected death.
As you know, the primary purpose of the medical examiner/coroner is that of law
enforcement and protection of public health.

It's also well known to you, however,

that the ideal candidate for a tissue donation is a healthy young individual who is both
free of disease or significant aging processes and is either somatically or brain dead
suddenly and unexpectedly.

By definition this is a case that is typically death under

the coroner or medical examiner's jurisdiction with relatively few exceptions.
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Since we must obviously be an interrelation between any transplant program and those
responsible for the investigation of sudden or unexpected death, there must obviously be
support and interaction between the two.

In point of fact, that has not always been the

case up and down the state; and there have been conflicts and problems on both sides including those that cause the loss of potential donor patients from the system as well as
those cases that have cost the loss of evidence for the judicial system.
The problem, then, that I want to discuss here today deals primarily with the resolution of those difficulties so that tissue and organ transplantation can continue to
advance the welfare of mankind smoothly and unimpededly.

Principal to tissue harvesting

is the assurance of death or that death is totally assurable.
fear the potential of error in the diagnosis of death.

No family should have to

That anatomic death is assured

beyond any reasonable doubt must be an unquestionable principal for any of our donor
programs.
Although all of our states have adopted a Uniform Anatomic Gift Act, principal to
which is the concept of brain death, there is considerable variation by which that
critical decision is made.

Not only do the minimum criteria vary, but the quality of

the evaluation and the training of those making the diagnosis of somatic or brain death
vary tremendously.
Currently, all of the cases that I am personally aware of in the United States
where a person was declared dead but in fact wasn't were patients pronounced dead by
physicians.

In some situations death was so very near that the difference was a mere

technicality; but nevertheless, the basis for cures is such that doctors will act in a
selfless or self-serving manner, taking lives to aid their own purpose.

This evokes the

movie writers and, of course, stirs the press.
The most significant problem of concern to myself and others, however, is the
judicial aspect.

Since many of these patients are victims· of accidents or violence,

there is an increased probability of a court proceeding either in the criminal or civil
system.

Such proceedings are extremely expensive to the taxpayers and depend heavily on

evidence and facts for proper adjudication.

More and more, patients are being removed

from the scene of the death or injury and, more and more, they are being placed on life
- - -----suppurt--equ±pmentvlhih tlre-i.ssue---u£- tissue- ~onsidered.

Without the

scene of the injury or the accident or the event, careful investigation becomes difficult.

While the patient is in the hospital, vital real and biologic evidence is being

lost.
Recently we had the experience of a young lady who had taken an overdose in another
state who was determined to be brain dead largely by physical examination and an EEG.
The medication she had ingested was a classic, a very strong respiratory and mid-brain
depressant.

She was transported across several state lines to my particular jurisdiction.
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On investigation, having heard of the case, I determined that she was not legally brain
dead.

Brain death was redetermined in our state and she was used as a donor success-

fully.
I performed an autopsy and examination.
in her body.

The drug in question was still detectable

However, afterwards, the county jurisdiction issued a death certificate.

This death certificate then raises a tremendous difficulty, because the lady had two
death certificates, two separate times and dates of death.

And as you can well imagine,

her death has left a conflict typical of what we are seeking to avoid.
What if a physician, mistakenly or through some error, transfers a homicide across
several state lines?

Or if a death initially thought to be an accident or suicide

changes in its perception, how can we protect the people involved?
Principal to this purpose is the issue of jurisdiction, reporting to the legal
authority, and some degree of investigation, supporting the manner of death prior to the
intercounty or interstate transport of those cases where the entire patient must be
moved.

And I know well that this committee is familiar with the differences.

Similarly, this should be true where patients of unnatural death are being maintained for potential harvesting.

The same policy should be enforced nationally as well

as within the state.
Secondly, there must be a uniform brain death protocol, one that will reasonably
protect patients and physicians alike from error.

I personally believe that the proto-

col proposed by Dr. Pitts, which you are familiar with and will be discussing, will
reasonably preclude the potential for medical error that a patient who in fact still has
brain stem function will be inappropriately or mistakenly pronounced brain dead.
Under the concept of the Uniform Anatomic Gift Act, brain death is in fact somatic
death.

All life forces have irreversibly left the patient, never to return in any form;

and as such, the following problems become significant to the medical examiner/coroners
responsible for the investigation of that death.
First, when is a brain-dead individual legally dead?
on the death certificate?

What date and time should go

On those cases where the coroner has jurisdiction with the

legal proviso that that jurisdiction starts at the moment of death, when does he assume
----phyb--ieal----an-d-l:egal--e-rm-t-FGU

When--does-he assume --the.... responsibility_ .fo..r the body and

the evidence that goes along with it?

Who has the legal responsibility for collecting

and maintaining in a legal chain of custody such evidence as paint fragments, fibers,
foreign material, or blood in urine for toxicology or serology?

Who has the respon-

sibility for documenting pattern injuries that may be present on the patient initially,
but will fade or disappear or be lost over the days or sometimes weeks?

Since these

patients on a respirator to facilitate harvesting for hours or even days continue to
metabolize chemicals, many times that evidence is lost.
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Since the potential for a legal

motion or a trial misdirected is enormous against what would have been proven by
appropriate investigation -- or, I should say, could have been proven -- there is little
doubt that prolonging the patient's life interferes with or affects, at least, potential
for a proper adjudication.
Many of the facilities, for example, have protocols where wounds are debrided if a
patient appears to be capable of surviving for 24 hours.

As such the issue of a wound

such as a gunshot wound may become clouded in the aspects of the distance from which
the weapon was fired; and therefore, the issue of homicide, accident, or suicide becomes
forever clouded.
To me, this type of question would require the examination of the patient on admission by a criminalist or forensic pathologist when trained in collecting and recognizing
that evidence as well as the appropriate photography, collection of blood and urine,
other specimens for proper examination.

Who will pay for these costs?

Currently, we know who pays the costs when they aren't done properly because in the
judicial system, these questions become major questions and with the advent of Hitch and
Nations and several other decisions regarding evidence, such issues are commonly major
difficulties.
With our capabilities, is a patient who is being transported over a state or county
line brain dead by definition somatically dead?

Which coroner or medical examiner is

responsible for the investigation; and therefore, which county incurs the costs and
responsibilities of the investigation and potential court presentation, and mention the
issue of what time and hour go on the certificate?

Additionally, if brain death is

somatic death, do you have to file a death certificate and get a transport permit to
move a patient across the county or state line?

If indeed brain death is somatic death,

then what becomes of the brain-dead patient on a respirator for weeks or possibly months?
Do we file a death certificate at a required time even though that patient may technically have an EKG on a ventilator?

Once a brain-dead patient is taken across the state

or county line with or without a death certificate or transport permit, what procedure
do we go through to legally get them back to their loved ones?

Is the coroner or medi-

cal examiner responsible for obtaining donation permission in harvesting tissue?
part _af._that answer iS-currently in the works, as you're wel-l--aware.

And

Does this inter-.

fere with his responsibility as a law enforcement officer and does it incur any reflection in the public's eye as to his impartiality to do such an investigation?

Should a

homicide case be included or excluded from consideration in this program?
Obviously, I suggest and believe that these are not minor or trivial questions,
but the very foundation of which any transplantation program must be based.

They go to

the root also of our American judicial system and the health of our community.
We've recently seen a coroner accused of contributing to a recipient's death by
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failing to make certain patients available for harvest.

As a result, these questions not

only in our state but nationally take on potentially more and more consideration.
If we make appropriate legislation to evaluate a patient and determine brain death
nppropriately throughout the nation, that alone would help solve many of these problems.
The uniform brain death policy is one that must be followed •.. in order to mean a meaningful transplant program.
Additionally, we need to recognize the few problems involving certain tissues, at
this time, that require intercounty or interstate transplantation or transport of the
patient in its entirety.

As you well know, many organs and tissues do not have that

unusual situation.
Since many of these patients represent civil or criminal issues, the transplant program must not advance at the expense of the judicial system.

In my opinion, to attempt

to do so would be a critical error, because in that struggle the transplant program could
only lose.
Finally, the coroner system in the State of California is extremely vulnerable as
we've recently seen.

The system is generally not well-established or supported in the

U.S. in its entirety so that problems in methods of handling them vary widely as they do
even within the 58 counties of this state.

Since the changes we are discussing could be

national, or should be national, in their scope, inappropriate and poorly made laws could
literally destroy the medical legal investigation system as it exists in the United
States.

That would be a major injury to the legal and health programs in America and, in

short, could make every suspicious death investigation as poor and as suspect as that of
President Kennedy.
There is no reason that reasonable laws cannot be enacted to benefit all.

With

appropriate safeguards, no rights would be violated and both health and law would grow.
To reach this goal, we need reasonable, well-thought-out state and national laws that fit
the needs of all involved and don't sacrifice one aspect of patients' care.
One of the additional things that we may well consider is adding appropriate courses
in medical school on death determination and the legal responsibilities of physicians.
Generally we find that neither of those subjects are included formally in medical school
pnrgrams; and i f they -are, they-!-re given enly very casual treatment-

That's my prepared statement.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:
DR. STEVENS:

Can I answer any questions?

First of all, do we have a copy of your statement?

I will see that you get one.

CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

Thank you.

Could you explain, Dr. Stevens, because the question

has been asked me several times by reporters who are interested in this hearing, whether
or not this has anything to do with pulling the plug on live patients?
DR. STEVENS:

Yes, it does.

As you well know, there is a great deal of controversy
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about who has that authority or who should take that authority or who wants that
authority.

It's an extremely tough decision many times to make.

We do not have well-

prepared programs for handling just that issue, as you pointed out in the literature
that Miss Norris prepared.
A classic example of exactly such a problem exists in the state now.
totally unheard of.

This one has caught a lot of attention.

These are not

But these are major issues

because the issue on this particular case reference is whether or not the step is a
factor if a patient dies of homicide.

The longer the patient lives on a respirator, the

more difficult those questions become to answer.

Actually pulling the respirator plug

or turning off the ventilator or life support equipment is tough.
precedence.

Legally the law sets forth those criteria.

Legally there is a

However, a court order has been

issued not to turn off the respirator.
So yes, it does go to exactly that definition of when and how and who should do it.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

But then, in fact, you're raising a second question.

One, we

have a person who is still legally alive and there has to be a decision made whether or
not to pull the body function systems.
DR. STEVENS:

Yes.

Is that correct?

On the brain death, the criteria should be absolute.

death individual cannot survive without mechanical support.
criteria.

The brain-

That should be an absolute

But a patient who is injured severely and who is unquestionably not going to

survive but who is not brain dead, that's another and totally separate issue.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

All right, thank you.

All right, first of all, before we get into other questions, I'd like to introduce
Assemblyman Nolan Frizzelle, representing the Fountain Valley area of Southern California.
Are there questions of the witness?
SENATOR ROBERT PRESLEY:

Only a question of jurisdiction, Doctor.

I always thought

that the jurisdiction rested with where the---I guess in this case in your discussion,
involved with crime--where it initially was committed.

For example, if it occurred,

say, in Phoenix and the person was transported to the Eisenhower Medical Center in Palm
Springs, I thought the jurisdiction would remain with Phoenix.
DR. STEVENS:

Well, it is clouded, Senator.

ordinarily where the crime was committed.
body lies.

Is that clouded?

The investigative responsibility is

The responsibility for the body is

wher~

the

So under the laws that exist now, if somebody murdered an individual in

another county, transported the body to my county, I am the responsible medical
even though the investigation for that case may be handled by another agency.

examine~

It ordi-

narily means then that I would have to prepare my report and go to that other place for
the actual court presentation.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

But yes, there is a dichotomy.

But within the State of California that law would be applicable

statewide, so county to county wouldn't create the problem that state to state does.
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DR. STEVENS:

Well, no, that is the existing law in the county as you are well aware

that coroner/medical examiner is a county agency, not a state agency.
by our county boundaries.

So we're limited

Within the states, it becomes even more confusing because some

states have a state medical examiner system and some have a coroner system that varies
from what we use.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

I think you're saying that the longer a person is in a hospital

on life support systems, the less viable--! guess is the word--the organs that may be
potentially transplantable.
DR. STEVENS: No, not necessarily.

That really goes to the quality of their condi-

tion at the time they're actually pronounced brain dead.

If the patient is not labile,

in other words, very difficult to maintain, does not become infected or septic, then the
organs may be fully transplantable for quite a period of time.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

But it does cause a deterioration on some very important evidence,

l guess.
DR. STEVENS:

Well, it does.

Just as a very quick example, if a person was in an

auto accident and had a very high level of, say, alcohol, even though they are technically on a respirator and unquestionably brain dead, they're still metabolizing the alcohol at the rate of about one ounce per hour or very nearly so, as long as the liver is
oxygenated.

Therefore, the body continues to eliminate that drug as long as they're on

the respirator.

If the question asked of me, then, as a medical examiner after 24 hours

is, was this person legally drunk, I have no data on which to give an opinion.
that's true for many drugs.

And I had mentioned fibers and other evidence.

And

In most of

our trauma centers, one of the first things that's done to examine a patient is to cut
the clothing off.

With that clothing goes so much vital evidence.

Obviously, if the patient survives, that's an entirely separate matter and certainly
that's the primary responsibility.

But if the patient is not survivable in the beginning,

once that evidence is lost, it's gone forever -- the clothing are lost or thrown away or
discarded and the issues of distance of gunshots, the movement of particular autmobiles,
so much of that trace evidence is just simply lost forever.
SENATOR PRESLEY:
any-kind

~f

Is there any prohibition against a doctor, or maybe not a doctor,

an evidenee eJtpert, coming into the hospital and securing that evidence---

immediately flown in to the hospital and while the person is under a life support system?
DR. STEVENS:

No, there is no prohibition against doing that as long as it is a

crime or a crime being investigated.
by the police in the same aspect.

Some cases would not ordinarily be investigated

It really goes to protocol, what's commonly done,

legal jurisdiction, and even reporting a case.

Many times cases are simply not reported.

We recently had a man walk into the hospital with a fractured neck who indicated
that he had been robbed and during the robbery his neck had been broken.
-8-

But he was

still able to walk into the hospital.

The patient died, essentially, two days later.

There was never a police report made because it was expected by the hospital staff the
patient would survive.
So there are many factors that do cause difficulty, but technically, there's no
law that would prohibit someone from the police department or agency going there.

There

is an increased cost, of course, because some of these cases would never be adjudicated.
But that's not the basis on which law enforcement works.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

Since the Legislature is in the business of trying to clarify law

or laws, have the coroners met and are they able to with one voice make a recommendation
to the Legislature in areas where these kinds of confusion or cloudiness of the law
could be clarified?
DR. STEVENS:

Well, they do within our jurisdiction, Senator.

The California

Coroners Association represents the vast majority of county coroners, and they do have
information that they've prepared and are certainly willing to submit and have done so
in the past for the use of the Legislature.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

So those recommendations have been made and it's up to us to try

to sort those out and then, hopefully, they'll gain passage of some changes .••
DR. STEVENS:

Yes, sir.

SENATOR PRESLEY:
DR. STEVENS:

where we generally are at the moment.

Yes.

SENATOR PRESLEY:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

Nolan?

Care to ask a question?

ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN FRIZZELLE:

I might take a stab at one •••

I carried a bill last

year, 3378, that I dropped in the Judiciary Committee before the legality problems in
many circumstances confronted by physicians and attorneys.

It has to do with the ethics,

I suppose, and morality of making a final determination of when an individual is dead.
And I consulted Leslie Steven Rothenberg.

You may know of him through his efforts with

the Los Angeles County Medical and Bar Association.

They have a joint committee trying

to deal with this very critical problem.
If I may, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to read just one little segment of this letter now
because I think it bears

it kind of goes to the heart of an issue.

He says:

Finally, I am not so certain that eliminating any fear of liability is
is good for the patients. I have not been sued or prosecuted to date for the
dozens of situations in which I have recommended the withdrawal of treatment
and have stood by while treatment was withdrawn and the patient died. I certainly hope that I will never be found to have acted in violation of any civil
or criminal legal standard. But if I should in the future, that is a risk
that I must be willing to face as long as I do the type of work I do. I must
approach each patient with humility and extremely conscientious concern, carefully learning and documenting each element of the factual situation on which
I base my recommendation or consultation. I don't want people to be casually
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strolling down the hall, deciding who shall live or who shall die. I know
that is your opinion as well, but if we make this task too risk-free [that
is, by defining to tightly all the different elements that comprise death],
there are those who may succumb to laziness or indifference or worse motives.
The concern about unknown liability may keep some people "on their toes";
it may also prevent patients from having their rights respected, but the
solution to that may be to encourage them to find another physician or hospital, if possible [if there's a doubt].
I think that this gentleman has been dealing with this problem for many years.

I

know you have a board or some kind of a device, I understand you have, that makes or
accepts some kinds of recommendations regarding death, when it occurs, who should be
allowed to expire and who shan't and so forth.

If we're going to transplant organs, I

think it's very important that there be some definable way of ascertaining whether or
not this individual body or structure could sustain life if it weren't on life support
systems which you can't find out until you take the life support systems away.

Then

you get into the area of legal liability.
I'm not sure that we can solve the issue of transplants, Mr. Chairman, until we get
to the business of solving legal liability, who makes these kinds of decisions.

My bill

spoke simply to having the family or nearest relatives have a hand in making that decision.

If the patient does not activate themselves prior to being in the hospital, that

legal document that they can activate, as I understand it, currently, which directs at
what point, by the patient, at what point life support systems would be withdrawn.
I don't know that I have a specific question except to frame an issue that is sort
of a bottom-line context for deciding how organs or when organs might be lifted or
transferred from one individual to another.

It's all related.

And this gentleman,

after much consideration, seems to say, let's not make the decision, let's decide not
to decide in order to provide an ongoing risk to physicians so that they will not treat
too lightly this concept of withdrawing life support systems or recommending that they
be withdrawn.
DR. STEVENS:

Well, my comment is that generally physicians take on inherent risk

when they take their license, and almost everything they do is a decision-making process.
Under our current system, risk is certainly entailed in many of the decisions they make.
-------- I haven't really d1.scussed or talked" about ethics, because I know that's been a

subject this committee has handled before.

But the ethics of dying and of no-code

policies of how an individual hospital or medical group is going to handle the terminally ill or dying patient is another totally different subject.

Ethics are extremely

important here, and I think many times that the public is very concerned about just that
factor.

That's a subject that's commonly mentioned to me by next of kin when an issue

of turning off a respirator or the fact that a no-code policy has been written by a
physician, has occurred.

And certainly one of the important ethic considerations is
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the family itself.
ment.

The right to die policy that you described is a very important docu-

But it's human nature for all of us not to expect to die; and therefore, few

people are really that farsighted to really take the time to sit down and fill that very
simple document out or even to discuss it with their next of kin as to what they want to
happen in the event of a severe illness.
Those are important considerations and certainly just as the old issue of transplantation, discussing that with your family and loved ones, making your wishes one way
or the other known is very important, because among other things it helps take some of
the pressure off the family at that moment, a tremendous situation of grieving and the
grieving process.
So I think the person who wrote the letter to you was certainly---has firsthand
understanding of the ethics issues involved.

I hadn't really gone into them because of

what I believe the committee has done in the past.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

I would---first of all, do you have a question?

Well, thank you

very much, Doctor.
DR. STEVENS:

Thank you so much.

CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

Thank you for holding the hearing.

You're most welcome.

For the succeeding witnesses, I'd like to

ask that because the question has also been raised---or the issue has also been raised
of the removing of life support systems for living patients as opposed to brain-dead
patients, that if when they refer to life support or support systems that they clarify
that they're talking about a life support system of a live person or whether they're
talking of a support system for---we can refer to it as an organ function support where
there is brain death.
ferring to.

If you could clarify in your statements which it is you're re-

Because without that, some of these lay people here may get a little con-

fused about the issue you are addressing.
All right, our next witness is Phyllis Weber, the Program Director for the Northern
California Transplant Bank at Pacific Medical Center in San Francisco.
MS. PHYLLIS WEBER:

Good morning, concerned .••

My testimony is basically directed to the questions that you asked us in your
letter of invitation, Senator Speraw.

And I would like to comment on some things that

ll1ere discussed uith Dr. Ste•Jens after my
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

Could you briefly explain, first, exactly what it is that you do

and why you're involved?
MS. WEBER:
Bank.

Sure.

I'm the Program Director of the Northern California Transplant

Our activities involve coordinating organ donation with the transplant centers

in Northern California.

We also operate a tissue bank including an eye bank which

Senator Presley was •.• [Inaudible.]
A couple of things:

What criteria should be accepted in determining brain death?
-11-

Because of rapidly changing medical technology , we feel that it is very important not
to incorporate medical criteria into the brain death statute that is already in existence in the State of California.

While the State of California has a legal standard

for the determination of brain function or brain death, the medical criteria must remain
the prerogative and the responsibility of individuals involved.
We would recommend a uniform agreement among physician groups, however, to adopt
certain criteria, such as those described by Dr. Pitts in his recent article in the
Western Journal of Medicine.

This would eliminate confusion regarding acceptable medi-

cal standards in the determination of death.
To give you an example, there is still a lot of confusion in hospitals as to what
actually is the legal standard of death.

Many hospitals have written their policies

and procedures years before the California brain death statute went into effect in 1974.
They require, for instance, on some occasions, two isoelectric EEGs 24 hours apart.
Some hospitals even require three.

Since this is not the legal standard in the state,

there still is some confusion though as to how hospitals should approach this.

And be-

cause the medical criteria are under the responsibility of the physician that it assumes
that the physician will adhere to the standards in the community and that often is what
the hospital's policy has already been dictated to be.
This has also been a problem on occasions with some of our county coroners who when
we contact them about getting consent for organ donation, they will say well, do you have
the results of the three EEGs.

And again, since that's not legally required, we would

like any attempt that you could make to eliminate the confusion in that area.
This conservative approach to declaring a patient brain dead can also result in a
circulatory demise of the patient which would mean that even if the family was very committed to organ donation, the process or the delay in declaring brain death may mean
that the patient will no longer be suitable for organ donation.

This has been a very

devastating impact to some family members who have really wanted to make some sense out
of a terrible tragedy.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

A question on that point:

Aren't these patients on life support

systems at that time and doesn't that preserve the organs and tissue?
MS. WEBER:

Perhaps we should really clarify what we're looking for in the brain-

dead individual who is to be an organ donor.

These patients have to be without any---

they cannot make any attempt to breathe without the aid of a ventilator support.
patients are in a deep coma.

The

They're unresponsive to any type of painful stimuli.

That's really the basic medical assessment that the physician will make of the patient.
Now there are other promontory tests that can be done to support this assessment
of the physician.

If you will read Dr. Pitts' criterion, I'm sure that Dr. Wagner will

address this later on, these other supporting laboratory tests are not always necessary.
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CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

But my question---it's still not clear to me.

If the person has

lost the ability to perform his own body functions, and there still hasn't been a determination of brain death, doesn't the person go on life support systems at that time
until brain death is determined?
MS. WEBER:

I think it would depend on the situation of the individual patient --

what diagnosis the patient has, what disease the patient has.

If we're talking about a

patient who's involved in a car accident comes to the emergency room and it looks like
that patient is not going to be able to maintain his vital functions, then yes, that
patient resuscitated, is put on life support systems until some time can elapse where
the determination of brain death can properly be made.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

But you're saying that there are some cases where the determina-

tion will be made that the person is dead and therefore ••• on life support systems
even before a brain death is determined?
MS. WEBER:

No, brain death can't really be determined unless the patient is main-

tained on life support.

I think, you know, if the patient is not on life support sys-

tems, then the patient dies a circulatory death or a somatic death as Dr. Stevens often
refers to it.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

My question was based on the statement you made that sometimes

procuring the organs is defeated by the waiting for the determination for the brain
death.

And I just thought they would be on support systems during that period of time.

MS. WEBER:

Yes, the patients would be.

However, as a result of the injury that

the patient has sustained, the patient may become very unstable.

And many studies that

have been done, retrospective studies evaluating patients that have been declared brain
dead, very few patients will survive more than about 48 hours once it's very apparent
that the patient meets the clinical criteria for brain death, even if they are maximally
supported on ventilator support.
Another question that you had was, Should "brain" death be accepted as legal
"death"?

The Uniform Brain Death Act establishes that irreversible cessation of brain

function as death.

This policy has become a legal standard in the State of California;

therefore, we believe that there should be no question as to brain death being accepted
as legal - death.

We operate under

the~~the

legal time of death is the

t~e--- -

when the second physician documents brain death in the patient's chart.
Just to give you, again, an example of some of the common problems that we run
into when our teams are often out in the hospitals doing an organ recovery, the nursing
supervisor will call the operating room nurses and say, "Well, make sure to call me when
the patient has died."

Well, the patient already is dead.

the transplant programs really have no business being there.

If the patient were not dead,

What the nursing super-

visor really means to say is "Please contact me when the surgical procedure is over."

-13-

However, her leading statement is misleading and at times the O.R. nurses will then
write on an O.R. sheet a different time of death; i.e., when the organs were removed
or when circulation ceased.

And that has become very confusing to many people.

Does the local coroner have jurisdiction when a body is transported from another
county or state for organ donation?

If the determination of brain death is, in fact,

legal death, then jurisdiction should remain with the county coroner where brain death
occurs.

Arrangements for post-mortem examination must be made in advance with the

originating county coroner's office by the transplant program.

Provisions for the

transfer of an unembalmed donor body across county or _state lines by common carrier
should be made by amending rules and regulations relating to funeral directors and
embalmers.
Again, this is a problem that Dr. Stevens initially addressed.

What do you do

when a patient has been declared brain dead at the legal standard of one state is
transported to another state for organ recovery?

You know, there are rules and regula-

tions against transporting unembalmed bodies via common carrier.
don't use common carriers to transport these donors.
the transportation.

Now, we certainly

We have a medical team that does

However, once the organ recovery has taken place in a state where

the donation has taken place and the body is transferred back to the originating state,
the body at that point, of course, is still unembalmed, so it doesn't interfere with
the other coroner's duties.

Often those bodies are shipped via common carrier; and you

know, it's something that we've not really looked into very closely and we've just gone
ahead and done it.

But it is against the rules and regulations of the funeral directors/

embalmers.
Does brain death need to be reaffirmed in California, when the determination has
been certified in another state?
this.

And again, I think that Dr. Stevens really addressed

There are different criteria in different states.

the model statute that California has.

Not every state has adopted

And to determine a time of death in one state

and then to determine it again in a second state makes the issue even more complex than
it already is, and Dr. Stevens gave you a good example of the difficulties that he has
run into in one occasion already.
'1'lTI: issue of discontinuing life support when a patient has beeome brain dead,

where the families are not going to donate the organs for transplantation, is an area
out of my realm since I'm really involved simply in transplantation.

I think that this

is really a very, very difficult moral and ethical dilemma.
Not too long ago -- again to give you an example of how difficult this becomes to
the family -- I was asked to speak to a family about the possibility of donation.

Their

young son who was 17 years old had been playing basketball; he had fallen and cracked
his skull on a cement playground and was taken to a hospital where he underwent many
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hours of surgery; and he simply did not recover from that.

Two days after the accident

he was pronounced brain dead by the physicians in the morning.

And the family was in-

formed of how serious this event was and that their son would not be with them for much
longer.

The physicians considered the fact that the patient might be an ideal organ

donor and they did ask me to come and talk to the family since they had not had much
experience in doing that in the past.
was waiting in the waiting room.

I went to the hospital where the extended family

And I went in and sat down with them and asked them

exactly what they understood about the gravity of the situation.

The family told me

that they understood that their son was really very ill; however, he had never ever been
sick for a day in his life and that he had a very, very strong heart.

And they felt

very strongly that if they just waited long enough he would get better.
Now clearly in those situations, that family will never give consent for organ
donation.

But how, you know, if the family feels like that, can the physicians sensi-

tively remove the patient from life support even though the patient has been declared
brain dead.

It's a very, very difficult situation.

in your handout.

Another example has been included

Again, I can't really answer those questions.

The other thing that I would, finally, recommend is that the coroners, at least in
the State of California, provide the transplant programs with guidelines.
individual counties have done that.
county coroners have done that.
the transplant programs.
others.

I know that

Dr. Stevens has done that in his office.

Other

But a lot of the counties want different things from

Some want more information, more detailed information than

And, you know, it gets very difficult when you're dealing with so many counties

about OK, well, this person is---you know, this donation is occurring in this county,
now let's make sure that this coroner has everything that he needs, which might be different than the adjacent county.
Senator Speraw, I really want to thank you once again for holding these hearings
and dealing with some very, very sensitive issues.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

Well, I want to thank you for your interest and participation on

a statewide basis also.

Are there questions of the witness?

ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:
of the body do not

May I ask a question?

Is it true that some of the organs

the donation of them or the use of them have the successful use

~

them does not necessarily depend on the brain death or absence of brain death, but
rather, maybe, the circulatory death is more significant than brain death?
MS. WEBER:

Yes, you're absolutely correct.

When we're talking about patients

being organ donors and needing to meet the criteria of brain death, we're talking about
really solid organ transplants
and kidney.

the heart, heart-lung combinations, liver, pancreas,

There are many tissues; again, as Senator Presley is very familiar with.

The cornea can be used in transplantation.

The cornea can be removed within six hours
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after the patient's circulation ceases.

And there are other tissues, like bone, skin,

midd l e ear tissue, cartilage, many, many tissues.

And those donors are certainly many,

many more that we see than we see organ donors.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:

Do you have in addition the ability to remove organs that

have been donated by a given patient prior to any criteria of death, like brain death
or circulatory death, if I wanted to donate something, I could donate it in a live condition, right now?
MS. WEBER:

The only time when transplants are removed or donations are taken from

living persons is in the situation of kidney transplants where you can easily give up
one of your kidneys and continue to live a normal existence and where the chance of the
outcome of the recipient is very, very good.

And right now, that's really restricted

to family situations.
There is also a question now of being able to donate bone marrow to unrelated
donors.

That's not being done now in the State of California although bone marrow

transplant programs are considering that.
But they're really the only tissues or organs that we're limited to in living situations.

You could always donate your blood.

That's included as tissue through trans-

plantation.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

Senator Presley?

Thank you very much.

I'm going to make a quick change in the sequence here.

I am most pleased to be

able to announce that Dr. Lawrence Pitts, Chief of Neurosurgery at San Francisco General
Hospital, has arrived, has made it.
this effort.

And we appreciate very much the fact that he made

I know he had some problems this morning.

And I'd also like to add that in our request---our letter that we sent out to possible witnesses, we asked them to name anyone else they thought should testify as well.
And in most cases, Dr. Pitts's name was included in the response; and he seems to be an
authority on brain death.
DR. LAWRENCE H. PITTS:

So we're most happy to have him here with us today.
I'm not sure I'm entirely happy to be an expert on brain

death, but that is the situation I'm afraid.
A particular point that I would like---several points I'd like to make at the out'!fe---r-a-nd therr r.Ld be -happy- t-o- re-s-pend -te a-ny EfUe&t4,rms- thB-t---¥-OU -may have.

CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

I might add that we have your summary here and your paper on

brain death too.
DR. PITTS:
fai~ly

Thank you.

The points that I would make, and I believe these are

universally accepted among physicians, and that is the fact that it is possible

to determine brain death and that insofar as there are any reasonably documented cases,
there are no survivors of individuals who have had proper application of brain death
criteria.
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I think these facts have allowed the legislation in a number of states including
California under the general rubric of the Uniform Determination of Death Act to be
enacted.

And I think that the UDDA is an excellent piece of legislation.

A couple points about the brain death law in California, at least in my judgment,
reside in the fact that it's a very general statement of the concept of brain death
without undue reliance on legislative determination of what goes into the determination
of brain death; that is, it merely states that two physicians need to certify brain
death by acceptable medical standards and that is the limit of the legislative language.
Now in my judgment that's the proper way for such legislation to be written because
technology is changing fairly rapidly.

What was necessary for the proof of brain death

at some point in the past is no longer necessary.

The advent of new technologies in-

cluding widespread availability of CT scanning, for instance, to measure the degree of
brain injury.

All of these things have changed our ability to diagnose brain death.

You referred to an article that I wrote and was published recently in the Western
Journal of Medicine, and I was a little surprised to see a query come from one of the
California Medical Association committees dealing with brain death and transplantation
talking about the Pitts' criteria.

That's a little shocking; it was clearly not written

to be any set of criteria, but rather an interpretation of the elements necessary to
diagnose brain death.

They were not set up to be ironclad criteria or be the basis for

any protocol determination of brain death, because from patient to patient, there are
minor differences and so what necessarily must be used in one patient may not necessarily be required in another patient.
important.

So I think the general language as stated is very

I think that trying to tighten it up more than that would be detrimental to

technologic change in medicine.

But the application of that portion of the law that is

applying brain death to an individual, I guess, is still not universally or readily
accepted or easily done.
I was just shown a copy of an article in the Sacramento Bee from, I guess, yesterday or the day before where a problem still remains with the application of an interpretation of brain death and the actual carrying through what the law allows us to do.
So, with those very general comments, I'd be happy to explore any further questions that

~may

have.

CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

Doctor, you mentioned that you felt rather than the state

attempting to set up by statute standards for determining brain death, or criteria,
that it should be left to acceptable medical standards.
determine those?

Who in your opinion would

Should they be uniform within our 58 counties?

form within the 50 states?

Should they be uni-

That's a relatively simple question I understand.

[Chuckles.]
DR. PITTS:

Right.

I think that since patients vary and clinical situations vary
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from case to case that it would not be trivial to write a set of protocol guidelines
that could then be applied across the board throughout this state or among states,
for instance.
For instance, if one---at one point in time, electroencephalography was, if not
required, was strongly recommended.

And at one point with respect to the Harvard cri-

teria where EEGs were not formally required but alluded to and then shortly after the
Harvard criteria someone came up with the idea that you had to have two flat EEGs 24
hours apart.

Well, that's a suggestion for the application of technology to confirm

brain death and the irreversible nature of brain death, which is the other feature of
the law.
The problem with that is there are a number of patients who are so clearly
irreversibly injured from the moment of impact -- steamroller over the skull, for
instance -- that a flat EEG 24 hours apart really bears no relationship to the real
world.

And so to set up technologic standards or time periods of standards would be

impractical in some instances, would be detrimental in some instances.

If a patient

were having a rapid deterioration of their organ systems and one were waiting for the
second EEG tomorrow, and in the process despite the fact the patient may have wanted to
give organs for transplantation, the family may want to do that, and yet if you're constrained by some set of rules, then you may lose those organs which everyone agrees--everyone in that clinical situation would have agreed would have been apppropriate.
So, I think that an article such as mine or other general guidelines that might be
proposed by some of the nervous system associations -- either one of the neurosurgery
associations or one of the neurology associations -- would provide enough specific
material for physicians to apply the concept of brain death in individual cases.

And

I think the matter of an individual physician judgment should still be left in the
equation.

I think that there are times when for family reasons you may know that a

patient is brain dead, but for a variety of reasons choose not 'quite yet to say that
because some family member is on their way to town or something and you don't want to
quite quit at that point.

There are a lot of judgment matters that would be very dif-

ficult, I think, to write into any specific set of guidelines in the interest of
uni£efffiity.

ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:

Before you go past that point, I want to point out one

particular dilemma that we consistently run across.

In the absence of some kind of

definition, even if we define in flexibility or define in physician participation and
so forth, ultimately the court makes a decision.

And they seem to exercise jurisdiction

as a matter of public policy rather than the Legislature that probably ought to be doing
it.

The public is more and more conscious of these kinds of problems, both the desire

to donate organs, the concern about death and who determines it and who ought to have
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the right to make judgments regarding it.

And in the absence of legislative determina-

tion to some specific end, if we leave that void into which, for one reason or another
or one set of criteria or another, this court may decide one thing, another court may
decide another, other types of decisions may be made that really establish by precedent
public policy that may not be valid across the board at all, may not allow for participation by physicians in general.
circumstances.

It may indeed make physicians involved liable in some

Maybe it's the absence or the void that needs to be addressed.

know how to construct that type of thing .

I don't

I think the committee is seeking, as much as

anything else this type of addressing of the issue, some kinds of guidelines.

And you

struck a very common thesis, I believe, an important thesis, that physicians ought to
be involved in the equation.

But to what degree should public policy be actually an

identifiable factor and could we even construct it?

If we're going to take an organ out

of a body, we can't allow the tissue structure to be dead.

We can't allow the courts

to go through their decision-making process to the point of the death of a tissue structure that you may need to use.

You may lose the very motive for transplant or the very

capacity to transplant if you allow that kind of complication in procedure.

So could

you address that a little bit?
DR. PITTS:

It's a very thorny problem, as you have very clearly stated,

But I'm

fearful that even fairly specific language may not necessarily prevent a court from
ruling otherwise.

For instance, this article that I just reviewed or just read before I

came up to the stand indicated that at least several physicians in the instance of this
child who, I guess, is still on a ventilator or was when the article was written several
days ago, the child had been pronounced brain dead by several physicians and it's clear
in current California law that that is an allowable situation in which to call the
patient dead and stop support.

And yet the court, as I understand the article very

briefly, decided to at least have to allow or require the hospital to continue to support
the child with a ventilator for the present time.

Now that's a situation where the law

is reasonably clear and has been complied with and yet the court still chose to take a
different course than it was my belief that the law intended.
So even if you write down a careful set of rules, the best rules that someone can
construct, and I 1 m worried about bow wel 1 they can he constructed, but even if you do____ -·--

that, I don't feel certain that that would forestall the legal process from stretching
out from changing what the initial intent of legislation was.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:
DR. PITTS:

••• by the court.

Sir?

ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

That's a general problem we have with the court.

Doctor, you do have some suggestions though, I believe, that

certain things be in place to determine brain death.
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Could you state what those

minimums---what you think those minimums ought to be?

Like, for instance, should there

be at least a second determination by a second physician?
DR. PITTS:
able.

The law currently calls for that, and I think that that's very reason-

This is an emotional-laden situation in many instances, particularly in my area

of specialty which is head injury.

It's an unexpected event.

has gune from very healthy to basically dead or indeed dead.

All of a sudden someone
And so that time course

is such that it's hard for families to deal with the information and so forth.

And I

think that under those circumstances one wants to be very certain of the ground on which
you're standing in calling brain death.
would be entirely appropriate.

So I think the opinion of the second physician

I think that the individuals who are joining in the de-

cision or in the diagnosis of brain death should feel comfortable in their ability to
diagnose brain death.
And the purpose of the article that I wrote was to enumerate a number of things
which must indeed be present before diagnosis of brain death could be entertained.

I've

tried to be as---since wishy-washy within the article or to allow as many interpretations
of the data as are appropriate clinically.

And the example of the steamroller over an

individual's head is clear without a lot of technology that that's a pretty dead individual.

So that needs to be tolerated or allowed within the criteria as well as the

much more complex patient in whom a diagnosis is not certain, a CT scan doesn't necessarily show overwhelming brain injury.

And in those individuals a much greater deal of

caution needs to be applied and more data needs to be gathered.

That's the spectrum in

which we're trying to operate.
However, I did state a number of elements which must be present in order to be certain that brain death is present.
absence of all brain function.

They are enumerated in the article:

the absolute

That is clearly definable and testable and must be done.

Making sure insofar as possible and as far as the clinical situation will allow that
there are no toxic---intoxicated states-- barbiturate overdose, alcohol intoxication-that would complicate the exam.

Those need to be considered.

brain injury, and the fact that it is overwhelming.
~1en

And a known cause for

Those are the essential elements.

circumstances are uncertain, then one needs to allow a bit more time to pass

----ro matce-· s m f the diagnosis and the accuracy of the diagnosis.

I don't know if

I

can

enumerate any more closely than that.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

Dr. Stevens, who testified prior to you, mentioned the possible

need for something on brain death as part of the curricula for medical students, for
doctors.

And what brought that to mind was your statement that many doctors are not

familiar with determining brain death.

In your opinion, should it be

part of the

general education of the doctor to have some knowledge of brain death or how to determine
brain death?
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DR. PITTS:

I think it certainly should be part of the medical curriculum to go

over the key features of brain death.

I think the interest in the process and the need

for making the diagnosis is clear today, but was not perhaps so clear ten or fifteen
years ago.

So now would be an appropriate time to consider making it a formal presenta-

tion in some fashion to medical students because they indeed may be called on to make
such determinations in the future and do need to feel comfortable with how the diagnosis
is made accurate.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

I'd like to introduce Senator John Doolittle who has joined us.

Are there further questions of the witness?
SENATOR PRESLEY:

Senator Presley.

Doctor, on the last point, I guess that could be included--

medical training-- without any legislation though, right?
DR. PITTS:

I think so.

I'm not sure.

I'm not aware that there are other legisla-

tive features ..•
SENATOR PRESLEY:

••. down there, there's a bill introduced that says in medical

school you have to teach this and that you have a heretofore policy.
to force people to teach something maybe they don't want to.

I guess that's

But nothing is said that

they can't go ahead with it.
I was trying to listen very closely to your testimony and that of Mr. Frizzelle.
I think what I hear you saying is that you think the law, as you've set forth in your
article, the existing law, is adequate and that if you try to build on that, you may
build more complications than you're asking or we'd like to have.

With the 58 counties

and different interpretations, I guess with the courts available if somebody has a dispute to resolve that, you think that's probably the best we can do-- I think, is what
you're saying.
DR. PITTS:

Insofar as physicians need to be educated as to how to make a diagnosis
~he

of brain death and what

applicable law is, it would suit me very well if the courts

could come to some agreement that they understood these same interpretations and would
take a common approach from the legal side.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

I think Mr. Frizzelle's point is one that certainly is valid and

that is that courts aren't supposed to be making public policy.
_ __.·.n-t.e*-P*8ti.ng.

They're supposed to be

And I think his pOO;nt is that we ot1ght to somehow build on this law with

some rules and regulations that will be applicable statewide, but I don't hear any answer
to those few concerns.

And I guess maybe that your opinion is let's leave it like it is,

and I think Mr. Frizzelle's opinion isn't all that strong.
more than anything else.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

He just raised the question

So we have a great big unresolved

Perhaps what we need is that something be included in the educa-

tion of the attorneys who eventually become judges.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:

That would help clarify the situation.

It needs to be pointed out also the fact that we have a
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situation that bleeds the treasury or the money facilities of individuals, families,
insurance companies, the state, and all kinds of people who put up the money to keep
people alive which, technologically, in the future, potentially, would happen to everybody that you could keep the tissue structure somehow alive with technology at however
much cost with cost not even considered.

We may get to the point where we have to keep

them alive at any cost and people not be allowed to die in a normal way.

And it's to,

maybe, at some point or other, be stated who gets the right to make that decision when
an individual be allowed to die in the face of all this technology and the dollars
involved.
DR. PITTS:

There is a very major issue that to my knowledge no one has approached

and that's the care of the clearly terminal patient but not, for instance, a brain-dead
patient--a patient who has irreversible brain damage and will not resume consciousness
but who is not brain dead.

That's a very sticky problem and a lot of legal, economic,

ethical considerations are yet to be unraveled.

But in the brain-dead patient, it really

is a fairly straight-forward matter in terms of there are no survivors.

No matter how

much money you choose to spend in the person who is brain dead, there are no survivors.
And given that fact, that's a fairly straight-forward question that I'm intrigued continues to generate so much discussion.

That's a resolvable issue.

And I think the law

has resolved it and yet, periodically, it gets overridden by well-meaning legal systems.
There certainly is an element that needs to be passed on to the courts; and that
is, when physicians seek---when a clinical situation seeks legal input, it needs to be
extremely speedy.

And I don't know how quickly court systems can move.

But the point

that you make while the legal wheels are turning, certain transplantable organs are
deteriorating.
organs.

And here again, I'm not trying to market the concept of harvesting more

I'm just saying, to allow the possibility when the patient wanted his organs

to be transplanted should he die and his family wants it, everybody wants it, and yet
the system can't quite deal with, that's very detrimental, I think, to the system.

And

so, there needs to be a speedier response from the courts in order for their decisions
to have much meaning.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

You used the statement that no brain death patient survived.

"Would you expl:rinhow that takes--p-la-ce-?-

How wou-1-d--yeu j-us-t---pu-:1-±-----the -plug

and-~i'*f-

they don't start reviving themselves, the proof that they were brain dead •••
DR. PITTS:

The technique that I have found useful is that one goes through the

motions of confirming brain death by what is outlined in the article, leaving in a sense
the breathing test as the last test.

That is sort of one of the most robust brain

functions that lasts longer than almost any other and may be present when no other
brain function is present, for instance.

Leave that test for last.

One knows by the

time you get around to having made all the other determinations except this breathing
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test that the patient is a transplant candidate or is not a transplant candidate.
If the patient is a transplant candidate, then a breathing test that is outlined
in the article, and it's a fairly straight-forward, well-accepted test, is conducted.
If the patient fails to breathe, that is, has now shown in the last test to have no
brain function, then the patient is put back on a ventilator and the process is started
promptly for harvesting transplant organs, usually within a matter of hours, because
everything has been lined up at that point.
If the patient is not a transplant candidate for a variety of reasons, then one
simply does not reinstitute the ventilator and the patient then without a ventilator
goes on to a lack of oxygen and the heart stops within a matter of half an hour or an
hour.

So that is---so when you pull the plug, you are doing so in the setting of the

last test.

Then if the patient fails that test, then the patient is indeed brain dead

and there is no purpose in continuing artificial support in that setting.

In the trans-

plant setting, they have to go back on the ventilator to preserve the organs for the
short time necessary to harvest the organs.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

So when you do in fact terminate the life support---the body

support systems, you do continue to check them and in fact that your diagnosis that
there is brain death that it is confirmed?
DR. PITTS:

Absolutely.

I mean that is---discontinuing the ventilator is an

absolutely critical feature of the brain stem death of the dead brain examination.

And

so one terminates the life support systems under a very specific circumstance where
you're watching carefully to see if the patient has any brain function.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

Are there any other questions of the witness?

you so much for the trouble you took this morning.
We'll return to the agenda.

Doctor, thank

We appreciate it.

Our next witness is E. L.---Mr. Twilley, would you

like to wait until the rest have testified before you make your comments?
MR. E. L. TWILLEY:
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:
yet?

Yes, •••
Very good.

He was to arrive at 11:00.

Then we'll move to Dr. Julius Yeomans.
Good.

Is he here

Professor of Neurosurgery at UC Davis Medical

Center, our host.
DR.____.lllLLUS _yEOMANS:

.Tha.n.k__:}WIL-

Senators, 1 adies and_gentlemen.. ...ID.}1: t_estimony wilL __ _

be very brief because I was going to say, almost word for word, what Dr. Pitts was saying.

I guess it's because I'm a neurosurgeon also, we see the same type of problems

on a daily basis.
I think the law as written is a masterpiece of brevity and clarity in the sense
that it has to be where it can be broadly used.

It has to be a physician's judgment.

And although we use the same basic criteria of brain stem function being gone and some
various chemical and ancillary laboratory tests, there are differences and it's a medical
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judgment as to when brain death has occurred, just as you would make the medical judgment using various things if you were going to decide to do an appendectomy.

It has to

be left without the encumbrance of a tightly structured technologically defined area
because, as was mentioned by the previous gentlemen, today we declare brain death differently than ten years ago.

For instance, coming on the horizon now is a nuclear mag-

netic resonance scanner, which probably will tell

us even more.

So I think it's---in

essence, I'll just stop to say the law as written I think is appropriate.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:
DR. YEOMANS:

You mentioned a magnetic---! didn't catch all of it.

Nuclear magnetic resonance -- NMR -- scanner.

It's a new type of

scanner that, as opposed to the CT scan, which can show tumors or serious injury to the
brain, it shows function of the brain; and we're basically judging functions.
may be just on the horizon of having even a better technology.
one point:

So we

But this does bring up

it's expensive; it will be only in the larger medical centers.

And it's

necessary that brain deaths be---people to be declared in the smaller medical centers
even if there's not going to be a transplant because, as one of the Senators mentioned,
you can keep many patients going day after day and at $500 to $1,000 a day, it's rapidly
draining the family when there will never be any good out of it whatsoever.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

Question?

Thank you very much, Doctor, for your testimony.

Our next witness, Dr. Davis Drinkwater, Assistant Professor of Cardiothoracic
Surgery.

That's a new one now.

I haven't stumbled over that before.

University of

California, Los Angeles.
DR. DAVIS DRINKWATER:

Good morning.

I thank you for letting me speak.

I just have

a few thoughts as a physician and as a participant in the transplant program and some

technical aspects I think which pertain to both which may be---should be uncovered a bit.
The question of brain death and what is defined has taken new meaning in the recent
years with organ transplantation which is now a medically accepted practice.

At issue

is protecting the rights and dignity of the living as well as of the dead and to see or
to be thought of as premature about the establishment of this diagnosis of death both
in a legal and a medical term is an anathema to a transplant surgeon or to a transplant
program.
Most of the victims that are potential donors are young, in prior good health, and
participants in the senseless accidents of the type that we're all familiar with, with
massive injuries involving a motor vehicle, gunshot wound,

alcohol, drug, and suicide.

The families are in some sense vulnerable to the aspect of the organ donation as a gift
of life, which indeed it may be.

And most families, therefore, are willing and support-

ive of a transplant program when educated properly.
However, if organs are perceived to be harvested, as it were, without a full
diagnostic and therapeutic action being taken, and without full and informed consent,
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a well-deserved sentiment against the organ procurement will severely and justifiably
curtail transplantation programs.

A judicious and efficacious arrival of the diagnosis

of brain death prior to a program's involvement is essential.
Now as a brief background, I'll summarize what is involved in a transplantation.
Since the introduction of cyclosporin A, I know that a transplantation era has begun.
Briefly, it involves the kidney, the bone marrow and, more recently, the heart, heartlung, and liver transplantation.

Now the last two are very important in distinction to

the earlier ones as one can easily see.
The constraints on a heart and liver transplantation are obvious; and they are two,
primarily:

one is---the first is financial, and the second is suitable donors.

The

question of cost effectiveness for social and personal good is a large one and one which
we'll have to deal with with some more time and more results as we indeed have decreasing resources to deal with.
The issue of suitable donors is an important constraint as well. , And strict criteria and guidelines are needed to achieve the best results for the recipient in the
sense to make the gift of an organ or organs as meaningful and justified as possible.
We have strict criteria in the cardiac field for transplantation donors.
criteria have been alluded to:
etc. , etc.

Some of the

less than 35, no infection, no major chest problems,

And these have to be very strictly adhered to.

Now, a significant delay in the diagnosis and transplantation program involvement
is crucial in some cases to the outcome.

This equality of brain death, secondary to

closed head injury, intercranial hemorrhage, gunshot wounds, respiratory rest, has a
number of very important results.

The first and most important is less vasomotor tone,

resulting in hypertension of the individual.

A second one is diabetes insipidus, re-

sulting in hypovolemia.

A third one is the homeostatic temperature regulator, which

results in hypothermia.

And neurogenic pulmonary edema may as well be present.

And

the ultimate, of course, is renal failure where acid-base regulation is deficient.
Now, an expeditious resolution of the question of death medicolegally then is certainly warranted.

Whether or not a body may be released too presently has consequences

to the transplantation program.
Now, in order to mobilize, in ottr experienee, reeipient and a donor

in~ol~es

the

regional organ program, which then involves the doctors at the location of transplantation, special O.R. nursing, special pump teams, and transportation.

It's a great deal

of financial and logistic headaches, but it's one which is very worthy.
Now it takes two forms.

The body itself may be supported with inotropes, keeping

the organs and body in homeostatic balance; and this is probably presently preferable
to the individual organ procurement from the standpoint of the coordination of these
various teams.

Now, if not allowed as in some instances of crossing state lines or
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county coroner situations or any question of legal problem, the individual organ procurement time is an even greater issue.
Now with respect to the heart, approximately three hours to six hours from removal
to implantation, kept in a cold environment, is the continentally accepted time period.
Research is going on; and in some cases, certainly, this can be extended.
Liver transplantation has even larger constraints on time because of the mobilization of a large amount of blood.
Now I've presented two sides of the issue that are joined by the primary physician
to make diagnosis of brain stem---brain death is at issue.

A diagnosis which must be

based on straight-forward guidelines and principals and government by "commonly accepted
medical knowledge and practice."
Now, the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee of 1983 update of the earlier results, particularly relating to children, and as a participant at that time, I want to point out some
of the important highlights of that which are workable.

And that is, that the primary

diagnosis of brain death is a clinical diagnosis and is based on clinical examination.
Now, all medical schools currently have neurology and neurosurgery rotations; and
I think the diagnoses of brain death can easily be covered in their rotations and indeed
are.
Now, the question of whether a death---the diagnosis of a death the individual suffered either, first, "irreversible cessation of circulatory respiratory function," and
two, "irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain regardless of the
cardiopulmonary status."
diagnosis of brain death.

And I think at issue here is the second one which is the
Clinical examination is the absence of

responsiveness

to external stimuli, heartbeat, respiratory effort, in the absence of two very important
factors:

Hypothermia, which can result; and circulatory assist devices.

Confirmatory

tests only should be the EEG and other tests such as an NMR and other more advanced
laboratory techniques which, I think, should be used as supporting if there is a question---any doubt in anyone's mind, particularly the two physicians making the diagnosis.
If there is

2

coma involved, the physician has to be absolutely or sufficiently

certain that he can or she can account for the loss of brain function on the basis of
----the-injuiy and not on other causes--external such as drugs or alcohol.
The strict adherence to a policy of establishing brain death prior to the involvement of

the transplantation program is vital to the protecting of the individual

rights and to preserve life when at all possible.

This adherence is integral and essen-

tial for the success of transplantation programs by maintaining the high standards of
human compassion and care at all levels that the public deserves and expects of the
physicians.
This is some prepared remarks that I had, Senator.
questions
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I'd be glad to answer any

CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

Are there questions of the witness?

ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:

Through mechanical devices of one kind or another or chem-

ical devices, you can keep the circulation going long enough to extend the time period,
I imagine, for the surgery necessary to remove organs, transplant them in good repair
from the donor to a recipient.

Is a lot of the complication you mentioned chemical?

I mean, you mentioned a number of different things that happen such that it occurred
to me that there's no way you can measure what the response would be in a normal or a
more vital individual.

If an organ was transplanted from a donor to the other indi-

vidual---in the other individual, you don't really know what kind of chemical reaction
is going to occur under the nonartificial circumstances that you've created keeping
this person alive.

I begin to wonder whether or not there's a point at which we cannot

really consider a donor however willing to be really a legitimate effective donor of an
organ.

Is there a way we can derive criteria that would establish not just is a tissue

alive, but is the tissue credible tissue?
DR. DRINKWATER:

Experience probably is the greatest test of that, the time that

we're gaining with a number of cases that we do is increasing daily, but using strict
selection criteria as always.

The degeneration of the organs within the body, using

the body as a support system, as it were, to create a whole new static environment is
not without its problems.

It cannot be done as some people alluded to, to 48 hours.

In our cases, we've seen the effects at an earlier time period.

And the heart, using

so much oxygen, is very vulnerable to any type of oxygenation defect which can result -acid-base problems; the use of inotropes--these are drugs that support the cardiovascular system.

Once we get over a certain level, which most physicians would con-

sider a medium dose, we found the heart doesn't function as well, that it has a very
grave input as to the result of that recipient's results of the heart.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:
DR. DRINKWATER:

Exactly.

ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:
DR. DRINKWATER:

involves---

Is an emotional---

ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:
------4n~o~t~~s

And the fantastic cost of the whole procedure

If you have actually taken an organ from a donor that is

credible as it ought to be, you are not

g~·ing

the apprepriate chance to the

recipient.
DR. DRINKWATER:

True.

Then on the same regard, you are not giving the, as I had

mentioned, I think the donor the benefit of giving the best in a sense as it were.

When

we obtain organs, we approach the families and they are very willing, because it is a
gift that oftentimes makes their suffering a bit more palatable as it were.

It's a

difficult situation all told.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:

I think, !rr. Chairman, that where we're possibly heading
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with this kind of a question is, is there a point at which, whether the brain is dead
or not, there ought to be as a public policy a capacity for a donor to donate anyway?
I'm not sure that we can take that quantum leap.

Physicians don't want to potentially

create the vulnerability or liability to themselves unless they have some definable
criteria for when they can take the organs.

And yet, on the other hand, I'm wondering

if maybe under some circumstances with some kinds of organs, we ought not to establish
a freedom to take from the donor the organ at an earlier point in time than when brain
death has been established.
DR. DRINKWATER:

Especially if it's a voluntary donor.

I would think, Senator, that a very concise and flexible law re-

lating to the criteria of brain death would facilitate its diagnosis at an earlier time
without having to wait for the 48 hours or the 24-hour EEG, second one, which we don't
feel is necessary in most cases.

And if we could avoid that delay, I think we'd

probably still be within a very acceptable period of time for organ procurement with
good results, without having to bypass the family involvement, the issue of law, etc.,
which I think is a big one.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

Are there other questions?

Doctor, thank you so much for your

testimony.
DR. DRINKWATER:

You're welcome.

CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

Our last scheduled witness, and I might add if there is anyone

in the room who wishes to testify, you may have the opportunity to do so after
Mr. Twilley.

Mr. Twilley, Manager of Licensing and Identification Policies and Proce-

dures with the Department of Motor Vehicles, Division of Driver Safety and Licensing.
MR. E. L. TWILLEY:

Thank you, Senator Speraw.

As you know, since the Legislature

directed us to begin providing the donor cards with drivers licenses and identification
cards in 1976, we have been one of the behind-the-scene instrumentalities of creating
public awareness of this important program.

Although our program doesn't involve these

awesome issues on a day-to-day basis that are the topic of this hearing, we have a little survey that I believe you were aware of; and one of the responses that was given to
one inquiry-- if you do not wish to become a donor, what are some of the reasons?

And

one of those was, candidly enough, that "I'm afraid that perhaps they might prematurely
take the

a on a tion.

1

'

Ana- l.~

wasn't given facetious-ly · or-

in---h-ume~ ,-bu-t-

it-Was a- candid_

response that kept appearing in the responses that we received.
As a point of information, we provide approximately 7 million of these cards to
individuals and organizations each year.

And we feel that it is a valuable function

that we play for the benefit of the people in California.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

Well, it most certainly is.

We've been working closely with

you, as you know, for the past two years; and the Department has been most supportive
of a function that really had nothing to do with drivers licenses or licensing people
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to drive.

But they've been more than cooperative in assisting in this vital area of

organ donations.
Are there questions of the witness?
I might add, I made a statement that I want to retract.
witness.

I said this was the last

I'm sorry I didn't have---we also have Jay Hartz and Jon Wagner.

mean to overlook you.
MR. TWILLEY:

I didn't

Go ahead, Senator Presley.

We acquire 7 million and we make an effort.

In addition to mailing

it with each renewal by mail notice and each driver's license and identification card
that we send out, we make them available to individuals upon request and to organizations
who wish them.

For the last two years, the round figure purchase of these for distribu-

tion has been 7 million.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

Do you have any way of knowing what the return is on those

7 million in terms of a donored ••• ?
MR. TWILLEY:

No, unfortunately, we don't have any way of determining that.

Based

upon these questionnaires, 5000 questionnaires, approximately 62 percent of the individuals responded favorably--yes, we look upon this favorably.
SENATOR PRESLEY:

There's no way to measure, though, what the actual return is on

that
MR. TWILLEY:

No, we have no way of knowing whether people use them or not.

CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

I might add that the Governor signed into law a bill that

generated from this committee which eliminated the need for the witnesses on the pink
slip that goes on back of the license which seemed to be one of the stumbling blocks in
people using it.
In addition, it will be included in the mailings for those who are able now to renew
their license by mail--the pink slip will be included so that they may attach it to
their new license when they get it.
And one other item, there will be a small sticker issued that a donor may place on
the face of their driver's license so that if someone forgets to turn their license over
to look at the back, that they will be notified, it will appear on the front that they
are donors.

We thank the Department for their help in that.

MR. TWILLE¥~ ~~~~~--------------------------------------------------
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: You bet. All right, Mr. Jay Hartz.
MR. JAY N. HARTZ:

Yes, thank you, Senator.

Good morning.

My name is Jay Hartz.

I'm an attorney with the firm Weissburg and Aronson in Los Angeles.

We represent the

United Hospital Association, and I'm appearing on behalf of the association.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

I'm sorry, can we hold up?

has happened, we're not ••• hear the witness.
MR. HARTZ:

Is that better?
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I don't believe the P.A. --something

CHAIRMAN SPERAW:
MR. HARTZ:

[Faintly.]

CHAIRMAN SPERAW:
MR. HARTZ:
f~RTZ:

Oh-oh, you just lost it again.

Does this do it?

I don't know.

Just a moment, the Sergeant will help you.

Is that working now?

CHAIRMAN SPERAW:
MR.

Yes, fine.

Yes, that's all right.

Thank you.

Continue.

I'm here on behalf of the United Hospital Association.

It's

an association comprised of over 170 hospitals in the State of California with about
17,000 beds.
We carne in response to a letter invitation addressing this issue which I think is an
important issue.

I'd like to start by focusing, I think, attention on the critical dis-

tinction that I think exists, that I think has come up already in some of the testimony
that has been given between this issue of brain death and the issue of terminating life
support with respect to persons who do not satisfy criteria of brain death.

I think you

might visualize this issue as being the extreme end of one spectrum, because there are a
whole host of decisions that must be made along the way as to when and under what circumstances to withhold treatment.
dead is only

The decision to terminate care for a patient who is brain

the very extreme end of that spectrum, one where it is most clear that the

patient is irreversibly gone and that brain function is gone and will not return.
It is, or at least has been, until very recently with one or two court intrusions
into the area what I think all have viewed as the one fairly fixed point in the spectrum
of decisions about terminating life support.

Brain death, I think, has, as I think all

the witnesses have acknowledged, come to be a necessary concept in our society as the
technology improves and we can keep organs functioning longer and longer.
to facilitate transplants.

It's necessary

It's necessary to answer some thorny problems that have

arisen in the areas of criminal laws to when one dies.

It's been necessary to relieve

concerns about liability by physicians who are charged with the responsibility of care
and decisions about when to terminate care.

In some states, in fact, where there is no

statute authorizing brain death, the courts have gone so far as to create it because of
the necessity for it.
In our view, however, it is a mistake to go beyond the statute that presently
-exis-ts-, -which says "Brain death is the loss of function of the entire brain which must
be confirmed by two physicians."

I think it's the view of the Association and its mem-

bers that to try and legislate on a specific protocol about how one goes about measuring
the absence of brain function would be unworkable since technology changes, will continue to change, and since there is some clinical judgment involved in that determination.
I think the statute as it exists now is workable and it is, I think, the proper function
of the statute to define the concept generally and to permit the
precise measurement.
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physicians to make the

Although I am not a physician, I have been consulted on a number of occasions by
hospitals and physicians about these issues.

From what I've seen, physicians tend to

err, if at all, on the side of conservatism.

Particularly in the climate of fear of

liability that now exists, with the criminal prosecution that we saw in Los Angeles,
most physicians are walking very carefully on these decisions and if anything, as I say,
err on the side of conservatism.

Every once in a while you find one who absolutely

won't terminate care for fear of liability no matter what the statute says; and that
exists out there right now-- not on a large scale, but a certain degree.
The accepted medical standards which I think the statute points to as the basis for
determinations have evolved and will evolve over time.

There have been study groups such

as that which published the Harvard criteria, which most physicians, I believe, have
looked to.

There have been updates of those criteria.

recently published, I think, some suggested criteria.

The President's commission
And I think these things will

continue to change over time and must be left flexible to accommodate changes in the
technology.
I might point out that all of the groups that I'm aware of that have studied this
issue have also recommended that there not be a precise protocol written into law.

That

includes the President's commission, the Commission on the Uniform State Laws, and some
of the courts even who have gone so far as to create these standards such as the Supreme
Court of the State of Washington in the Bowman case.
To my knowledge, I've been unaware of any actual disputes about the validity of the
diagnosis of brain death.

The few cases that I've seen that have gone into the courts

have not really focused on a dispute as to how one determined brain death or whether it
was properly found.

If I might take a moment to address the two cases that I think have

been referenced here in testimony, the one that's currently underway in Eureka and
another case in Riverside -- it was decided within the last six to eight months, which
spawned this case in Eureka.

What has happened in each of these cases is that there

have been some unusual circumstances in the Riverside case, known as the Dority case,
were these:

A child came into a hospital as a result, apparently, of a severe beating.

The child was in a coma over a period of time, was on a respirator, and was finally
determined- by-physicians to be ""brcctn dead.

Wnen th-e- physicians sought the family's -per-- -

mission to terminate care, as hospital guideline required within that hospital, the
family refused to consent because of the pending child abuse charges against them.

The

hospital was uncertain what to do, so it went to court and asked that a conservator be
appointed for the child and given the authority of consent to terminating aare.

That's

conceptually a strange situation since conceptually the child was already declared dead
and they were asking a court to appoint a conservator for a dead person, which is
theoretically very strange and not what the conservatorship is designed to do.
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The court did it, however, I think, as a matter of practicality to try to resolve
the situation.

And the child, in fact, died of natural circulatory cessation even prior

to the court's decision.

It went up on appeal, and on appeal the Court of Appeals said

that was the proper way to deal with it, that hospitals ought to consult with family
members before they terminate care, and if there's a dispute, the courts are available.
That I think is what's happened up here in Eureka, as I read the newspaper article and
from some information I've received about the case.
~~at's

happening there is there are, once again, four physicians who have certified

the condition of brain death.

You have family members-- and I've seen two different

issues raised in the news article:

One is the possibility that there is some child abuse

behind the incident, and the other is simply a mother who says, "I'm not prepared to
accept that; I think a miracle will happen."

And what's happened there is the physicians,

because of all the litigation that they've seen including the criminal case in Los
Angeles, are, as I understand it, simply afraid to terminate care until there's been an
adjudication of whether or not they can do it in the face of opposition by the mother.
Now, as I understand it, there has not been an order precluding them from stopping care,
but rather they have voluntarily not stopped care until the issue has been decided.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:

Yes.

I'd like to ask you, you've taken the issue on a basis of a

protection of the patient or the protection of this odd case you've stated---protection
against the legal situation.

To take them from the other side, is there any protective

device available to people who are required to support the individual who is on life
support systems?

Is there a petition device by means of which they can petition the

court to terminate life?
MR. HARTZ:

Prior to the determination of brain death, for example?

ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:
MR. HARTZ:

OK.

Yes.

There is not really a formal mechanism to do that.

Theoretically,

you can do it through the conservatorship proceedings, but as I think some of the
physicians have referenced, that's long and cumbersome in terms of the time frames that
medical care---or medical practitioners must act within particularly with respect, for
example, to transplant issues.
a natural deatfi

So it's difficult.

One can sign---there is, for example,

ac t- "O"irect1v--e "whicrr-.:an say' t-ermina-t-e

certain circumstances.

-the -use-

0

llfe._supp.orts. under

There is a document known as the "Durable Power of Attorney for

Health Care" which someone can sign to appoint someone else to make decisions for them
and then someone else might assist in directing care in an appropriate fashion.
There are conservatorship proceedings; but as I say, they're long and cumbersome.
So there is not really a direct mechanism by which that can occur unless you have a
mentally competent patient who can sit there and tell you, this is what I want you to do,
this is what I don't want you to do.
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Have I addressed your question?
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:
addressed the issue fully.

I'm not sure that I---

You've addressed the question, I guess, but you haven't
And of course, that's not the subject of this hearing--

we're basically involved in the transplant procedure and so forth so I'm not going to
extend the question.

But it is a consideration all the same in the determination at

which point an individual can be determined to be dead and where life is not supportable.
And I'm concerned about, to some extent, the liability that we place people under.

Are

hospitals always willing to terminate a life or to allow it to come to a conclusion in
the face of the fact that they can extend life and collect $1000 a day?
MR. HARTZ:

Yeah, I think that they're not, and not necessarily for that reason.

But I think many of them are simply concerned of legal liabilities as well,

And I think

there are two sides of the coin, which I think you're bringing out here, which is that
many times families would like to have life support terminated prior to the time that
physicians in hospitals are willing to do that.
of care in some cases want that too.

And individuals who are the recipients

And that's the area where it's most difficult and

most muddied because there are interests on both sides of that.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE:
MR. HARTZ:

Right.

And nothing addresses it.

That's an unresolved problem, I think, at the present point in

time.
But getting back one moment again to the court situation.

The courts, from what

I've seen, have intervened in cases like the two I've described, where there are unusual
circumstances.

In most cases, the determination of brain death has not resulted in

legal problems and I'm not aware of any outside these two cases.

In most cases where

physicians determine that the patient is brain dead, the families, the loved ones, or
the individual simply accept that and there is no incident.
difficult time dealing with that emotionally.

In some cases, they have a

Typically what happens is the hospitals

simply wait until they've had an opportunity to digest the situation and deal with it
emotionally and then some resolution is achieved.

In the rare and unusual cases, this

kind of court proceeding may resolve the issues in the end.

But that's what we've seen

of the issues as they've gone through the court system.
That's really the end of my prepared statement.

If anybody has any quest1.ons, I

be happy to answer them.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:
MR. HARTZ:

Questions?

[Inaudible.]

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

Thank you very much, Mr. Hartz.

Dr. Jon Wagner was here to testify for Dr. Pitts.
are there other witnesses that wish to testify?
California Hospital Association.
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Is he still here?

All right,

One is J. E. "Skip" Muir of the

'a

MR. J. E. "SKIP" MUIR:

Senator and Members, we have prepared a statement for you

answering the questions posed in your original letter setting up the hearing.

And I

have also included for your information and background portions of a document from the
Consent Manual, which our legal staff prepares for the various hospitals; and it does
deHcribe the protocol used in determining brain death and also the obligations of a hospital in informing the family and all of the necessary requirements.

And I think that

will answer some of the questions that have been posed by the committee; and really, I
have nothing further to add.
CHAIRMAN SPERAW:

Any questions?

Are there any other witnesses?

All right, thank you very much.
Then we thank you for your interest and your

attendance, and we'll conclude this hearing.
--ooOoo--

-----
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Nothi g easy ir1 case
of a brain-dead child
B:r Tom C..llle:r

-SI.IHWrttor

aad 8111 Israel

-~··

EUREKA - Kalby Wllllamo
foupt to keep breatll lo ller Welell
~ld'l IIIJIII!I Friday and WOII, j\11111!
aJoomy cloud• broke up to ollow
patcbel of blue lily OUIIIde tile
Humboldt County courtDouse.
But ller temporary victory In court
filled to !ICalter tbe doudl or uncertainty, lepl eotaqlemelll and IIIIIPIcloo IUITOIIndllll WWiam'l attempt
to keep ller 5-year-old clau&bter on
Jllesupport.
Tllll week, even more lept ml·
neuverlng II el!peded as tile cue
lhlfts to Juvenile Court, followlq a
deCision by Humboldt County SUperior Court Judge J . Michael Brown
lllat Juvenile Court 11 wbere !be
matter beloop.
Tbe court declllon Friday a11o baa
meant lbal SL Joaepll Hoopltal. tbll
toWn'l CBI!Iollc beallll care pf'CIYido
er, operating on a medical land·
acape lraupt wllll tile rear or Jaw·
IUIII, II treating a clllld - dlagooaed
• brain- dead by four docton - 1o
u lntellllve cera unll where ooly a
bed or two bu been open In recent

_....

•If your daugllter wu run over by
a car,• wed Jerry White, a.111aot
ad.allolltrator at tile hoopllal, "BDd
our ICU was ruu. ud all we could do
II 118blllze ud lr8lllport, and aomelllllllllllppened to ber 111 trallllt. bow
would ynu feel?"
In 11111 Norlllem cauroroJa couta1
lown or 25,000, Wllllamo and bar
atlomey, Bruce Wataoo, went to
court Jut week to lllop tile bOIPital
!rom turolq off a ventilator pump.
1111 oJtygen toto tile -Y or SlobiLu
LyDII LaBin, WWJaml' cb1ld.
For !be put tbree weelll, Wll·
IIams. ber Uve-ln boyfriend Darrell
Sherman, boapltal omclall, docton.
Jawyera, !be dlltrlct attomey ud
county aoclal worken bave been
playen lo u lo'-, track dnma
offerlq an uniii\LAI pubUc alrtl!l or
tbe medical and legal Jaoueo sur·
roundlq tile concepts of Jlle and
dealll.
Tbls dramt IDVOIVOI twO percep.
110111 or deelll: !bet or docton and a
boopltaJ cllolcally esamlniJig a patient and llodlog tile brain II dead,
and !bet or a motller seeing tbelllle
· cblld'a color II better, walcblqllle
cblld "breallle" on a macbloe, talk·
1111 IO 1118 UDCOIIICIOUI yOUllpler,
spendlna !be alibi wllll bar and
waltlqfor a miracle.
"There II clear Jaw on tbe matter,•
said S!Rer Corrine Bayley, vice presIdeo! for biCH!IIIIca or tile St. Joaepb
Reallll Syatem. "If lbere II lrreve,..
lble c:e.atlon of all IUDcUoDJ of tile
brain, llley're dead. Tbe COIIfllllol
llllq IS !bet tecbnolotl)' pveo tile

II bepo Aug. 25 when tbe cblld

was talleo by ller molller to tile st.
•JOIOpll eJ!IefllliCY room. uDC:OIIIIIous

and lo cardiac and reoplratory .,...
rest, aecordlog to tile hOIPital'a petl·
Uoo !Ued lo tile cue. Tile child was
resuscitated, but bu been uncooslous ever llloce. Tbe hoapltal aought
a court order Sepe. e to permtt tile
lllulll.q off or ber lire 111pport IIYItem after two electroencepbalogremo lllowed Slobbao to be braindead.
Oearly, If IIIII lllory bad occurred
In yean put. wheo tecbnoiCIJJY wu
1- IOpblltlcaled, Kallly WIIIIIUIII
mlabt !lave already burled ber
daughter. Nor lllould tills drama be
confused wllb tbe life and deatb
acenertoa or Kereo AIID Qulolno or
Elizabeth Bouvla, 1o whlcb tile IIBue
was a Uvlq penon's rlabl to die.
In IIIII drama, a bOIPIIal Is not
ftghiiDB to keep a peUenl alive, but
to obtain tile lept go-abead to Jtop
treatment after deelll, even lllougll
hoapltal omcaJJ reel tbetsucb a go.
abeed may not be leptly aeceaary
IQ Pllll the plua. but II a prudent
approacb.
Money, boapllnl omclall llave Insisted, has no bearloa 111 tile case,
alhough one local doctor'• ..Umate
or tile coat or cartog for Slobbao - a
Medl<aJ peUeot- II roUgllly 11,100
to 11,200. day.
In IIIII drama, utbe court hearlq
Friday pointed out, key lept queoUoos loclude .,.bat rlabts doeo tile
perenl of brain-deed petlent pol8ell
when life support II bellll ceued"
and "bow loqlllould a IIOIPIIaJ walt
to pull tile pl"l when a survivor II
bavlq difficulty adjUitlna to a paUeot's deelll?"
In Its original petition, tile boapllal
cited the Dority case, a Soulllem
California Appenls Court decision In
wblcb tile court userted tile rlabt or
a hoopltal lo cease life IUpport to a
breln-<lead peUent, but allo empbaslled pereotal rlgllts to COIIIUIIadoo
on that decision. Tbe court allo IIIII"
aested lllat II might be adYIJable for
a llospllal to CODIIder keeplq a
braln-<lead peUeot on life support, u
relatives were not prepared lor tile
lllock or tile penon's dealll.
Sisler Corrine, tile beallll systems
vlce•preoldeot, said slle believes !bel
tile ooly etblcaJ dilemma Ill tbe cue
CODCUDI tbe family's rllbts to losllt
Oil CODIIIIUIJII mediCal treatment.
Bat. In bralo-c!ealll caaee, llle said, "I
lllloll lllere's no sucb rlgiiL•
Wataon, argued In court Friday
!bet 1111 client bel a rlgllt to veto a
decision to lllut off tile support to
her child. Alld, bei\IIPIIed !bet tbe
lloopltal's request for lepl sanction

&PIWI6Dce ttutl a pawn II really

to tura oil me veomator wu prema·

alive Wbeo tlley're dead.•
Williams and Sberman, wbo llave
lived togetber ror more· tbao two
yeara, llave decided aot to talk to tbe
pre&
But. Watson, Williams' attomey,
olll8rved: ·u, on day one, Slobbao
!be beiiDDIDB
llad died and !bel and tile end, (It would llave been)
euler for (WIIIIaml) to deal wllll
tile llnaJity. (But) wltll tile tile lUllport IYII8ID ••. llle, u a parent. to
wlllldraw tile bralll !rom tile cbUd.
Sbe can't brlq benell to do IL Sbe
- I t u ceuolq dealll to ber cbUd."
Tbe drama unfolding bere bu
beeo made even more trallc by law
enforcement suspicion~ lllat cblld
abuse may have played a role In
Slobllllll's late. It II a drama raiJIIII
qu..Uo111 about wbat protecUoo was
provided to tile child by tile public
egeney cbarpcJ wllllller welfare.
Tbll dnuna bu not caused speru
of anger or commuoal grtel to IIDite
lo 11118 COGMm~tlve commuolty. But
II baa made Ute tougher for people
~-~ -a~. tile boopllal !bet Is em-

lUre.
Meanwhile, as Slobban lay In her
Intensive care bed, taw entorcement
offtclals bepo lnvestlpUIII bow sbe
- so badly Injured. And bolll pollee and proaecuton conceded a sad
fact: any successful lnveoUgaUoo
would require an autopsy on tbe
child's body and a coroner's report.
"No cbaraes are llled on aoy·
- y .• IBid Eureka Pollee Depert·
meat cape. Murl Harpham. "Tbere'a
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not mucb you ceo do unless you
llavea-y.•
Still, late last week tile Humboldt
County Dlatrlct Attorney's ortlce
bepo ftghiiDB"Chlld Protective Services or Humboldt County ror re·
cordi prosec:uton want for lllelr
lnvestlptloo of cblld abuse lo tills
caae, Dlllrlct Attomey Terry Farmer said Prlday. ·
SlobbaD came under tile jurisdiction of protective MYiceo In April
after DUrell Sben11811 was CIW'Jed
In a mlademeanor warrant wllll
abllllllllllle cblld.
Lut June. FIU"IIIer'a
placed
Sbe1111811 on a dl•enlon proaram,
approved by protecdve servlcea,
orter learolDB !bel lbe agency's plan
lor tile child Included permlltlnB ber
to II•• WIUI bar molber and wllb
~ tbe dlltrlct attomey said.
But !be qucy IIIII reiUaed to
comment pubUcaUy on any aspect or
tile caae, and, acconlilll to Farmer,
IIIII claimed !bat It's recorlls are
confldantlel - even to a dlltrlct
attomey loYellllptlq cbUd abuse.
So tile drama goes on. llalllllllle
baCkdrop ol tbll coasem~tlve town,
wbere timber Is klnl but tile government Is tile larBest employer. Resl·
dents have read about tile court
developments lo !be lOcal DeWipe·per and -ltorl• OD televllloo.
But In tbla moot praamallc of
town~, tbere bas been Do ru.sb to
jUdgeiD8DL Humboldt County Oerlt
Don Mlcbael, a IOJIIIIme resident,
obaerved !bel people lo Eureka get
aclted over ap&DJioo or RedWood
NatiOIIal l'llft or IIP"IYIIII of pestlddes. But tbll drama 11 a prlvale
one.
"The IUY In tile street really bull'!
become !bat Involved In II," IBid
Mlcbae!. a Celllollc. "I really doo'l
llllnll !bey knoW wbat lt'a all about.•
At tile lloapltal, and eapeclaJiy In
tile ~floor lotelllllve care uolt,
bowever, tile tragedy bel llad a 1111DIIIcaot Impact.
HOIPitaiiiPOIIesmaa Robin Cmwn
aald !bel nunes 1o ICU llave beeo
lostructed to use all available IMBIII
to suotaln a child, ruled dead by
doctors. Tbe nuneo have even beeo
told to attempt ...,._llaUon. II tile
cblld's baerl pves out even :_tboUib
abe's on !be macblne.
"
you 1magtoe resuacitaiiDB a
dead penon?• Cmwn aued.
"I was lo VI~" be aald. "l"ve
seen a lot or kinds or deatll. Tbll 11
tile wont.•
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CritiGJI Issues in Medicine

COMPLIMENTS OF: LAWRENCE H. PITTS
M.D.

Determination of Brain Death
LAWRENCE H. PITTS, MD, San Francisco

With the careful application of the principles outlined herein, brain death can be determined with certainty. There have been no documented reports of survivors when these
guidelines have been followed. The triad of a known mechanism of brain injury, absence
of contributing metabolic or toxic central nervous system depression and absence of
demonstrable brain function is sufficient to determine brain death clinically and, In most
states, legally. The use of apneic oxygenation protects cadaver organs for transplantation
during the period needed to prove that a patient cannot breathe.
Very little can ameliorate the tragedy of sudden and unexpected fatal cerebral injury.
Nonetheless, the concept of brain death is well established, and there Is no longer a medical or an ethical reason to prolong unnecessary support of these patients.
(Pitts LH: Determination of brain death [Critical Issues in Medicine]. West J Med 1984
Apr; 140:628-631)

T.

hc recent report of the President's Commission for
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research devoted considerable
attention to the questions of defining death generally1
and brain death specifically. 2 The concept of brain death,
defined as the irreversible loss of all function of the
cerebrum, the cerebellum, the midbrain, the pons and
the medulla, is no longer very controversial among
clinician., in the United States. However, during a recent
nationallv televised debate in Great Britain, claims
were made that some patients had survived termination
of life-support systems despite a diagnosis of brain
death.~ A review of the cases in question showed that
no patient who survived termination of life support
had been declared brain dead. Additionally, a review
of published instances of brain death 3 and a review of
data banks that have extensive information on central
nervous system (CNS) disease 1 •3 did not identify a
single instance of patient survival, for even bnef penads, after brain death had been determined using the
proper criteria. Conversely, none of more than 1,000
patients with severe head injuries who survived ever
were suspected of being brain dead, even during their
worst clinical states. 8
Medical professionals must be able to accurately
determine if a patient is brain dead so that life-support

systems can be withdrawn in a timely manner to prevent unjustified use of precious critical care facilities
and to provide donor organs for transplantation. The
success of renal transplantation and continuing attempts
to transplant other vital organs require that appropriate
donor candidates be identified and that their neurologic
status be defined carefully to assure that they are indeed "beating heart cadavers" before organs are harvested. Transplant surgeons are extremely cautious and
insist that candidates cannot be considered for organ
donation until after they are declared to be brain dead.
Because incorrect or questionable criteria have sometimes been used to evaluate brain death, occasionally
incorrect diagnoses of brain death have been made.
Rarely, organs have been harvested from patients who
were not brain dead at the time of organ removal; patients have survived for short periods after organs were
removed. Such errors invariably can and must be
avoided by applying pi oper criteria for determiningbrain death.
Laws regarding brain death vary from state to state.
California has an excellent law that requires only that
brain death be certified by two physicians and does not
require undue and unnecessary technologic verification
of brain death. (Pertinent sections of the statute are
reprinted in Figure 1 ) . I believe that this law is

Frum the lleparlmcnt of Neuroloaical Suraery, UDIYOnlty of California, SUI F11111cllco, Scbool of Medlclllc, and tbe Department of Neurosurpry, San
Francia«> General Hoapltal Mt'dlcal Ccnlrr.
Submitted. revised October 26. 1983.
~f!l~ . rcqucsu to Lawreacc H. Pitts, MD, c/o Edllorial omcc, DepartiiiCIIt of Neuroloalcal Suraery, 3.50 PBrDUiua, Suite 807, SUI F raDclsco, CA
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DETERMINATION OF BRAIN DEATH

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TEXT

CNS =central nervous system
cr=computed tomography
I!EG =electroencephalography

appropriate, expedient and correct and rightly places
responsibility on physicians who are called on to determine if a patient is brain dead. Although a diagnosis
of brain death does not have to be made by neurologists
or neurosurgeon's only, it is imperative that other physicians who may be in a position to make this diagnosis
are confident of their knowledge of the criteria with
which brain death can be determined and of their ability to apply them properly. I hope that the following
discussion of these criteria will make this process easier
for all clinicians.

should be done to determine the nature and extent of
the brain lesion; a CT scan provides the most readily
available and definitive documentation of structural
damage such as unilateral or bilateral cerebral infarction, massive intracerebral hemorrhage or other cerebral mass lesions that would account for failure of
cerebral and brain-stem function. In a few patients with
basilar artery occlusion that leads to brain death, early
CT scans may show no abnormalities and cerebral
angiography will be necessary to delineate the pathologic features. In the absence of clear clinical or radiographic evidence of overwhelming brain damage, a
clinician must be extremely cautious in diagnosing
brain death; patients should be supported for one or
more days, during which time appropriate additional
diagnostic information can be obtained.

Metabolic and Toxic CNS Depression Must Be
Excluded
Many systemic abnormalities will depress central
nervous system function and should be corrected as
completely as possible· before· the diagnosis of brain

Criteria for Determining Brain ·Death
Criteria to determine brain death described below
are used at the San Francisco General Hospital Medical
Center, a regional trauma center that treats a large
number of patients who ultimately die of head injury.
It should be emphasized that most patients who die
Article I
after head injury typically are not brain dead until the
§ 7180. Determlaadoa of death; lrrevenlble ceaadoa of
time of terminal cardiopulmonary failure and arrest.
drculatory aad respiratory or braiD faacdo111
The clinical course of these patients is characterized by
(a) An individual who bas sustained either (I) ir.h
'1 ·
d h b ·
reversible cessation of circulatory and reapiratory tunccoma wlt spontaneous venb atlon an ot er ram-stem
lions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the
function for some days or weeks after severe head
entire brain, including the brain atem, is dead. A deterinjury; patients usually die of infection or ventilatory
mination of death must be made in accordance with
complications of protracted unconsciousness. Thus,
accepted medical standards ••••
criteria for the diagnosis of brain death can be applied
Article 11
properly to only a relatively few of these patients. 1
The diagnosis of brain death requires that the cause
~ladepeadeat coDfinaadoa of braiD falldloa
of CNS dysfunction be known, that no toxic or metaWhen an individual is pronounced dead by determinbolic factors that could depress neurologic function be
ina that the individual has sustained an irreversible ceaapresent and that there be no demonstrable brain funclion of all functions of the entire brain, includina the
tion (Table 1). While a number of electrophysiologic,
brain Item, there shall be independent confirmation by
. 1og1c
· or nuc 1ear me d'Jcme
·
another physician .•..
ra d10
stud'1es may prov1'd e
17182. ladepeDdeat confirmadoD wbea part of doaor
additional proof of brain death, generally these studies
need not be done in typical patients. However, it is
~!~r a~ 0~~=~:used for direct transplannecessary occasionally to do one or more of these tests
tation •.. and the death of the donor is determined by
in patients whose clinical course is complicated, or who
determining that the individual has suffered an irreverhave a myriad of apparently unrelated clinical signs or
sible ce&Bation of all functions of the entire brain, includresults of laboratory tests (or both) that can make a
ins the brain stem, there shall be an independent condiagnosis extreme! difficult. An e•.~~x~a,m
!.!
.!J
lP
~
I
£
e
_;o
~
f
~
st!!
U!k
Ch
!
La
!
L._-f----JI
~
IhLnn~~tiei''onan---tofnallthe:it'll1dieatbethMI!byetelanmolli~natric.
pmhr yOlstr--'c"diaCJnlt.lrN--;
e,_'the
;-;-r-,lhiDel'"----j·- - - - - - - - :-.'l"---c:--:-. ' h b
'h
1
'd
•
":: -~
:••-"!!' _,. __ "':"'',
Ul UCGW , , , IIUI"
patient m1g t e one Wit pro onge unconsciousness,
the physician making the inde~dent confirmation shaD
no evidence of brain function, negative toxicologic
participate in the procedures for removing or transplantstudies and a nondiagnostic computed tomographic
ins a part.
(CT) scan for whom no definitive cause for apparent
brain death has been established.
Figure 1.-Pertinent sections of the Uniform Determination

The Cause of Brain Damage Must Be Known
A diagnosis must be established. This can be done
clinically in instances of severe open head injury, gunshot wounds of the brain, prolonged cardiac arrest,
drowning with recorded long periods under water or
other very obvious causes of brain damage. Without
such convincing clinical evidence, diagnostic studies
APRIL 1984
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of Death Act of the State of California (Chapter 3. 7 of the
California Health and Safety Code).
TABLE 1.-cr/ter/a for

Determlnln~ Brain

Death

Known mechanism of in;ury
Absence of toxic or metabolic central nervous
system depression
Absence of brain function
829

DETERMINATION OF BRAIN DEATH
TABLE 2.-Absence of Brain Function
death is considered. Systemic hypotension or intracranial hypertension, singly or in combination, can lower
No pupillary response to light
cerebral perfusion and depress CNS function. HypoNo corneal reflex
thermia Jowers cerebral metabolism and can depress
No eye movement with doll's eyes maneuver or caloric testing
brain function, though coma as a result of hypothermia
No response to supraorbital pain
alone does not occur if core body temperatures are
No gag reflex
above 32°C (90°F). Temperatures between 27°C
No cough reflex
(80°F) and 32°C can cause coma and temperatures
Apnea
below 27°C virtually always cause coma.• Severe
hyponatremia may increase brain water content profoundly and cause severe cerebral edema, thereby debrain. Pupillary response to light is absent because
pressing brain function. Hyponatremia also may cause
death of the upper midbrain causes loss of optic nerve
focal or generalized seizures, the presence of which
input and parasympathetic nerve output from that region. No eye movement can be elicited either by the
excludes a diagnosis of brain death. Poor ventilatory
doll's eyes maneuver or by cold water caloric testing
function with hypoxemia or hypercarbia can depress
cerebral function and should be corrected. While it is
because pontine vestibular nuclei are without function,
as are the pathways for coordination of eye movement
unlikely that any of these metabolic disorders can cause
in the medial longitudinal fasciculus that extends from
cessation of cerebral function, any might depress minithe third nerve nucleus in the upper midbrain down to
mal brain function to the point that an incorrect diagupper cervical spinal cord segments, where joint-posinosis of brain death could be made.
tion sensation of the cervical spine enters the medial
Systemic toxins alone can produce apparent brain
death in patients who can recover with absolutely norlongitudinal fasciculus for coordinating eye movement.
mal neurologic function if they are supported during
Corneal reflexes in both eyes are absent with loss of
the period of intoxication. Thus, it is imperative to
trigeminal sensation input and facial nerve output to
exclude an intoxicated state, either by reliable history
th~ orbicularis oculi. There is no gag response to firm
(for example, the patient being normal immediately
tongue blade pressure against the oropharyngeal wall.
before trauma or having a dramatic and abrupt neuroThere is no cough reflex with tracheal suctioning via an
logic ictus consistent with intracranial hemorrhage) or
endotracheal tube. Finally, a patient must be apneic in
by appropriate toxicologic screening before the diagthe presence of an adequate carbon dioxide stimulus.
nosis of brain death is made. Barbiturate overdose can
Because hypoxemia with prolonged apnea can cause
abolish all clinically detectable brain function, though
cardiac arrest and complicate possible organ removal
brain-stem evoked potentials often are present even in
for transplantation, proper apnea testing' is necessary
the absence of other demonstrable brain function. Other
and is summarized here. A patient should be ventilated
hypnotic or sedative agents can greatly depress CNS
for five minutes with 100% oxygen at normal tidal
function to the point that brain-stem reflexes are lost.
volumes so that arterial levels of oxygen are greatly
Ethanol intoxication also can depress CNS function,
elevated and levels of arterial carbon dioxide are northough it is exceedingly unlikely that the effects of
mal (about 40 mm of mercury) at the time that
ethanol intoxication alone can mimic brain death.
ventilation is discontinued. The ventilator then is reAn appropriate toxicologic screen for CNS depresplaced by a T-piece delivering pure oxygen to replace
sants should be carried out on blood and urine specioxygen removed from the alveoli by circulating blood.
mens. Even in patients known to have structural brain
The patient is observed carefully for evidence of relesions, toxins must be excluded before the diagnosis
spiratory efforts; if none occur within 10 to 15 minutes,
of brain death can be made reliably.
during which time the partial arterial carbon dioxide
.
.
pressure usually will increase 30 to 45 mm of mercury,
There Must Be No Demonstrable Bram Functzon
then apnea will have persisted despite an intense re- - Neurologic testing must show .tba..t_there is no brpJ'l:._ ---~iratory_~im_ulus._ This method of apneic oxygenation
generated response to any neural stimulus (Table 2).
ensures that a patient has no response to apnea, a Sine
Some brain dead patients retain spinal cord reflexes.
qua non of brain death, but will maintain an adequate
Thus, minor flexion of upper or lower extremities with
partial arterial oxygen pressure for 15 minutes or more
local extremity pain need not preclude the diagnosis
(in the absence of lung diftusion abnonnalities)
of brain death. With medullary failure, however, spinal
and protect organs that are potentially available for
shock generally intervenes and deep tendon reftexes
transplantation.
and segmental withdrawal reflexes are absent.
In a few instances, patients being ventilated mechanA patient would have no response to supraorbital
ically are given muscle relaxants during treatment and
pain stimulus because sensory input to the brain is via
the ability of a patient to respond to neurologic testing
the trigeminal nerve into the brain-stem trigeminal
might be questioned. Most paralyzing agents used in
nuclei. Pupils will be mid-dilated (5 to 6 mm in size),
this setting are metabolized within a few hours of
with loss of neuronal response of both hypothalamic
administration. Even in unusual circumstances such as
sympathetic cells and of parasympathetic cells in the
the use of aminoglycoside antibiotics in patients with
Edinger-Westphal nucleus located in the rostral midrenal failure or in rare instances of prolonged paralysis
THE WESTERN JOURNAL OF MEDICINE

DETERMINATION OF BRAIN DEATH
TABLE 3.-Supporting Examinations to Confirm Brain Death

Electroencephalography
Brain-stem evoked responses
Cerebral angiography

Radionuclide brain scan
Intracranial pressure
monitoring

=-=-=.::...--=-~============

from the use of a single injection of succinylcholine
chloride, paralysis can be assessed using a nerve stimulator and observing an appropriate muscle twitch response. If possible paralysis is a concern, the issue
should be resolved through consultation with an anesthesiologist.
There are no special precautions for pronouncing
brain death in infants and children. Even very young
infants have well-developed brain-stem reflexes, and
absence of these reflexes is the cornerstone of a diagnosis of brain death. The usual precautions must be
followed, including an accurate diagnosis for destructive brain lesions and the absence of CNS depression.
Because it is often difficult for families to accept the
death of a child, to allow the family time to adjust to
the tragedy, some delay-perhaps up to a day-might
be justified before ventilation is discontinued.
Additional Examinations That Can Be Made to Verify
Brain Death
Results of several electrophysiologic, radiologic and
other tests can be used when necessary to confirm a
clinical diagnosis of brain death (Table 3). Since
publication in 1968 of the Harvard Brain Death Criteria,e electroencephalography (EEG) has been used
frequently to confirm brain death. It has been suggested
that two EEGs that record electrocerebral silence7a "flat" EEG-must be obtained 6 to 24 hours apart
before brain death can be diagnosed With certainty.
The use of EEG is not required in California, though
it is sometimes reassuring to clinicians, especially in difficult or uncertain cases, to prove the absence of electrocerebral function. If there is a known cause of brain
destruction, absence of contributing metabolic or tOXiC
CNS depression and absence of demonstrable brain
function, we do not do an EEG. In patients for whom
the diagnosis is uncertain, or if one of our clinicians
desires support of the clinical diagnosis, an EEG may
be done. However, a single ftat EEG is enough to con------ffinl"'llrri+b...,.,.anhri-rid!.oe-,.atlt}fl-r.-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Cessation of cerebral circulation also invariably produces brain death, The absence Of cerebral blood ftow
can be shown by arteriography, a during which a carotid
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injection of iodinated contrast material will fill the
cervical carotid artery but wiii not enter the intracranial
space, producing what is referred to as a "carotid stop."
If brain death is strongly suggested in a patient known
to have barbiturate intoxication, absence of intracranial
ftow will allow a diagnosis of brain death regardless of
the degree of intoxication. Radioisotopes injected intravenously will not enter the cranial space, and a brain
scan will show no intracranial ftow." Care must be taken
with radioisotope studies to ensure that extracranial
circulation is not misinterpreted as intracranial flow.
Both auditory and somatosensory evoked potentials
of the brain stem can be used to prove brain death. 10
They may be particularly valuable in excluding brain
death in cases of barbiturate coma, which can produce
absence of demonstrable brain function and a flat EEG,
by showing that there are brain-stem evoked responses.
In brain dead patients, all components of the brainstem auditory evoked response will be absent except
for wave I, which arises from the cochlea in the ear
and may be present despite brain death.
Monitoring intracranial pressure may show the presence of intracranial hypertension that equals or exceeds
arterial pressure. This lack of cerebral perfusion will
produce complete cerebral ischemia and death within
five to ten minutes.
None of these procedures is required for proof of
brain death in many states, including California, and
in my opinion should be reserved for those patients for
whom there is considerable uncertainty about the clinical picture or some reason to doubt the reliability of
the clinical examination.
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Pattema of practice were analyzed for the United
States and 28 other countries "';th reapeet to consent to
remove cadaveric organs for transplantation and the
legal atatua of brain death as a basis for declaring death.
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, adopted throughout
the United States, allows either the donor or tbe family
to atve consent to remove cadaveric oreana. In no atate
Ia eonaent presumed. The lesal atatua of braiD death u
a baaie for declarlnc death £. ntablished by atatute lD 35
atatea and by court decision In 'I more. Model braiD death
lawa have been proposed reee11tly by the Americaa Med·
leal Aaaoclatio11 aad by the National Conference of Com·
mt.aioners on Ulllform State Laws. Both moc!els are
brief. They recopi&e tbe equlvale11ce of brain death and
death of a penon without prescribing the medical criteria and testa used to eetabUm the c:Uapo.la of braiD
deatb.
Seven teeD of the 28 countries aurveyed provide for
donor carde olmflar to thoae used lD the Ulllt.ed States.
In 15 countriea eoa.e11t to remove orgaaaa mQd be obtained from the donor or a family member. In thirteen,
eonaent Is preaumed by law, but iD 6 of the 13, the family
Ia notified before proceedin1 witb organ aalvage. Brain
death Ia recognizee~ by statute or administrative law In
13 of 28 countriea. Ia aeveral of them, medical detail•
and procedures for diagnosing brain death are incorporated into the lawa and replations. The number of ea•
daver organa aalvaged falls to meet the needs of potential
recipient• In any of the eountriea. Pouible modifications
of attitudes, lawa. and practice witb respect to tr&DIplantation of cadaver orJan• are discussed.

candida~e& for kidney transplantation. A.a immunosuppressiv~
techniques become more BpeCUIC and much safer dwing tho:
next decade, coosiderably more than one-half of them mighr
benefit from transplantatioD. Yet, in 19'79, only llichtly mont
than 3,000 of the 45,000 patients on hemodialysis receivect
cadaver kidney transplants
One major factor that limira the
availability of kidney transplantation ia a lack of cadaver kidneys. Transplant propama throuchout the country ba\·e lo~
waitinllists.
It is atimated that at leut 20,000 Americana die hiD brain
injury, brain tumor, or ltroke each year under ~
that could permit removal of viable organs for transpWatatioa
CR, 3). That number is easily larp enough to meet the needs or
patients who mlaht benefit from transplantation. The public 1.1
inc:reuinlly aware ofpreseDt and potential beneftta flom oqm
transpl.entation and can be eJ:peCted to cooperate with a vlrilcJ
of at.atutory and aocia1 effortt toward fadlitatinc alvap of
cadaver organs. A. lone qo u 1968. a Gallu.p poll incficate4
that 7~ of AmeriCIIDII wer. willina to donate orpufor UIIIISplantation upon their death. (4). Subsequently, all 6 0 - .
have puaed the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act and 28 Aates
recognize brain death throu&h ICICUte or Supreme Coun decisions by the end of 1979. Yet, the aYIIilability of cadaver kidneys
does not meet the demand. The remainder of this article re,'iewa
the evolution ami current statua of laws and practice relarid to
dec:laradon of death and conaent to remove organs from ~-.ldav
ers for transplanwion in the United States and 28 other countries. lt c:onsiders new .uategies that might facUitate retrie\'1.1
of cada,·er organs while maintaininc acrupuloua regan! for the
interests and wishes of the dead person and his family.
THE UNIFORM ANATOMICAl. Gin' Ac:T

m.

In 1979, the survival of approximately -15,000 Americans with
end stage renal di.Hase depended on hemodialysis treatments
three times a week ( n. The num~r of patientl on dialysis has
increued dramatically from abou_t ;;3~,000
;;,;;;;;in~l;9i'2
; : ;t'~·~h~e;;;n;;:t;an~-fcll'llnrol!il968,~rtheta<wNra-pti"'o'lnalJ081Cold-nfidenrertlnce'DifoD1fn:Commissrlbllm.IJJDiioienerallt~~~
·- - -- ---.-m endment ro the Medicare prosram of the Social Security
Administration provided co\·erage for 95'C of the patienta with lea purpose was to .etanclardize and limplify variouaaate &au
end stqe renal diNAM in the Cnited States. How many patienta on donation of all cadaveric tiMues &md organa. Most statuW:I
will be maintained by dialysia in 1990'.' No one knows, but the prior to 1968 required comples legal rituals to &m\1111' for
"cimates range from 80,000 to lOO,OOO.
anatomkal gifta and were too cumbersome to pennir urpD&
Until the causes of renal failure can be pre\·ented, only death postmortem removal of organa for transplantation. l'ncWI' dli
and successful kidney transplantation acr to red~ the num· Uniform Gift Act, which by 1970 had been adopced in all 50
ben on dialysis. On•halfofthe patients on dial~..i8 are suitable atates. the donor's -iahes are bindins after death in that 1M
rights of the recipient created by the lift AN paramount t" dw
' Thuc work wu M~pponed in part b~· Unitf'd Stare Public H•allh rightl of others (5). The legal iutnament i8 a simple "·ai:.te·
aized card which noquirt.>S the oipatww of rhe donor and ~,
~"·k-•• Grants HLBI 1741~ and 5 HOI·C'~"'Ol"~ll3, ttw JIUDN Hilton
witnesses (all at lt-ut 18 ye~~n~ of
Many .uates ha\·• p~....d
Mannin~t and Emma Auatin Manninl Foundauon. and the E. J. An·
the donor card format on the *k of vehicle driver~'lin'nM'.,
dtr""" Foundation. Prw.nted at th• Suuh .~nnuAI Mft'ting of the
Anwnnn Societ~· o( Transplant Surgt'Ona. Chi<"ago. lllinoU. Ma\· 29 to a ronvenience to encourage organ gift..
:11. I !Nil I.
.
1'hoee who drafted tht> Uniform Anatomkal t~ " -"•"' .-s·

as••·

,,,,,, ,.,' . ,
~·led that rh«: puhh•:'s al1ruasm and st&ll!d willi""nes.o; tt>
donate orgMns wc,uld tM! tranl'olllf~ antu wide!ipread UHe of donor

-----

cards. Certainly, the Natat~nal and many Suate Kidney Foundation" 811 weU a11larglf t~mpltJyel'5 have mount~ campaifn," to
encfJUrqe organ gift.'l. )'et, a recent survey in ~arytand. where
the donor card i,; on tht~ back side of the driver's liceMe,
indicated onJy J.5Cl. participation IG. M. Williams. penonal
communicational. The remaining98.5'i simply avoided dealing
with the completely voluntary donor card. Dukeminier (61
antacipated many of the weaknesaes in the t:niform Gift Act
a nd predicted that few would oother to sign the card&. The
greate5t weakneliS iR the paychologicaJ dif(aculty in ac:tUAJ.Jy
1etting down to the ta&k of giving one's own orcaos away. The
sipinc of a donor cant ia a much more significant event than
responding in the afr&nnative to a pollster's question about
williJlcneaa to donate organs after death. Dukeminier (6) notes
that leu than 20% or all decedenta leave wills. The fraction ia
even lower for the young and middle-qed whose orgua .would
be moat auitable for transplantation. In analyzina attitudes
toward death. he quotes Freud:
Our own death II indeed uaimqinable, u d 'l!o"hetaeWr . . make
&be attempt to imaPne lt, . . can perceive that we rully IW'Vive
u .-peccaton. Hence, at bottom no ODe believes in bia OWD death,
or t.o put the unw thiDc ia another way, ln the llllleotl&dou.,..,.
one of WI is conviDced ofhll oWD iauDortality.

Dukeminier (6) maintains that aociety mUSt ftnd an Utema·
tive to the voluntary cift acta to meet the needs for trantplant·
able organa and euueata that laws be modifiH to provide for
routine aalvqing of cadaver orsua uale11 there ia objection. In
Iicht of the Gallup poll NIU.lt, be thinks a carefully dnwn
atatute could be acceptable to a ~rity of people In the
United Statu. Seventy-one per cut ohhe phyaid&Ds In a 1869
IIW'Vey supported the concept of routlDe orsan alvap from
cadavers (7). Praumed consent would a1lo be ill keepiq with
traditional humanist values by lll.akiDt the basic preMUDption
one that favors Ufe and by puttins the burden o£ objec:tiaJ upon
those who would deny Ufe to aDotber. Tbe policy ot uvial
human Ufe would be given ftrst priority, yet the wlshes of
persona to preserve a corpee inviolate would abo be accomJDOdated. Objections could be entered in a nationwide computer
·egistry such as the Medical Information S~'ltem of tbe End
":)tage Renal Diaeue Program already funded by the Social
Security Administration. In addition, the nest of kin could
re&Vter objectiona 111oith the atcendins phy.iciana before or at
the time of death. Before proceedins further •ith ual)'lia of
the Uniform Gift Act and. its poaible modifications or alterna·
ives. it may..he. helpful to miew the practicn of other countries
with respect to consent for ca daver organ donation.
CONSENT TO REMOVE CADAVER ORGANS FOR
TRANSPLANTATION IN 28 COU!'.'TRIES

In late 1979, • questionnaire was meiled to renal transplant
•rograma in 40 c:ountriee.. RHponses were obtained from 28
lUntriea. Eighteen used .eome form of donor card that could be
1111ed while a penon was in sood health (Table U. Thirteen
··ountries used presumed conaent u the built tor remorinar
or"Rana for transplantation (Table 21. A C:I"'OIt'C'beck of Tablftl 1
and 2 indicates that &e\'eral countries provid.d for both donor
cards and presumed c:onaent unless an obj..-('tion bad been
entered by the decedent or hwrelatives. In about Oftll'oohalf of
the countrk-8 wht're pl"t'ffUml"d coneent prevailta. phy.ricians ap·
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Be Ilium

Aumia

Canada
Denmark
Finland

Caec:boelovakia
IDdia
line!
New Zealand
N-s

,,_

Germany
Great Britain
Greece
Ireland
Italy

SpaiD

s..den

J .,aan
Norway
Puerto Rico
South Africa
South Korea
Swilaedaad
Tbai1ud

no objection
(Finland, Greece, Italy, Norway, SpUn. and SwedeD); iD the
nm•ining one-half pbyaidaM aimply proceeded with orpn
aalYqe in the abseace ot prior obj tioD by the decedent w lais
famUy (Austria, Cz.ec:M.Iovakia. Deamark. Fruce, x...L Poland. and SwiuerlaDd).
In 16 of the 28 reapondiDg cowatries. COOMnt wu not pte.
IWDed. Rather, u in the United Stata, c:ouent wu obtained
throqh donor cards or requested from tbe nato! IdA. It lbauld
be DOted that aD ot the £nsllah·spe•kfnc countrialwere in tbJa
category.ln tbe ablence of family, all but thne couatria (Jadil.
Japan. aad South Korea) allowed haepltal oftida1a 01' medical
aamb:aera to authorize removal ot orpaa. European countries
are expected to cradually modify lheir CGD~e~at Jawa toward
presumed c:onaent to remove cadaver orpDS. Tbia baa beeD tht
positioD o£ the European Committee on Lepl Cooperation ot
the CoUDCil of Europe llince 1975 (8). The Commluee on Legal
Cooperation is the European equivalent o£ the National Con·
ference otCornmisaionen on Uniform State WWII in the United
States.
Even those countries with presumed consent ltatutes fail to
meet their need. for cadaver orp.ns. All have sizable •-aitins
u.t. fM reDal cranoplantation. Preswaed consent laws iDctuse
the likelihood of kidney aalvage after a potential donor bu
been ideatified. but they do little or nothing to atimulate
hoepital·bued nunet and physicians to aid in that identifia·
tion. Moat of me k.idne,y,"l come fl:om lup balpitals wMn
transplantation and dialysis ~ ensure h~
awarenea of the need. The medic:allltafr there ere moN libl~·
to ..,o the extra mile" reqUired after brain death hu occurred
to eupport the cardiovasculu ayatem until tbe tnnaplant team
has been notified and a decision baa been made about the dead
person'• suitabWt~· u an organ donor. Tbe problem of enlistinl
the intereec and support of hospiW. dWrant from or unfamiliar
with transplant centel"8 is a aerious one for couatrt. with and
without pre.urned consent laws. but c:ountriel with pnMJJMCI
consent eeem ro come closer to mntiq rheir neect. for trantplanr lddneye.
SalWJe of c:ada\'el' organa in eountriea without prwumed
conat'nt laws d..,.ndt~ more heavil~· on an infomwd, aJtruilltk'
citiz•nry. TIK- iniriativt' must come from rhe dyinc patient via
proac:hed the families to be certain thai they had
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Great Britain
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X
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X
X
X
X
X
X

Canada

X
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''Hospaw Commattee deac:ift eaeh

Ar~~:Pfttina

Auattalw
Belgium

X

Poland
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No

X

J)tonmark

l11111e1•
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Countn.,. •·~ famli~ n>nWftl or
donor card.,.. ~Ulftd

X
X

..
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finland
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GrHCe

·------------- - -

\ 'ol

X

1be Ne&herlanda
New Zealand
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South Africa

X
X
X
X

South Korea
Thailand

X

X

caM.

a signed donor card, or from the attending physician and the
{unily at a time when the family is preoccupied with grief. The
chief causes of brain death appear .uddenly and give the family
little time to prepare for lou o( their loved one. It is natural.
e\o·en in .eezninlly hopeless situations, for the family to hope
&nd pray for recovery right up until the time that death of tbe
brain occW"' and the patient'a death is declared. In eome cases.
n may not be appropriate to diseuse organ donation before
do~ath has been declared unle• it Is initiated by the family. To
do eo mirht raise the possibDity in the minds of the relatives
:hat nunea and physicians would limit their effort on behalf of
the patient. Nor ahould the announcement of death (on the
~is of brain death) to the family be equivocal. It must be
dlreet and clear and accompanied by a .s tatement that the
,·entilator will be left in place until the family can make a
d.ciaion about consent to remove organa for transplantation.
The attending physician ia frequently reluctant to introduce
the request to consider organ donation. From his own perlpe<:•
C'\o"e he has failed, albeit against great odda, to restore the dead
po.orson'• health. Insofar as he has been unable to "'deliver" on
:he family's implied request for restored health. he may avoid
:nakina the request that they consider organ donation. More·
,wer. he may not wish to incerrupt a b\.ISy schedule to make the
:tJntacu and arrangements for organ donation. Yet. retrospec·
~,-e sociologjcal1tudies indicate that those famUies who conaent
~" organ donation come to view it in a very positive way as their
;:riehubsides.19t..They drt~ ~~~rt f_rom knowing that a part
..t their relative survives and frequently-relate
t t ey are
:\Jnfident he would have wanted h that way. Thus, organ
.:"nation and transplantation actually offer some solace to the
;neving family.
On the rare occasion when the potential donor has signed a
,:.,nor card or when his family has requested organ aalv8Je, the
.mE-nding physician and hospical staff usually go to great lengths
·,, oontact a transplant team and are t:ager to facilitate organ
:"nation. Jl iH a rfl(Uefit chat can usuaUy be met. However, in
:!le usual 11ituation where neither a donor card nor the family
:.:uuates consideration or organ donation, the attendint physi·
:~&n must !lt't! beyond his own pt:n;pecti\·e and pouible r~Iinp
i failurto in ordtor to bring thto ht-nt"fit of organ donation to thto
:.>nvr·~ fumih and to thto pott"ntial rtonpient~ . Nu~ wh<J
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helped to care for the patient in the inteuive care unit. aDd
hospital chaplaina and social workers c:an be bnmensely beJpfui
to both the anending phyllicia.na and tbe family in OeaJiDr
eoacumtntly with their lou and the opportunity to give. Members of u-ansplant teams are abo quite akilled in ~
organ .donation and are usually available to .auwer quwioa.
for the family.
APPROACHES TO INCREASE THE SUPPLY OF ORGA.~
FOR TRANSPLANTATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Identification of potential orpn donors ad iDitiadoD of
contact with a traDBplant center to anaDI• for organ lllv.p il
a problem in all of the countries I&D'Yeyed nprdlesa ot wt.cberconsent for removal is presumed or must be obtainecS from the
famUy. But. the need to obtain apodfic f'amily c:onaent compounds the problem. In the Cnieed States. not more chan ~
of auitable donors come to the au.ntion of tn.nsplant . . . ac:eording to lltl.ldies made in leVeral regiona of the ~· by
the United StateS Public Health Service Center for Dilaae
Control <COCt in Atlanta f3, 10). The CDC finds that consent
to remove organs is obtained ODiy 47'1 of the time, and IICtUal
orsan salvqe occurs in only 8111 of caae1 with consent (because
or logistics problems or sudden deterioration of the carctiovascular system). Thus, the CDC ftnda that kidneys are aalvqed
from only 1~ of suitable potentia! cadaver donora. ln addition.
the CDC atudies indicate that suitable donora comprise ~ of
hospital deaths and c:oWd provide 110 kidneys per million
populatiun (about 25,009 kidne~ eee~. An actual ,.,.,;.,-a~
rate ofl6% would provide 4.000 kidDe)'&. Subtraction of a final
20c.t for kidneyt retrieved but not used because of damqe. poor
~orage characteristics. or logistics problems leaves an estimate
of 3,200 usable kidneys; a f~~Un very close to the number
actually transplanted in 19';"9.
An ideal combination of laws and practica would atimulate
aUPnding physicians and hospital peraonnel to notify transplant
teams about potential donors. and alao ena~re a high likelihood
of COIW!nt to rt!move OI'Jans. How micbt this combination be
achieved? Perhaps one key is the pc.itive reapoue that att•ndinc physicians mak~ to sign~d donor carda and requt!I'U from
tht- family. Both 11ituatioruo remove the initiath·e for oflan
donatiun from tht- phyKil·aan and plat·e him in a mut·h mor~

.~,.

·~,

....·
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,, 11 ~. .rtablt'. familiar rolto. name!~-. ont' of anempun~t to meet
tha· , o'QUl'!lt!l of patient!! and their families. Such requei'UI ~~erve

a maxunal stimulus to contact the nearest tranRplant team.
Initiatives from the Camily llhould increase as the pubhc
tM-come11 more aware of transplant recipienu ,..hoee health has
befon NSJtorKI. h will bt a alow proceu and alone will probably
not Yield a aufficient aupply of donor organ!'. H'"'·e\·er. the
number of people carrying · ed donor cards could probably
be increased dramatically simply by requiring that t"'ery adult
~,.pond to the donor card provision of the Uniform Gift Act by
eith .. r aiming it or indicat ·
that he is opposed to organ
don11tion. Perhaps the curnmt option of voiding the issue
ahugether ahould be denied. If the poUa are correct, t least
70'< or the adult population could be expected to sign the cards.
Yet, the mere ct of requiring a response might decrease the
number of people willins to sign the cards ther than register
tion"ide prosram, it
an objection. Before embarking on a
•·ouJd be important to
polls or sample populations to
anticipate tho off'ect of requiring a reeponae to the donor card
option.
811
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famil~ of hi~ dt'daration or imenl w declare death on the buis
of brain death. the tra n~>planr nul"''e coordinator was all ed to
talk wath the family about organ donation. In the event of
family l"on~ent. the nur!'e, rather than the attending physician.
made aU of dw aJTan,em•nu for organ
e. In aev ra1
participatin, hot~picals. identification of potential donom nd
contact with the famil~· to consider donation a pproached 1~.
However, consent was obtained onl)·
of the time. The
combination of increased use of donor cud&. Unpro\'ed donor
identification through th
· tanc:e of nUJ'IIeiJ from
tra.zas.
plant team, and adoption of laws that preaame conaent to
salvqe organa fin &he absence of
·
objectioa) would
certainly ensure an inc
d supply of cadaver orpna probabl)·
sufficient to meec society'• n
Dukeminier C61 has noted that continued short 1Upply of
cadaver o
•'ill ine\itably inc:n~ase the preuure~ to buy
spare OJ'i&na, IUCh as 8 kidney or a pnoDt of inteatine, from
willing, living, unn ted persons. Alcbouih the ale of organa
by live donors or by the next of kin after the donor'• death ia
repugnant to most people, it ia not d t 'th by the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act. Sale of o
by unrelated live clonon is
not forbidden by any state. Only Georgia speci(acally forbids
the sale of cadaver organa. At present it only the unwritten
code of ethb of transplan tion surgeons that prevents the aale
of live, unrelated. and cadaver orpna. Specific IDaDipuladon of
the immune r.pow~e · 110on &llow
r concrol of graft
rejection. Increasing success in aunaplan tioD will place tremendous pressure on transplant aurgeona to modify their opposition. at least to th willing, li ,
ted donor. W are t
the point beN, as Dukemtnier (6) sta
"'Society must lace
the fact that cadnver OJ"'IM can
to ve human W'e &Del
that a bnrd choice must now be made. It must deddo whether
to advaDCO the policy of preserviDg uti or to
d pon1yzed by
ita taboos."

the

:.awa that presume consent to remove organs would require
interpretation under the Fifth and Fint Amendment& of the
t:nited States Constitution (6, 11). The Fifth Amendment pes
covemment the right of eminent domain over property. It is
likely that organs of the deceued would be considered pzoperty
4Dd could be claimed by the state with or without compe tins
the clonor'a estate. The First Amendment which provides for
free exerc · of nligion would require that an "objection clause"
be added to any presumed consent laws. Th
appear to be no
other conatitutional problema with DUCh laws. However, JegiJJ.
lation would remain the preqative of ch of the 60 state&
Pt-rhapa the National Conference ofCommJsoionera on Uniform
BASIS FOR EQUATING BRAIN DEATH WITH DEATH
Stdte Laws should be asked to consider proposins ...,resumed
Brain d th (in'eversible loss of aD brain func:tiona) ia DOW
eorusent" amendment to the Uniform .Anatomic Gift Act,
already enacted by all otatea. ln the absence of model amend· wid ly recognized aa mectically definable cnate and a basia for
rson's death (12, 13). Moreover, th re
votid
ment endorsed by the Confenmee, it ill unlikely that many decJaring
reasons why it ia ppropriate to recognize brain deeth when it
states would enact presumed consent Jaws.
tilator in place until
Presumed coNSent laws ould recognize the humanise mood occurs and to not leave mechanical
of the country d relieve the family of deliberatiDB on the hypotension or pneumonia and hypo:ria finally cause che heart
ph:--'Sida n'a request for organ donation at a time whtan their to atop (13). It is unreuonable to subject the tiGnts' family to
dditional days or weeks of false hope, grief, and medical
crief is most inten&e. Such laws would almost certainly increaae
the nwnber of organs aalvaged. But, d'
d talre.Ddy, they expense beyond the point of brain death. Society ebouJd also
would in no
y direct physician to initiate organ salvqe. be spared the useless costa that it coven
a third party.
Rt ~her, phy1icians would be free to iftitiate or to avoid orpn Prolonged support of respiratory and cardiac function after
aa. ;qe inquiries.
bnUn death hu occuned is demoralizing to nurea and other
_______Th~eam_~~ ~L_do'~LP~~~~~~lC~~n~~~~Lm~~~~~~kL~uwUd~~~~~~-
e
Atlanta ~eema to have found a way co increue identir~Carion of urgently by the lhing, ~-et they muat take part in a c
potential donors in hospitals t t are not involved directly with involving the brain-dead patient for the sake of his relativ
an transplantation (10). The plan was accepted by all but who
not yet aware that death hu occ:urred. Finolly, the
ono hospita.l in the Atlanta metropolitan area. Initially, pennis· only practicaliiOW'Ce of \'iable cadav ric organs for tnuuJplan•
aion wu obtained for a nur~e coordinator from the ne
tion ia from patittnu whose cardiac function and ventiJatioD
tranaplanr program to work with the local hoapitaJ'a medical are maintained brittfi~· after brain death hu OCCUlTed. None of
wW be \.;able and tr naplantabJe if the d
tion
1'\'cord librarian to survey the incidence of d ths that might the o
of death is delay~ until agonal hypotension, hypoxia,
ha\··
n roUowed by organ 81.\lvage. Next, permiuion WM
ohtained from the hospi
dmin' rataon d the medical staff cardiac arrest ha\'t- occurred in spite of m.:hanicaJ ven · tory
for the nurse coordinator to viait the inte1111iv care unil& on a IUpport.
r• ~-ular buis and to pproach the attending ph)·sicia.n~~ about
The American 1\!.,.dical .Aaeo<'iation hu long maintained that
'ng death on the
p.ttienu whose brain death was imminent. Then, with the physicians have d the prerogative of
basis of brain death. Many phyBicia have exerc:iMd chat
pt1~ l!lcian'e pt:nniaaion. and only after he had infurmtod t~
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prt>rugau'..: rlunng tht! past two decade:;. Other ph~·siciaru~ are
afraid to dedart- death on the basis of brain death it it ia not
~tpt-eiflcally allowed by state law. If the~· are unwilling to risk
law11 uit, such ph~·sic1ans have little choice other than to leave
rh.- ventilator in place for as long u it takes until cardiac an-eat
occura. Otipit~ Jta medical and scientific uhdity and despite
its considerable legal and social acceptance. w;e of the brain
death concept has been hampered in some areas by the absence
of legal recognition. This reluctance to make death pronounce·
ments on the buia of total and irreversible cessation of brain
functions hall been documented by letten from neurologists or
neurosurgeons in 13 of the 50 states. Because of theM letters.
the American Medical Aaaoc:iation recently revereed ita position
that specific legislation to recognize brain death as a basia for
dt>elaring death was neither necessary nor helpful.
LEGAL STATUS OF BRAtN DEATH J:-; THE UNITED
STATES

Twenty-five states adopted lawa from19i0 through 1979 that
specifically recognize brain death as a basis for dedaring death
(Table 31. As indicated in Table 3, the lawa are pattemed after
11('\'eral models that have beeD thoroughly ft\iewed elsewhere
c131. In three additional statet~. Maaaachusetta, (14), Colorado
(15), and Arizona (16), the legality of a pronouncement of death
baaed on total and irreverm"ble c:eaation of brain fuadioaa baa
been conaidered before the lUshest state court. ID all Chree of
these states, brain death pronouncements have been beld to be
\'alid and legal. Ia four other states, New York, MinneDota,
Florida, and Ohio, lower court decisiODS bave made llimi1ar
judamenta. However, the decisions were not appealed to bieber
courta.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS INDICATING THAT THE BRAIN
DEATH CONCEPT WILL GAIN WIDER LEGAL
RECOGNmON WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

In addition to the more widespread statutory and jwiicial
recoenition afforded brain death pronouneementa over the past
several years, several other rennt developments indic:ate that
still wider legal rec:osnition ill likely. The first is the adoption in
August 19'78 of a model Uniform Brain Death Act by the

:n. No. 4

National Confere-nce of Commissioners on Uniform State La.- 8
in the United Sla t~ C17). This act specifies that:
For legal and medical purpoaea, an individual who hu MlataiiWd
arrnenible rell68tion ol aU functionina of the brain. includinc &he
brain atem. u dead. A cletennination under thia MCtion mUIC be
made in acc:ordanc9 with reuonable medic:ai i&Mdarda.
·

In a comment on the Uniform Brain Death Act. the Com.
missionen stated that "the act does not preclude a determiDation ol death under other legal and medical criteria, inductina
the traditional criteria of ceaaation of respiration and circula·
tion."
Another important development has been a chazage in the
position of the American Medical Asaoc:iation away from ope
position to statutory defmitions of death. Thill opposition wu
based on a belief that there wu no need for IIUch laws. In 197i.
this oppoaition BOftened and in December 1979, largely aa a
result of added praaure from organizations representing neurologiata and n•urosW'Jeona. this opposition waa entirely reversed, and a Model Act to provide for the determinatiOD of
death waa adopted by the American Medical AasodaQon House
of Delegates ( 181. The important sections of this act read:
AD individual who bu 8Witai.aed either 1l inevenlible Cell&tion
ol cin:ulatoey or respiratory fllnc:tioa~, or irrevenlible Ce~~&tioa
of all lunctioDa of tbe entire brain. aball be ~ c1ea4. A
cs.terminatioo or death aba1l be~ ba &CIC'OI'dance wt&b ·~
med:kal st.aDdan!a. A ph)'llician or 8ll)' otbllr periOD autboriMd by
law to determine death who makes ~~~eh determiudoa ba accord·
uce with Ithe above) il DOt liable for d.u:Dqa iD &D)' civil ac:tioD
w IUbject 10 proeeeutioD ba 8llY criminal~ for bJa aeta •
the ICU ofo~en ilaMd OD that~

2•

lD May 1980, representatives of the American Medical Maoeiation, American Bar Aaociatioo. and the NatioDal Coat•·
nee of Commis&ionen of Uniform State Laws reached qree.
ment on a Uniform DetermiDation ol Death Act. 1'bia DeW
uniform determinatioa reada:
An i.Ddividul who hu sustained either 1) ~le ceaadon
or cimdatory Uld nspi.nltory functioDI. or 2• irnvenible -.atioD
of all fllnctioDa of the entire brafn, l.ndudiq the brUa a&em, il

T AJU.& 3. Mode!a adopted by 25 ~&ata for mtutory det\nilion or death
Amenean Bar Aw;ociation model: urev.n.il* ctaaauon of tow brain func:.
u-~u.a •ath

KlllUIII8 1970
~laryland

Aluka 1974
West Virginia• 1975

\'ir(inia.. 1 1973

Louisiana' 1976
low.-a• 1976

Oreton 197'~
Sorth Carolintr' 1977

~ioe

Nevada 19'79
W~l979

19'i'2-- -

:Sew Mexico 1973

Unifoml BraiD DNCb IIIOdel:
Samillt co AtMric:ul Bu ~
Ucla model but empb..-... irft.
nnible -tion of bnin -..m.

oma
IJHnoia• l !175
TenneMH 1976

Ha,.,-au•· ' 1978

Idaho' 1977

Teua1979
Alabama' 1979

Montana 197'7
Artcanau' 1979
Connecticut•·· • 1979

• Specifically .Uowa death declaration on basiS of cardiorespiratory failw. or brain death.
• Uae of brain·related cri~ria to pronounc~ duth requires opmion of two physicians. In wme inst.anc:~s N irrinia and Hawaii I, one or theM
muat be • llpeciali.lln neuroiOCY or neui'OIIUI'gen·
.
· Physician who makft th• determination of duth may not participate In removal or rran.~planta tion of orpru; from the deceued.
"Total br•in function ia deraned u pu~ful ac-uvitin of rhto br•in .. db ll"l\liahed from randum activity.
• Use of br•in-related criteria only to be uaed for purposetl of th~ Anatomical Gtfl Act. i.e f<K purpusea of or1an dunation.
'ALia require11 •baenl:e olepontaneoua breath ang.
'As amended in 19'711; Ca pron-Kualik~ in ,;omto r~:cardA.
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d.-~td. A dPtt'mllnarum of dt>ath mu:ot Ill" madt- an &4'1'ordann• wnh
accepte-d medical atandardll.

Thi.li new model law has been officiall\· endorwd b\' the
Ethics Conunitree ofthe American Acade~y of Neurology, the
National Conference of Commissioners of l' nifonn State Laws
and the Leplative c"«>uncil of the American Medical Auoc:ia:
tion. It is expecr..d that the Board of Trustees of the American
Medical Association and the House of Delegates of the Ameri·
can Bar Association will endorse the model law at meetings
IIC'hedult>d in late 1980 and early 1981. A newly appointed
Preaidenti.IJ ComnuSBion on the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research is a1ao
considering the issue of brain death and the need for legislation
to recognize it.
LEGAL STAT\JS OF BRAI~ DEATH OUTSIDE 11iE
UNITED STATES

Responses from 13 of the 28 countries reported that there
wu specific statutory recognition of brain death as a basis for
declaring death: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech·
oalovak.ia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Nor·
"'ay, Puerto Rico, and Spain (Table 4). Two of the 13 countries
f.\uatralia and Canada) have eeveral provinces or atatea that
have not yet enacted brain death law& Britain uses a code of
practice that baa quasi-legal stat\111. The code wu drawn up in
October 1979, by a Working Party under the uspicea of the
United Kingdom Health Departments.
Although the remaining 15 countries ve no specific laws
that recocnite brain death. in 10 of them the condition ol brain
death · accepted medically and uaed u a basis to declare
death: BelBtwn. Germany, India. Ireland, The Netherlandl,
New Zealand, South Africa. South Korea. Switzerland, and
Thailand. In the n-mninlns five. it ia the practice to wait for
cardiac arrest before declarins death and proceeding with removal of organs for tzan.splaDtation: Denmark.
el. Japan.
Poland, and Sweden.

physical ~xamin~tion alone C19, 20•. Electroencephalography,
computerued ax1al tomography, and cerebral arteriography are
ProcedW'es that ma~· be used at the diAcretion of the ph\·sici.an
to confarm the diagnosia of brain death. AU of the state iawo as
weU as the model laws propoeed by tbe Amerit"an Medical
A880Ciation and the National Conference of Commiasionen on
Unifonn State Laws require only that the phy.ician ue reuora·
able, accepted. or prevailing medical standards in pronouncing
death. The statutes are brief and avoid details of the medical
examination and testing that might be used to diqnoae brain
death. The laws simply recogniu that brain death can ~
diagnosed and that it is equivalent to the death ol a penon.
Other countries that follow this approach to the d'
oeia of
brain death
listed in Table 5. AU of the Engliah-apeakina
countries that responded to the questionnaire are in this group.
Ten countries require either electroencephalography d/or
cerebral arteriography to confum the diagnosia of brain death
before proceeding with organ removal (Table 5). In these COWl·
tries the medical criteria and testa required to diagnose brain
death are either part of a statute or part of a nationv.ide
re
tion with Jegalatatua: A.rpntina. AUIIU'ia. Czechoslovakia.
France, Greece, Italy, Norway, Poland, Switzerland. and Thai·
land.
SOURCES M'D REASONS FOR PRESENT OPPOSmON TO
STAT\..'TORY RECOGNmON OF BRAL'i DEA11i
PRONOUNCEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

In the last
years, bWs that recognize the leplity of
brain death pronouncements have been introduced in eevenl
state legislatures in the United States ed have been dd ted.
The buill for most opposition to etatutory definitiODa of death
is that such Ia are
ived u being
tAtd to laws that will
faeWtate active or
· ao-aDed ..d th·witb-

A coNMtnsua hu evolved in the United States that brain
death is a clinical diagnollia which can usually be established by
TABIZ 4. Specific leaal recognition of brain d

Yes

No

Belgium•
Denmark
Germany"

Argentina
Australia•
Auatria
------------·-·--

Canada'
· ·caealO.TovilUA-

-----

Finland
France
GrN t Bntain'
Greec•
Italy
Norway
Puerto Rico
Spoin

• Brain death

1a

·~·

Ireland"
laneI

J
The Netherlands•
N-Zealand•
Po!aDd
South Africa•
South Korea•
Sweden
Switaerland•
Tbailand"

ac-cepted medicaUy even in a bsence of aperi(~e

oif'ath atatute

• \'a.rW. wath state or provitk·.,.
'Code of practice with qu &~o~· l~al atatur..

Cervini

C'liDic:al

BASIS FOR DECLARATION OF BRAIN DEA11i

AUitria

X
X
X

Bel&ium

X

Alpntina
Au.st.r'ala
Canada
Czec:hoalovalda
Finland
Fnu1ce
Germany
Gnat Britaift
.GmteeIndia
Ireland
Italy
N- Zealand

X
X

X
X

X

01'

X

X

X

X

X

X

-·- ---··-·- ---. ---x---

Norway

~

X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
Poland"
X
Puerto Ric-o
South Africa
South KWH
&pain
Sweden•
X
X
or
X
X
brain Switzerland
X
X
Ttwi.land
• Ventilatory auppon ia lltoppt:d and cardiac .,_. - t occur bt>fonremoving orpm.
-.11::;-
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dignit.\ ·· or ''right-to-dit!" lav. :-o • .:o;ratutor~• dt>finitionll of death
an· re~arded B!l .. foot-in-lhe-door''legWation for bil111 which will
permit euthanasia 421). Althou~h thill has rartoly, if ever. bHn
the calle, thi.R rea110ning has promptl'd the strong and effective
opposition of aome groups.
Sonlf' oppoauion t6 the roncept of brain death also exiatl (22,
23). Air hough a roncepr of death bued on 1otal and irre\'ersible
ceuation of brain functions iD consiatent wilh the traditions.
ethics, and theological writings o( all three major Weatem
religions (13), there are splinter groupe within these religions
which oppose Uua roncept in principle. Most of these minority
groups within major religions have failed to publish their oppoaition or the reaaona that prompted iL Some members of the
Right·to-Life or Pro-Life Movement have recentl)' begun to
~gnize that statutory definitions of death and ao-c:alled rightto-die la ws or laws that permit euthanuia deal with quite
aeparate wues. This recognition ha&, in part. been stimulated
by the realization that the existence of a Ita tutory definition of
death makes an inadequate death pronouncement and eutha·
nu ia more, not Jeaa. diffic:ult. Awarenesa of these pointa ha&
prompted the prestigioua Pro-Life Catholic ethicists Germain
Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle to write in pport of atatutory
defmitions of death (24).
Meanwhile, court casea over the issue of exactly what consti·
tutes death continue to arise and attract public inters in those
juriadictiona without atatutory defmitions of death. Theae cases
more than anything e1ae dearly empb.a.me to IIOciety the need
for statutory def&nition ol death to keep the law consistent
with present cay science ud medicine. These coun caaa are,
lhenfore, a atrong and continuina impetua to the more wideapread legal NCOgnition ol the brain death concepL

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The need for cadaver organs wiU increase u the clinical
outcome of organ ttansplancation continues to improve. Society
is increasingly aware of the remarkable rehabilitation that·
cmnsplants offer. The shortage of organs is not because of a
lack o( potential donors. Enough people die under conditions
that would allow removal of transplantable Ol'g&ns to aneet the
needa of all potential transplant rec:ipientl. The ahortqe results
from failure to identify potential donon and from frequent lack
of consent to remove organs after death. Continued efforts to
inform the medical community and the seneral pubUc bout
transplantation will help to identify potential donon and increase the likelihood of obtaining family c:onaent to remove
organs. But, many doubt that these steps •ill be sufficient.
The Center for Disease Control of the United States Public:
m bo
established to identify suitable potmtial donom in hospitals
with more than 100 deaths each year. 11VI eurwrillance group
would interface between attending ph "dans and transplant
centers. Widespread use of the CDC proposal should identify
more potential donors, and might also increase the likelihood
of obtainins family con~~ent as bener informed hospital person·
nelleam to handle the i.uue in a sincere, aenaitive manner.
Some suggat that only pretlumed consent to remove orgaN
will yield aufrac:ient numbers. The c:ountrietl IIW'Veyed .-ere
equaUy divided amon thORe that require family or donor
consent and those that pte~~~.~mto conaeot. Conaent ia not preawned in any of the F"""lillh·sptoakinc C"OUntntoa and attempt11
to introduct! it would prubebl~· meet IDUCh ftoSiatancto. Hope.--

fully, other approachel' than presumed conaent will provide
adequate numbt>rs of organ!l for tran~~p la ntalion.
Finally, a consensus i.~ e,·o)\;ng both in the Uni~ Scates and
elsewhere that brain death can be diapoeed with reaaonable
· for deda.r·
certainty and should be recogni2ed by la u a
ing • person 'a death. Elimination of uncertainty about the lepl
equivalence of brain death and death of a person ahould increue
the liGlvqe of cadaver organs and reduce the amount of iache·
mic injury that they BUBtain bef<
removal.
Acluwu:ledjpnf'nt8. We appl'ftiat.e .-ponMS to our queatiDanairn '
from Argentina tO. A. Lopez Blanco), AUIO'alia CA. G. R. Sheil. J. E.
HWM. R. S. N1UU11, A. d'Apicet, Auatria cO. Waped, Belaiu~D CP.
Kinnaertt, Cauda IR. D. Guttmu~~, J. R. Jeffery, N. A. IWtuft. G.
Deveberl, Czechoslovakia (V. Koc:andrlet. Decunuk CF. ~rt,
Finland CB. L. Linclsuvml. F~ CJ. M. Dubemard). West Germany
CR. Pichlmayr, H. Pichlmaierl. Great Britain (G. D. au.bolm. P.
Morris. R. Y. Caine, J. R. Salamu). Greece fJ. D. Homatu. E. J.
Hadji)'Malcia), IDdie <R. V. S. YadaD,, Iarael CR. A. Preffermaam. Z. F.
Braf), Italy CG. Mazzoni. S. Stipal, J apu CY. ldnllki. Y.
Ireland CA. Walahl. The Netherland~ CD. W. wan Bekkum), New
Zealand lB. H.-lopl, Norway lA. Jako nt, PolaDd !W. A. Rowinlkil,
Pueno Rico cE. A. Santiqo-Delpiat, SoUth Africa CA. R. Poncin. J. A.
MybUI'gh), South Ko
!Yoftl Kale Lee), Spain (E. Rotellar), s..den
CC. G. Groth, C . Franblon, B. H uabarl. Switzertaa4 (F.l.aqiader, F.
Harderl, Gild ThailaDd (f. Shaipamcb). We appnciate dw bel,» or
Mary &..W.Ch in preparina and lllllidDi 1M manUICI'Ipt.
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COMPLIMENTS OF: JULIUS YOUMANS,

DECLARATION OF CEREBRAL DEATH
A person may be pronounced dead if it is determined by a physician
that the person has suffered a total and irreversible cessation of brain
function. There shall be an independent confirmation of the death by another
physician.
Factors to be considered in declaring brain death include:
1.

Cerebral unresponsitivity. There should be no evidence of a
cerebral type of response to intensely painful stimulus,
noise or visual stimulation. Spinal cord reflexes may be
present.

2.

Absence of brain stem reflexes, including the pupillary and
oculocephalic reflexes.

3.

Apnea. Trials of the first five and then ten minutes
without respiration should produce no efforts at spontaneous
breathing.

4.

The patient shoul~ have a brain lesion that is not unamenable to
treatment. Primary hypothermia and significant abnormalities of
the metabolic and endocrine factor should be excluded.

5.

Chemical screening for drug levels should be done in all cases
except those with a firm diagnosis of a major cerebral lesion
that is clearly capable of causing brain death and there is no
history of ingestion of drugs.

Confirmatory tests that may be used in making the diagnosis of
brain death include the absence of blood flow as shown by
angiogram, isotope studies or absence of midline echo
pulsations, persistent intracranial pressure measurements
sufficiently over systemic blood pressure to preclude
intracranial flow; and electrocerebral silence on the
electroencephalogram.
- -- ---------· ·- --------------~~~~:..:..:=.=~~~~------------------6.

7.

Factors supporting the diagnosis of cerebral death should be
present for six hours with a known structural untreatable brain
lesion of the type that can produce cerebral death. If such a
lesion is not present, or the patient is under· one year of age
the factors supporting the diagnosis of cerebral death should be
death should be present at least 24 hours.

JRY:bl
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For an~:ient and medieval man. death was
an experience cloaked in mystery and fear.
Because of its universal and irreversible nature. the subject has been treated extensively in the literature of philosophy, theology. and science from ancient times to the
present. The role of the physician in this
drama was to prevent death through treatment and, if this was not possible. then to
determine when death had occurred. Thus.
various criteria for the determination of
death arose. including cessation of respirations and heart beat, lack of pupillary action, rigor mortis, hypostasis. and relaxation of the anal sphincter. However. since
even deep coma might be reversible in the
rare case, the only incontrovertible sign of
death for the ancients was the onset of tissue decay.
The lack of a reliable criterion for distinguishing actual from apparent death caused
a universal concern that it might be pronounced prematurely. Indeed. in previous
centuries this fear was not unfounded. Numerous instances of individuals who were
thought to be dead but had cataplexy.
trance states, hysteria, hypothermia, and
coma from a variety of causes were reported even in the late nineteenth century .d 6 Writing in 1896, Montgomery reported on the condition of bodies removed
from a military cemetery. He states:
We found among these remains two that bore
every evidence of having been buried alive. The
first case was that of a soldier that had been
~truck by lightning. Upon opening the lid of the
coftln we found that the arms and legs had been
drawn up as far as the confines of the coffin
would permir. The other was a case of death resulting from alcoholism. The body was slightly
turned. the le!,l~ were drawn up a trifle and the
h.mds were clut~o:hing the clothe!..:,~

He concluded his report by saying
Nearly two percent of those exhumed were, no
doubt. victims of suspended animation.~ 2

Pamphlets with such t'itles as "Burying
Alive, a Frequent Peril" kept the public
concerned by citing cases like that of a 35year-old man who was supposed to have
died of scarlet fever and was buried 48
hours later. The pamphlet stated
The coffin was moved two months later and
the glass front was found to be shattered, the
bottom kicked out and the sides sprung. The
body was reported to lay face downward with
the arms bent and in the clenched fist were handfuls of hair. 7 ~

Such reports gained wide circulation and
fueled the universal fear of premature interment. As a result many individuals
throughout the world left instructions that
their bodies were to be mutilated by such
actions as having a sword put through the
heart after death was thought to have occurred. According to Walker. as late as
1918 the law in France was that death could
be declared only after temporal or radial ar'teriotomy produced no hemorrhage. 72 This
widespread attitude changed little until a
more scientific one developed later in this
century. Despite the scientific progress. incidents still happen that support the fear of
an incorrect dia nosis of death. For instance, in 1967 an American soldier who
had failed to respond to the efforts of a resuscitation team for nearly an hour was left
for dead and later showed signs of life as he
was about to be embalmed.:H In view of the
centuries-old universal fear of incorrect
diagnosis of death and premature burial, it
is remarkable that during a mere two decades the world's society could accept such

J. R. YOUMANS,T. M. KELLER, ANDJ. F. ALKSNE
1-'6
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,..,.·ceri ng sociological. philosophical. and
legal .:hanges as to even consider the diagno~i" of Jea h of the organism by death of a
~ingle o rgan. i.e., the brain.~
The backg round for acceptance of cerebral Jeath as an e ntity was developed during the last few decades with the grad ua l
•1cceptance of the idea that death encompas-.;es many factors a d evolves in stages
rather than being one simple finite cataclysmic event. The definition of death as a ces!iUtion of all vital functions in a Jiving organism was enlarged as insight and diverse
connot<Jtions were applied to it by individuals of various professions and backgrounds.
Many amplifying terms were used. They incluued such terms as "biological death,"
"brain death." "cardiac death," "cerebral
death." "clinical death," "cortical death,"
"cytological death." "irreversible death,"
"legal death." "psychological death,''
"p~ycho~ocial
death," and "spiritual
death. "' 2 Against this background, the development of modern techniques that permitted prolonged artificial ventilation of apneic patients gave urgency to the quest for
criteria for death that recognized the legal,
social. medical. and ethical implications of
declaring death in a patient who had lost
certain vital functions but not all others.
These discussions have led to many definitions of death. One that has been well accepted defines death as ". . . a point at
which the deterioration of functions becomes irreversible so that the organism can
never again function as an integrated, ratio-·
nal organ. " 10 Perhaps, in the statement attributed to him, Justice Holmes best summarized the problem when he said "to live
is to function: that is all there is to Jiving. " 27
The question has arisen whether destruction of the cerebral hemispheres or cerebral
cortex in a person with preserved respirafunctions could be conside red to be adequate evidence to ec are
that person clinicall y or legally brain dead.
Some wri ters have argued that cortical
deuth alone is not sufficient to deprive a
person of his right to liveY' The justificatiOn for t his argument is that some psychic
activity may be present in the brain stem.
Others have argued that if the cerebrum is
irreversibly destroyed bilaterally, the infratentori a l portions of the brain do not have
psyc hi c uctivity and make no significant
contribution to the continuing function of
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the total human organism .u The issue in
this controversy is whether vegetative
functions oft e body without accompanying cerebral function constitute an adequate
basis for declaring the person to be alive.
Some aut ors have qualified the term
"cere ral death" and have subdivided it
into "neocortical death," which means the
destruction of the cerebral mantle. and
"brain death,'' which has been reserved to
mean the total destruction of all the intracrania nervous tis~ue.~~ Although physicians well-informed in neurology can reliably diagnose brain death even with some
lower brain stem reflexes present, at present it would seem that a holistic designation is appropriate and that a subdivision of
the diagnosis should not be attempted.
A problem arises when the terms ··cerebral death'' or "brain death" and "irreversible coma·· are used loosely. Cerebral
death implies total and permanent abolition
of brain function so that both volitional and
higher-level reflex activity and responsivity
are lost. In contrast '"irrj!versible coma"
refers to a state in which all functions attributed to the cerebrum that identify the
human essence-mind. personality, behavior, and in theological terms. the soul-are
lost, but certain functions that regulate respiration. temperature, blood pressure. and
lower-level central nervous system activity
remain. Patients with irreversible coma fit
the so-called appallic state described by
lngvar and Brun, which implies loss of the
pallium, the cortical gray matter that covers
the cerebral cortex.36 These patients are in
the broad category that includes the persistent vegetative states, coma vigi l. and ak·netic mutism.~ 2 In them a variety of vegetative functions including respirat ion may be
preserved so that survival for years is possible.
The well-publicized case of Karen Quin•
•
27
an
For reasons that are unc lea , this 21-yearold girl ceased breathing for two 15-minute
periods. On her admission to the hospital
her temperature was 100°, her pupils were
unreactive, and she was unresponsive to
deep pain. She was given respiratory assistance via a respirator. When examined by a
neurologist three days later she was found
to be comatose with evidence of decortication. The respiratory assistance was continued. Tests of the urine disclosed traces of
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q uin ine. barbiturates. and diazepam. A
brain· scan. an angiogram. a nd a lumbar
puncture were normal. Her electroencephalogram was characterized as "abnormal.
but it showed some activity a nd was consistent wit h her clinical state ." The c linical
state was a sleeplike unrespons ive condition at fi rst, but later she developed sleepwake cyc les. In the waking state she would
blink and cry out. She was "totally unaware of anyone or anything around her,"
and was characterized as being in a
"chronic . pers istive, vegetative state, and
no longer had any cognitive function. ·· 2 ~

LEGAL ASPECTS
Prior to the evolution of the concept of
cerebral death before death of the entire
body. the courts of the United States were
applymg the definition of death from
Black ' s law dictionary. which was
the cessatron of life: the ceasing to exist:
defined by physicians as a total stoppage of the
circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the
animal and vital functions consequent thereupon
such a~ respirations. pulsations, etc. ~
1

Typical of the legal rulings based on that
definition was that of an appeals court.
which said in a case determining which of
two men had died first,
. . . death occurs precisely when life ceases
and docs not occur until the heart stops beating
. and respirations end. Death is n9t a continuous
event and is an event that takes place at a precise
'-time .67

to mary standards of mcdil:il l prac tice. it has bee n
determined that the person has ~ u ffered an irreversible ces~at i on of brain fu nction. . . . 1"
The legal ramificatio ns of defi ning death
are far-ranging. For instance. t he s ituat ion
may exist in which a pe rson is consi dered
dead for one purpose suc h as transplan tation of organs, and ali ve for anothe r such as
inheritance or predecease of a not her ind ividual or re solution of problems involving
estate taxes. The legal complexit ies h ave
led legislative bodies to vary widely in the
degree of specificity that they enjoin in giving legal sanction to the concept of cerebral
death. Some states in the United States
have been quite specific and others have
followed the advice of the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association,
which supported the concept of cerebral
death but opposed statutory definitions. In
the December 1974 meeting of the House of
Delegates. the following resolution was
passed.
Reso/l·ed. That the American Medical Association reaffirm established policies that: "At first
statutory definition of death is neither desirable
or necessary": "that state medical associations
urge their respective legislatures to postpone enactment of legislation defining death by statute";
"that death shall be determined by the clinical
judgment of the phys icians using the necessary
available and current accepted criteria··; and
"permanent and irreversible cessation of function of the brain constitutes one of the various
criteria which can be used in the medical diagnosis of death.· ' 72

MORAL ASPECTS
As a result of this type of approach by the
courts, the physicians making a diagnosis of
The potential for error a nd lax ity causes
cerebral death and stopping respiratory astroublesome e t hical a nd moral q uestions.
sistance to the patient or removing organs
The remote possibi lity of error mandates
for trans pian tat ion bet ore cessatiun~:orif'i1Tite!1antt-t-----ccli'aiTuf1tti71omnll'a[l'nrrdhc::-~:oJ1tntc::J:e~•,uriinn-ee"V"Yee-Fr)v-·-aaS1Sfll}lt!~C~trio>if:__ _
beat were at risk of prosecut ion for malmak ing the diagnosis . When appropriate
practice by omission or crim inal prosecucaution and concern have been used. curtion for permitt ing removal of an orga n
rent theological teachings would support
prio r to t he patient's deat h . Graduall y ove r
t he concept of diagnosing cerebral death
several years the concept of cerebral or
and t aking appropriate action. For exambrain death as representi ng the actual de at h
pie . Pope Pius XII discussed the obligation
of the ind ividual came to be s u pport ed in a
to use elaborate and expensive means of renumber of courts and j udic ial forums . 3 ~' 51 ' 59
susc itation by saying
For example, one early court ru li ng that
f b · d h
It is incumbent on the physician to take all reasupported the new conce pt 0
ra m eat
sonable. ordinary mean~ of restoring the spontawas that
neous vital functions ami consciousness. and to
Deat h is the cessation of life. A person may he
em ploy such extraordinary means as are availpronounced dead if. based on the usual and cusable to him to I his end . It is not !)bligatory. how-
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nt:r. ro ulfllllllll' ru uc,e cxlraonllnary
udinircly 1n hopeless c!asesY•

mean~

in-

In this regard the definition of extraordinary means has been interpreted as
.. whatever . .. is very costly or very unusual. or very painful. or very difficult. or very
dangerous. or if the good effects that can be expected from it are not proportionate to the diffi..:ulties and inconveniences that are entailed .20

WORLD ACCEPTANCE

The acceptance of the concept of cerebral death varies in different countries of
the world (Tahle 21-1 ). The difference in
philosophies of the various nations and societies was shown at the 1976 meetings of
the Neurorruumatology Committee of the
World Federation of Neurological Societies.72 Two major views were put forth. One
was that the criteria for brain death should
be based upon clinical considerations with

TABLE 21-1
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lrttle or no laboratory confirmation. Those
holding that view thought that, with a confirmed diagnosis of an untreatable and soon
to be fatal brain lesion, the absence of responsivity and spontaneous respirations
and cephalic reflexes for a period of 12 to 48
hours was a simple and satisfactory means
of determining the death of the brain that
could be used by all physicians regardless
of their neurological expertise. The other
view was that clinical criteria were inadequate and laboratory tests such as electroencephalographic or metabolic studies
were needed to confirm the diagnosis. Implied in this second view is the constraint
that the diagnosis of cerebral death could
be made only in centers equipped for these
laboratory studies and by individuals who
were adequately trained to interpret and
correlate them with the patient's neurological status. This latter approach would not
be a significant impediment to organ transplantation, since organs are transplanted in
well-equipped hospitals where the instru-

MEDICAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF CEREBRAL DEATH•
CONCEPT OF CEREBRAL
DEATH ACCEPTED

COUNTRY OR REGION

Medically

Argent ine
Austra lia
8ohv1a
Braz,l
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Czechoslovakia
Egypt
France
lnd1a
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea
Mex1co
Netherlands
Pan Alncan
Peru
Scandmav1a
Spam
Switzerland
Turkey
Un1ted Kmgdom
Uruguay
U.S A
Venezuela
Totals

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
es
Yes
No
Yes
No(?)
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes. 20· No. 7

Legally
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No

Tes

CRITERIA OF CEREBRAL DEATH

----

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
20 States
No
Yes. 5; No. 22

Yes
Yes
Local
Local
Yes
Local
Local
Nat1onal
No
Local
Local
Local
Yes
Local
Local
'l'es
Nallonal
No
Local
Yes
Local
Nat1onal
Loca l
Nat1onal
Local
No
Loca l
14
Loca l
Nat1ona110
None
3

• From Walker A E . Cerebral Death Dallas. Texas, ProfeSSIOnal Information L1brary, 1977 Repnnted by perm iss1on.
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mentat1on for making the various studies
is available. However. the question of
whether to continue costly and needless
support of a hopelessly ill patient arises in
smalle r a nd less well-equipped hospitals
also . Indeed. the need for the decision to be
made for economic and humanitarian reasons involving only the patient and his family will arise much more often than it will
for o rgan transplantation.
CHARACTERISTICS
OF BRAIN DEATH
Physical Signs

A patient with brain death will have no
respirations but may have a pulse and blood
pressure. The blood pressure may be normal or unstable, and pressor agents may be
required to maintain it. The pulse rate
shows no distinctive pattern with cerebral
death. If the blood pressure is unstable,
shock should be ruled out. The use of presso r agents may cause characteristic arrhythmias, but these are related to cardiac
irritability and not to cerebral responsiveness.
Cranial Nerves

'•

A variety of reflex arcs ~ubserved by the
cranial nerves or cephalic reflexes are available to evaluate the viability and function of
the brain stem . All these reflexes must be
absent for the criterion of absence of cephalic reflexes to be met.
The pupillary light reflex is produced by
flashing a bright light into one eye and then
the other. Subsequent constriction of the
pupit-t hat is--stimu fated--eon-s t-it tttes--t-he--e.t-rect response. and constriction of the other
pup il. the consensual response. The light
should be directed into the eye for several
seconds while the pupillary response is observed c losely . Rapid flashing of the light
may cause slow or minimal responses of the
pupil to be missed. Small pupillary size may
make eva luation of the light reflex difficult.
With pont ine lesions that interrupt the brain
s tem sympathetic p~Hhways the pupils will
be smul l. In this siiUation. reactivity is best
u ~sessed by using a magnifying glass or the
plus .:?0 lens on the ophthalmoscope. In as-
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sessing this reflex. one must remember that
damage to the optic nerves. chiasm, or radiation. and a variety of pharmacological
agents, can result in nonreactivity of the
pupils.
The corneal reflex is mediated through
the pons with the trigeminal nerve as the afferent arc and the facial nerve as the efferent arc. It is elicited by drawing a wisp of
cotton over the cornea and noting a blink
response of the eye. Belrs phenomenon.
the bilaterally responsive eyelid closure
and u.pward deviation of the eyes. will be
absent also when the corneal reflex is absent. Corneal hyposensitivity due to drying, edema. or corneal anesthetics reduces
the validity of the test.
The oculocephalic reflexes are tested by
the doll's head maneuver. The head is
briskly turned from side to side to evaluate
horizontal eye movements. and the neck is
flexed and extended to test vertical eye
movements. 34 The normal response. turning of the eyes in the direction opposite to
that in which the head is moved. reflects
function of the vestibular mechanisms. Absence of vertical and horizontal movements
implies dysfunction of the midbrain pretectal area and the pontine conjugate gaze centers respectively. Jn patients who have suffered trauma. the stability of the cervical
spine should be assessed before this maneuver is attempted. The test should be
done in conjunction with that of the oculovestibular reflex. since similar pathways
are being evaluated. The latter test shou ld
not be performed until it has been established that the tympanic membrane is intact. Then .:?00 ml of ice water may be introduced slowly into the external auditory
canal until nystagmus or ocular deviation
occurs. An induced conduction current is
5@-t--u-p-~n the labyl=iuthine..endoJympb__of..lb.e._ _
lateral semicircular canal that alters the balance of the paired vestibular systems and
produces tonic conjugate eye deviation
toward the same side with cold stimuli or
toward the opposite side with warm stimuli .
The pharyngeal. or gag, reflex is a contraction of the constrictor muscle elicited
when the posterior part of the pharynx is
touched. It may be unreliable in the apneic
patient supported by a respirator owing to
the presence of an endotracheal tube . The
same may be said for the swallo\\ and
cough reflexes .
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Sen sory and .Motor Responses

There are no ce rebrally mediated sensory
reactions or motor movements in patients
wi th bra in death . Decorticate or decerebrate moveme nt s may be present as long as
lower pa rts of the brain survive. but usually
th ese will be lost by the time that apnea
occurs. If not. they will disappear soon
the reafter . Musc le tone may be present in
th e e xtremit ies: in the majority of cases.
howeve r. it is absent.
Spinal Reflexes

Move ments induced by noxious stimuli
arplied to the extremities after brain death
are due to spinal reflexe!>. In the lower extremity the response is usually a partial
tlexn r reflex, although other spinal reflexes
such as the crossed extensor may be present. n the upper extremities, extensor response!> such as those characterizing a high
spinal cord transection may be induced.
The spina! reflexes manifested by tendon
jerk!> of the arms and legs are poor indicators of the state of the brain. Since the spinal cord may still be viable in the presence
of cerebral death. it is not surprising that
the tendon reflexes may persist. Pathological reftexe!l such as the extensor plantar re-

sponse wi ll be see n m re ofte n h· n he s perficia! te ndo reflexe s.

Laboratory T

ts

Unfortu nate ly. t e el i ical ndings are
not invariably re liable in rna i g the di gnosis of brain deal . Indeed. in the 50 atients who had coma and apnea for 15 minutes and we re adm i ted to the Col abora ive
Study on Cere ra Death. 4 (9 per ce nt)
survived for longer than three months. 3 As
would be expected. many of the m had va rious forms of intoxication. A number of laboratory and pathological correlates may be
used to corroborate the diagnosis of brain
death.
Cerebral Blood Flow

To perform normally, the brain req ires a
constant supply of o xyge n and glucose. Delivery of these substances requires approximately 15 per cent of the cardiac output.~ 6
Interruption of this blood flow in the human
for only 5 to 10 minutes will begin to cause
brain damage, and an interruption of 20 to
30 minutes will cause irreversible damage.
As a resu lt, the demonstration of an absence of cerebral circulation can be used to
diagnose cerebral death.

Figure 21- 1 Angtt>gram o f a patic:n "" ilh ~:erehral
death due h> increa~etl tnt r<~cr:m i . ol p re~~ re . The .J}c:
doe~ not rlow into t he in trac ;on i· I p rtwn f the ca·
rot it! arte ry a nt.J it s br;t c h.:~ .-\ . A m en>p.'- terior vie"'
H . L;Hera l vie w
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Ce1ehral angiography was the earliest
standard techn iq ue to assess the status of
the cerebral ci rcu lation (Fig. 21-1 ). Mitchell and associates noted the absence of
cerebral blood flow in patients with severe
intracranial hype rtens ion . T he contrast material stopped at the internal carotid artery
at the level of the carotid siphon whi le the
external carotid artery and its branches
filled normally. At autopsy . patency of carotid vessels was demonstrated, thus confirming that the lack of flow was due to increased intracranial pressure. 50 Greitz and
co ·workers U!>ed aortocranial and carotid
angiography in 42 patients with brain death .
In them . the ~.:ontrast media stopped at one
of several sites-in the neck close to thecarotid bifurcation, in the intradural parasellar part of the internal carotid artery, or intracranially either just distal to the carotid
siphon or in the bifurcation of the middle
cerebral artery .31 Angiographic evidence of
absence of blood flow is not a sine qua non
for the diagnosis of cerebral death, however. because of rare instances in which a
therapeutic measure such as ventricular
puncture has been successful in relieving
the increased intracranial pressure and restoring the cerebral blood flow .58 Of course,
if the elevated intracranial pressure cannot
he re lieved in a short time. it may be aso;umed that cerebral infarction and death
have occurred.
A noninvasive technique for assessing
the cerebral circulation is to inject an isotope such as 2 me of 99m technetium pertechnetate into an antecubital vein and then
to place radioisotope detectors over the
head and over the femoral artery. Patients
with normal cerebral blood flow show a relatively sharp rise and fall of radioactivity in
both cephalic and femoral leads. Patients

an ultrason ic reftec toscope or echoe ncephalograph coupled wit h a device that gives
additional processing of the scope's electrical signal so as to show the pu lsatio ns of the
mid line of the bra in with each heart beat.
This system was tested in 46 patients by
Uematsu and co lleagues. Three of the patients were in st upor. fifteen in coma, and
twenty-eight suspected of having cerebral
death on the basis of unresponsiveness ,
apnea . and e lectrocerebral silence. One of
tho se who were thought to have brain death
and yet had a midline echo pulsation had
had a large decompressive craniotomy with
removal of the bone flap. It was thought
that the persistent midline pulsation might
have been transmitted from the external carotid pulsation to the intracranial cavity because of the large decompressive cranial
defect. 69 The cause of the midline echopulsations in the other case with presumed
brain death is less clear. Perhaps the function of the cortex and electrical activity
were lost prior to the total cessation of
cerebral flow. In any event, these findings
lend credence to the absence of the pulsatile midline echo as clear evidence of lack
of cerebral flow. Further. when this finding
is present for 30 minutes or more. the diagnosis of brain death can be made with confidence.
Electrocardiogram

Electrocardiographic findings may be
normal in patients with brain death. but STT changes usually are seen in the terminal
stages . At necropsy. the heart often has
minimal abnormalities such as subendocardial and subepicardial hemorrhages of a
nonspecific nature . These changes may be
related to anoxia. 2 ~

__________ ______ -----,w~itc!..'h,____._.h.J._y~p~o~p~e.!..!rf~u!..>!s~io,!.!n.!........!h.._.a._,v"'e'---"a'----"-sm.........,a..,ll~g..._,ra.,.,d,.,u,.,a,....l_----:;;;=-o;o-------------------lincar increase in activity over the head and
CT Scan
normal activity over the femoral artery.
CT scans of patients with brain death
This latter pattern occurred in all of Korein
show no definitive characteristics in spite of
and associates' 80 patients who were comathe arrest of intracranial circulation as
45
shown by the angiogram ."!! It appears that
tose and apneic. Goodman and co-workers studied more than 500 patients by isoCT scanning cannot be used to diagnose
tope angiography with the scintillation
cerebral death.
camera. The cerebral arteries and venous
sinuses were visualized in all patients exBiochemical Changes
cept three who had brain death. 30
Another technique for evaluating the
As the cerebral function fails in brain
prc~en~.:e of a cerebral circulation is recorddeath a variety of biochemical changes
ing of the pulsatile midline echo of the
occur in the brain. It loses the ability to utihrain. These re cordings are made by using
lize nutrient sources of glw.:ose and oxyge n
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ro produce energy through production of
high -energy phosphate bonds. Thus, the
lack of oxygen consumption is manifest by
the d imin ution in cerebral blood flow and
the decrease in the arteriovenous difference
of oxygen content across the brain. 61 As
les:, oxygen is used. anaerobic glycolysis
begim., and it produces lactic acid. With
lo!>s of the brain· s normal metabolic integrity there is a depletion of phosphocreatinine. adenosine triphosphate, and adenosine diphosphate in the neurons. They
cease to function and become progressively
edematous, and the oxidized respiratory
enzymes are destroyed.
A variety of tests is available to assess
the cerebral metabolic parameters, but they
are too complex for routine clinical use.
Electroencephalogram

The electroencephalogram is a valuable
aid in evaluating patients who may have
brain death. Vestiges of cerebral cortical
function may be detected with this test
even though the patient is profoundly comatose as judged by the conventional neurological examination. The reliability of the
electroencephalogram is shown by the
study of the American Electroencephalographic Society's ad hoc committee on
electroencephalographic criteria for the determination of cerebral death. They reviewed 2650 cases of coma with presumably isoelectric recordings. 2 Only three
patients whose records satisfied the committee's criteria showed any recovery of
cerebral funct ion. T hese three had suffered
from massive overdoses of nervous system
depressants, two from barbiturates and one
from meprobamate. The reported "isoelectric" records of these patients either were,
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therefore fundamentally one with low voltage and fluctuating frequency . It may be
seen in as many as I0 to 13 per cent of
healthy persons. 3 ~·4 ~ Further. it is thought
that conditions such as advanced age, fatigue, drowsiness, and sleep. and anesthesia incn!ase the number of flat studies. 6.23.2 9
Diseases such as encephalitis may cause a
flat electroencephalogram. Bental and Leibowitz reported the case of a 44-year-old
woman with encephalitis who had a fiat
electroencephalogram for 28 days. 9 Although in their report they speak of her as
having "complete absence of electrical activity," it is apparent from rev iew of their
publications that she merely had a fiat recording and not one that meets the requirements of electrocerebral silence. This patient made a complete clinical recovery,
and her electroencephalogram returned to
normal.
To avoid confusion, it is recommended
that nonphysiological terms such as " isoelectric" or "linear" should not be used to
describe the recordings obtained during
brain death. The appropriate term is "electrocerebral silence." Electrocerebral silence, or electrocerebral inactivity, is defined as
... no electrocerebral activity over 2J.Lv when
recording from scalp or referential electrode
pairs 10 or more centimeters apart with interelectrode resistances under 10,000 ohms or (impedances under 6000 ohms I over 100 ohms.~

The reason for using the term "electrocerebral silence" is that the cardiac action and
artifacts from various causes produce electroencephalographic changes (Fig. 21-2).
As a result, the recordings are not truly fiat
or isoelectric.
Once electrocerebral silence has been
--------------------~o':"n':"'r'::e~v~ie~w:-t-"':lo=='w'.:L--v'='o;o::l~ta~e,_r;-::e':"c~o~r~d~s-::o~r~h7a::d=-c:be~e:::n~---:n~o~t==e~d~,7!t~h==e~re:;;i~s~a;-;:
hi~·g;:;;h~d~e;g:,re:;.;e~o;;f~co~r:;r~e~la;:.,-_ __
made with techniques inadequate to bring
tion Wit u tlmate eat :
ese n mgs
out low-voltage activities.
have, however. been present for more than
The distinction should be made between
24 hours and yet some patients recover. 12 .:J 2 .:J 7 •41 Also, a few patients may be
a ftat electroencephalogram, an isoelectric
electroencephalogram. and electrocerebral
deeply comatose, have electrocortical silence, and yet have functioning brain
silence. The flat electroencephalogram is
one that shows no spontaneous activity of
stems.~· 18 In fact. an elderly woman has
higher voltage than 20 tJ. v . 1 The majority of
been reported to have electrocerebral sithese studies consist of irregular bursts of
lence and yet to breathe spontaneously. 71
activity of varying frequency that merge
These reports suggest that although the
electroencephalogram is a valuable aid in
wilh each other and do not show any conslant frequency even during hyperventiladiagnosing cerebral death. it has to be used
in the context of the entire clinical problem
tion. In rare instances there is almost no
spontaneous activity . The flat study is
or situation and cannot be used as a single
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Figure 21-2 Electroencephalogram of It 34-year-old man with cerebral death. All waveform changes are related
to cardiac or mu~clc activity. Channel 4 shows muscle artifact~. There is no electrical acti\ it} of cerebral origin
that i' greater than 2 1-' v. These electroencephalographic findings would confirm the clinict•l e\"idence of cerebral
death . 1Cour1esy of Dr. A. Gabor. J
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te~t for it. As Bennett has stated, "in the
pain (e.g., pinch). loud sound. and (optionstate of brain death. the EEG is always sially) strong light (stroboscopic if available).
lent: however ECS does not always mean
9. Recording time of at least 30 mindeath. " 7
utes.
In order to standardize recordings and to
10. Recordings to be made only by qualiminimize errors in determining electroceretied technologists.
bral silence, the American ElectroencephaII. A repeat electroencephalogram if
lographic Society has set forth the followdoubt exists about electrocerebral silence.
ing recommendations for use in making the
I2. Telephone transmission of the elecrecordings.
troencephalogram not to be used for deter!. Use of a minimum of eight scalp elecmination of electrocerebral silence. 2
trodes and ear lobe reference electrodes .
Before the electroencephalogram is perj
•f
2. An interelectrode impedance under
formed, the patient should be in a stable
10.000 ohms but over 100 ohms.
state, since shock or hypothermia may de3. Test of integrity of recording system
press the amplitude of the recording. Also.
by artifact potential.
it is essential to insure that drugs are not
4 U ~;e of in te reI ectrode _.,.lJJi~s.ut:"-~•n.uc...~e;.:sL..t..JolLf---'a:11t_---1Pnr_~;e~s.k.eun.Lt_ji.un~suu.fufinc.li.k.eunt.l._l,Q(.IU.uaun!.!tJJitll'ie~S:t.'..Jt~o~dcl;;e!!p'!Cre~s!!.>·S!.___ _ __
lea~t 10 centimeters.
the recording. Drugs that are often nsso5. Seno;itivity increase from 7 IJ.V per milciated with electrocerebral silence include
limeter to 2 p..v per millimeter during most
barbiturates. methaqualone. diazepam. meof the recording with inclusion of appropricloqualone, meprobamate. and trichloate calibrations.
methylene. Drugs that can be ingested
6. Use of time constants of 0.3 to 0.4 secin toxic quantities and not produce electroond during part of the recording.
cerebral silence as a primary effect include
7. Use of monitoring devices such as the
phenothiazides. atropine sulfate. tricyclic
ele~trocardiogram and others as needed to
antidepressants. nitrazepam. salicylates.
detect artifacts emanating from the patient
or intluced by the surroundings.
H. Use of tests for electroencephalo' See reference~ II. 1:!. 30. 31. 35. 39. 44. 45. S I. 60.
grarh ic reactivity to intense stimuli such as
63. 69. 73.
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heroin. insecticides. glutethimide , and
amani ta phalloides (mushroom poisoning).
If sedative or intoxicating drugs are present
the diugnosis of cerebral death must be dela) ed until their concentration is below
toxi~ levels.
Evoked Potentials

Another electrophysiological means of
evaluating brain function involves the measurement of auditory brain stem responses .
The test is an objective method of measuring st!nsory pathways transversing the
brain stem . Starr found that these respom.e s were either absent or markedly attenuated in 27 patients who met the clinical
criteria of brain death. In addition, in patients who progressed from mere coma to
brain death . a decrease in amplitude and a
prolongation of the latency of the later components of the characteristic evoked waveform were noted.ll-l The technique can be
used as a corroborative test along with the
electroencephalogram, especially in evaluation of the brain stem. The American Electroencephalographic Society Ad Hoc
Comm ittee on Cerebral Death recommended that an effort be made to evoke potentials by auditory. visual, and tactile
TABLE 21-2
TEST

----

stimulation when a patient suspected of
having cerebral death is being evaluated. 63
Atropine Tests

Normall y the cardiac activities are under
the antagonistic influences of the intrac ranial parasympathetic system (vagal dorsal
nucleus) and. the extracranial sympathetic
system. In brain stem death the cardiac activities are influenced only by the sympathetic system without regulation from the
intracranial centers. As a result the intravenous injection of 2 mg of atropine will not
cause an acceleration in the cardiac rate. In
a study of 42 successive patients who had
cerebral death there were no exceptions to
these findings. 57
Combined Testing

Quaknine reported on 13 types of studies
that may be performed antemortem to confirm cerebral death. Forty-two patients
were included in the series, and various
numbers of patients were given each type
of test (Table 21-2). 57 From a study of his
findings. it is apparent that cerebral death
can be confirmed by a consistent lack of
cerebral and brain stem function. absence

TESTS PERFORMED IN 42 PATIENTS IN BRAIN DEATH•
NO. OF
CASES

RESULTS

Electroencephalography

32

Atropine Jest

42

Calonc test

42

Flat tracing even alter ampliltcat1on
and stimulation
No tachycardia after Intravenous 1nJect1on of atropine (2 mg)
No eye movements

E teet ronystagmography

22

Flat tracing

Echoencephalography

26

No echopulsations 1n the scope

Carottd and vertebral
--anq;oqraphtes
ln1racran1al pressure

26

7

Circulatory arrest at the base o the
skull
Very high (>100 mm Hg)

6

Brain

Cerebral blood flow

B

Cerebral O)(ygen consumptton

4

No signif1can1 flow : < 10 ml m1n '
100 gm · ' of bram
<1 .5 ml of 0 2 mtn '100 ml·' of blood

Bra•n temperature

Bra tn scanntng

12

Gamma camera

B

lnlta thecal on1ec1ton of radto·
toClmated serum alllumtn
Bra m autopsy

6
26

r• always less than rectal r•

REMARKS
13 cases under scope only
32 cases under ECG
With ice water or ethyl chlonde 1nto
the e)(ternal auditory meatuses
With ice water or ethyl chlonde into
the e)(ternal audttory meatuses
Demonstrated in 10 cases by photo
with three different exposures
lnjectton under ressure rn five
cases
Measured by intraventncular
catheter
Even in cases of hypothermia (e1c
29' < 32'C)
Xenon . two cases
Hippuran: Si)( cases
Blood taken from carotid btlurcation
and IUQular bu lb
Intravenous techneltum

" Cold brain area · and no appear·
ance of the sup. long sinus tn AP
pro)ectton
" Cold bratn area · and no appear·
ance of the sup long sinus tn AP
projection
No cerebrospmal flu id ftow

Intravenous technertum

From cerebral edema ro complete
1ys1s of brain

Correspond tng ro brain death
duration (1 - 7 days)

Even afte r 48 hours

·From Ouaknrne, G. E. Bedstde procedures •n the diagnos1s of bratn death Resuscttat ron . 4 159-177. 1975 Aep nnted
by permtssoon
,......,

I
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lead to controversy and delay in obtaining
organs for transplantation. Prior to the pioneering work of this committee. the concept of cerebral death was vague. A large
portion of the medical community did not
understand or accept the concept, and
those who did use it were without legal
sanction.
The ad hoc committee recommended that
criteria be set up so that the issue of the
time of death could be considered solely as
a medical one. Further, they emphasized
that the patient should be declared dead before the respirator was stopped rather than
afterward, since in the latter situation. the
physician would be withdrawing respiratory support from a patient who was, under
Autopsy
the existing Jaw, still alive. To make the
diagnosis of cerebral death safely in a mediAt autopsy after brain death. 90 per cent
cal and legal milieu in 1968, the committee
of the brains appear to be abnormal by
suggested four criteria to be met in patients
gross examination. 73 If the patient has rein whom hyperthermia or central nervous
quired a respirator for more than 24 hours,
system depressants such as barbiturates
over 60 per cent will have cortical abnorwere absent. The criteria were: (1) Unremalities including pericellular edema, neceptivity and unresponsivity with total uncrosis. neuronal loss, hemorrhage, and inawareness to externally applied stimuli and
farction. About 40 per cent of the cases will
inner need, with even the most intensely
have the characteristic findings of the "respirator brain ." These findings are a soft
painful stimuli evoking no vocal response.
brain that is difficult to remove from the
withdrawal of the limb, or quickening of
calvarium, a gross appearance of generalrespirations. (2) No movement or breathing
ized swelling, poor fixation, a congested
over a period of one hour. If the patient was
receiving mechanical respiratory support,
cortex. and a macerated cerebellum of
which fragments are found in the spinal
spontaneous breathing should be totally abcanal. Microscopic findings included pyksent for three minutes after the respirator
nosis of neuronal cytoplasm in some cells
was removed. (3) The absence of all elicitof all sections, little or no inflammation,
able reflexes, the absence of postural activscattered neuronal changes or loss, and
ity (decerebrate or other), and the presence
glial. microghal, or vascular alterations at
of fixed and dilated pupils that would not
respond to a direct source of bright light. (4)
the site of the microscopic findings.
A flat or isoelectric electroencephalogram
with the machine run at standard gains of 10
FOR MAL CRITERIA OF
p.v per millimeter and 50 p.v per 5 mm and
BRAIN DEATH
at double the standard gain, which is 5 !J.V
__ ----~r:...millimerer or 25 !'v per 5 mm All these
Harvard Criteria
tests were to be repeated at least 24 hours
later with no change. The committee reIn 1968, the need for a better understandgarded items I, 2, and 3 as making the diaging of the concept of cerebral death and the
nosis, the confirmation being made with the
need for obtaining organs for transplantafourth item, the electroencephalogram. 22
tion earlier than at death with cessation of
The so-called Harvard criteria were a noheart beat led the faculty of the Harvard
table advance, but probably were more
Medical School to appoint an ad hoc comstrict and relied more heavily on the elecmittee to study the matter. 22 The goals of
troencephalogram than was necessary or
this committee were to help identify those
justified in some cases. In particular, therepatients who had brain death despite susquirement for re-evaluation in 24 hours
tained heart function and to delete obsolete
often caused needless delays and damage to
criteria for definition of death that could
organs to be transplanted. Later criteria
of cerebral blood flow, brain temperature
markedly lower than body temperature, or
increased intracranial pressure of a degree
that would preclude cerebral blood flow.
The test of function of the brain can be accomplished by electroencephalography, the
atropine test of heart rate. the caloric test,
or electronystagmography. The status of
the cerebral circulation may be determined
by arteriography or isotope studies . Determination of the brain temperature or the intracranial pressure requires the placement
of intracranial probes of an appropriate nature.

I

,1

-58-

CEREBRAL DEATH
g

were published by other groups that reduced the period of observation to 12 hours
ami noted that segmental spinal reflexes
such as deep tendon reflexes and triple flexion responses might be present. Further it
was noted that the electroencephalogram
and cerebral angiography "may provide
supportive data and diagnosis of brain
death. but they are not essential. " 21

l-

ll

unreasonable measures may be required to
maintain cardiovascular function for the 24
hours suggested by the Harvard ad hoc
committee. (4l When any question arises
about the validity of other findings the demonstration of complete cessation of intracranial circulation verifies brain death.

Evaluation of Criteria
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American Association of Neurological
Surgeons Guidelines
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In the last decade numerous organizations and institutions have set forth criteria
for cerebral death based on known physiological principles and observations that
were post hoc. 5 · 1 a.IY. 2 ~· 39 Among them was
the American Association of Neurological
Surgeons. which issued the following
guidelines for diagnosing cerebral death.
I. Cerebral unresponsivity.
2. Apnea.
3. Absence of cephalic reflexes including
the pupillary. audio-ocular, and oculocephalic.
4. Dilated pupil (5.0 mm). In the event
that the pupil is less than 5.0 mm, the possibility of a toxic factor is heightened, and determination of blood drug levels or studies
of the cerebral circulation or both may be
required to eliminate this possibility.
5. Electrocerebral
silence.
Findings
meeting the American Electroencephalographic Society's criteria must be observed
for a minimum recording period of 30 min utes at a time when the requisite cl inical
conditions have persisted for at least six
hours. These findings should be re-examined and confirmed on a second occasion at
least s ix hours later. (These criteria may be
___inapplicable._ -10 ..children_under-.j--¥ears of
age. since there are indications that the immature nervous system can survive significant periods of electrocerebral silence.) 15
The arguments in favor of the American
Association of Neurological Surgeons criteria are: (1) Since brain function is what is
being evaluated, only cerebral reflexes are
important. (2) The presence of a fixed but
nondi lated pupil increases the possibility of
a toxic factor and therefore requires special
consideration . (3l The time frame is shortened because it has been recognized that
when the criteria have been met for even a
few minutes brain survival is unlikely and

To test the criteria of brain death in a prospective manner, the National Institute of
Neurological and Communicative Disease
and Stroke supported a collaborative study
at nine medical centers distributed geographically throughout the United States. 3
The study collected data on the clinical
findings, the electroencephalograms. and
the laboratory analyses for drugs of the patients as well as the neuropathological reports on the dead brains. The protocol required that every patient over I year of age
admitted to the participating medical center
hospital in a cerebrally unresponsive state
and apneic for 15 minutes be admitted to
the study regardless of the cause of these
findings. To be considered in the group for
a diagnosis of brain death. the prerequisites
were absence of sedative drug intoxication,
hypothermia, cardiovascular shock, or aremediable primary disorder, and the presence of cerebral unresponsiveness, apnea.
and electrocerebral silence.
The combined study demonstrated the
practical problems of applying such a protocol in the diagnosis of cerebral death. For
instance, in assessing the presence of sedative drug intoxication. it was found that the
history of drug ingestion was often unreliable, it was virtually impossible to obtain
accurate analysis of toxic agents within a
few bouJ:s.__and it was -difficult to evaluate
the significance of minimal amounts of
drugs in the blood. The determination of
normothermia and the absence of cardiovascular shock was less of a problem. Insuring the absence of a remediable lesion
often required detailed laboratory studie·s
such as computed tomography or angiography. The average time for obtaining those
studies was 7.4 hours. Determining the
presence of cerebral unresponsivity was
straightforward except in 9 per cent of the
cases: in these confusion was caused by
spinal reflex movements. Although apnea is
easily recognized at the bedside, its deter-
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minalron in rhi~ study was imprecise hc(;au.,e of the need to maintain artificial respirations . After the diagnosis of brain death
had been established by other criteria. removal of the respirator .. was rarely followetl by an~ respiratory effort and never
by sufficient chest movement to sustain
life.·· Determination of electrocerebral silence was complicated by three factors:
technical inadequacies. observer error
<misinterpretalion in the reading of the recnnl> . and the degree of validity of a single
rewrding. There was a 3 per cent disagreement between the panel reviewing the
~tudie~ and the original interpreter of the
recording. Most of the disagreement coneel ned I he confusion of artifact with biological activity . In only I per cent of the
ca~e., was there disagreement in which the
original reader diagnosed electrical cortical
silence and the review panel considered
lhat b1ological activity was present. The report states:
Though on critical analysis some ··fiat records " may be considered by reviewers who
know the complete history of the case as showing biological activity, such varied opinions regunling I lo 3 per cent of the cases are inevitable
at I he present state of lhe an of eleclroencephalogruphy .=•

abnormal posturing was noted in 14 per
cent of cases at the time of the initial examination. but in only half the number at the
time of final examination before cardiac arrest.
The spinal reflexes as manifested by tendon jerks with the arms and legs are poor
indicators of the state of the brain. Of the
I 87 patients meeting the basic criteria for
brain death. 101 had no reflexes and 71 had
active reflexes: the remaining 15 were not
examined for their reflexes.
The directors of the combined study concluded that the minimal criteria for diagnosis of cerebral death should be that (I) all
appropriate diagnostic and therapeutic procedures have been performed: and (2) the
patient is in coma with cerebral unresponsivity and apnea; has dilated pupils. absence
of cepahlic reflexes. and electrocerebral silence : and these findings have been present
for a period of 30 minutes at least six hours
after the onset of coma and apnea. If an
early decision about cerebral death is desired and particularly if any of the critical
findings are not definitive. it was suggested,
a confirmatory test to insure the absence of
cerebral blood ftow should be made.

When all drug-induced comas were excluded from the study. no patient in this series recovered after having a 30-minute periotl of electrical cortical silence.
The cepahlic reflexes-pupillary. corneal. oculoauditory (blink to a clap). oculocephalic (doll"s eye). oculovestibular, ciliaspinal. snout. cough, pharyngeal (gag), and
swallowing-were noted to have varying
scn~1t1vi1y as indicators of brain stem dysfunction. The addition of these reflexes to
the basic factors to be considered did not
m rov the accurac of the dia nosis of
brain death.
Although dilated and fixed pupils have
commonly been thought to be present in
bmin death. they occurred in less than half
the patients in this series. Of the 187 palients meeting the three basic criteria for
brain death. 128 had dilated. 44 had small.
and 15 had unequal pupils . Two patients
wilh drug intoxication had small pupils.
Almost 70 per cent of patients had absem:e of muscle tone in either arms or legs.
and 60 per cent lacked it in bo1h. Another
10 per cent lost their muscle tone sometime
before C<trdiac arrest. In this same group.

Ideal Criteria

b

The ideal criteria for determination of
cerebral death would give unequivocal and
reliable results that could be accepted without question by the medical and lay public.
Further, they would be simple and clear so
that any physician could apply them by
merely referring to the list of requirements
necessary for making the diagnosis. Unfortunately, criteria that cover all circumstances in the most ideal and expeditious
manner do not exist. As a result, the diagnosis of cerebra eat s ou
e a medtcal
decision based on the physician's judgment
that is made after all factors have been considered. A strict protocol cannot encompass all circumstances that arise. and if one
is imposed by institutional policy or legal
requirements. needless delays will occur in
obtaining organs to be transplanted and
needless expenses will be incurred to render treatment that is useless . As a workahle. practical. and safe approach to the
problem. the authors of this chapter suggest
the following factors be conside red in making the diagnosis .

t:
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CEREBRAL DEATH

I . There should be C'N<'hml unrespon~ivity

I

~

and unreceptivity. There should be no
evidence of a cerebral type of response to
inten!>ely painful stimulus. noise. or visual
stimuli. Spinal cord or lower brain stem
function may be present.
2. There should be no suspicion that the
coma is due to depressant drugs. A careful
drug history and chemical screening for
drug levels is essential in all situations except those with a firm diagnosis of a major
intraceJ:ehral lesion that is clearly capable
of causing brain death.
3. Spontaneous respiration should have
ceased. With the blood oxygen tension at
normal or higher levels, trials of at first
three and then five minutes without the res-·
pirator should not produce efforts of spontaneous breathing. To protect against hypoxia. 5 liters per minute of oxygen may be
perfused through an intratracheal catheter.
If facilities to measure oxygen tension are
not present and no organs are to be donated. then the trial without the respirator
should be 10 minutes. Since the carbon
dioxide tension increases at the rate of approximately 3 mm of mercury per minute,
the carbon dioxide build-up should be adequate to stimulate breathing. 80
4. The patient should have an untreatable
brain lesion. This situation may be obvious
within hours of a severe head injury, spontaneous intracerebral hemorrhage. or cranialom}'. With cardiac arrest. hypoxia, or severe circulatory insufficiency with cerebral
anoxia or cerebral embolism, longer periods of ob!>ervation may be necessary.
5. Primary hypothermia and significant
abnormalities of metabolic and endocrine
factors should be excluded. It is acknowledged that marked abnormalities of these
factors may develop during treatment of the
patient over a prolonged time and should
not delay the diagnosis of cerebral death if
other appropriate factors are present.
Whereas primtll'y hypothermia should be
ruled out, secondary hypothermia develops
in a majority of patients with cerebral
death. In these patients the temperature
may be 96° For lower.
6. Although a reliable diagnosis of brain
death can be made on the basis of the clinical findings and course of events in most
cases . adJitional confirmation may be desi l ahlt: in other cases. In particular. if there
is a question of homicide or other factors
tha i ma~ lead to legal questions the confir-
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mation of brain death by laboratory tests
may be particularly desirable. This confirmation can be obtained by several tests or
combination of them . Absence of cerebral
blood ftow may be demonstrated by angiogram, isotope studies, or absence of midline echopulsation . Abse nce of cerebral
blood flow and presumed cerebral infarction may be inferred from persistent intracranial pressure measurements sufficiently
elevated over systemic blood pressure to
preclude intracranial flow. Electrocerebral
silence on the electroencephalogram denotes lack of cerebral function. If suppressant drugs are absent. it is presumptive
of cerebral death. Brain stem function and
reflexes may or may not be present with
electrocerebral silence. If a known structural, untreatable brain lesion of the type
that can produce cerebral death is not present. the electroencephalographic e lectrocortical silence should be confirmed by recordings 24 hours later.
DISCUSSION WITH SURVIVORS

Explaining the concept of brain death to
the surviving family and friends requires
patience and an understanding of their emotional distress. The question of organ transplantation may be raised by the family, but
usually it has to come from the physician
attending the patient. When appropriate,
the physician should assume a positive
role. informing the family of the opportunity to get healthy organs to benefit the victims of chronic disease. After effective
communication is established with the family and the criteria for brain death have
been met. the declaring of death and removal of the patient to the operating room
for the transplantation procedure should
cause no difficulty. By arranging this sequence of events. the physician may have
aided the family to assuage their grief by
helping them to know that the death of their
loved one has, through organ transplantation, permitted another person to have an
additional gift of life .
Regardless of whether or not organs are
to be used for transplantation. the physician and ancillary members of the medical
team such as the nurses and social workers
must be knowledgeable about the course of
events and be willing to explain them, as
often as needed, to all members of the fam-
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ily in a kind. calm. and sympathetic manner. Finally. the diagnosis of cerebral death
and action based on it, such as discontinuing respiratory assistance. are medical matters. The survivors should not be burdened
with the decision about when to stop the
respirator. Of course. they should be informed of the plans in a clear, straightforward manner. In most instances they will
agree with the suggested course of action.
If they disagree, however, then further discussion is in order and the respiratory assistance should be continued until a full understanding is reached or cardiac arrest ensues
to settle the matter.
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University of Pittsburgh
SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
Transplant Foundation

August 23, 1984

Senator Ollie Speraw, Chairman
Senate Select Committee on Anatomical Transplants
California Legislature
Room 4082, State Capitol
Sacramento, California 95814
Dear Senator Speraw:
I am sorry I must decline your generous offer to testify in
person at your hearings on brain death to be held on September 18,
1984. I am, however, writing to you to try to answer some questions
you identified in your recent letter to me that possibly could be
helpful to you during these hearings.
As you stated, all states have adopted a Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act and many states have also adopted a brain death law. I am enclosing for your information a copy of the law which was passed in
Pennsylvania and signed into law late 1982. This law went into
effect early 1983. The Pennsylvania law, like most laws passed,
simply states that brain death is the legal death of the individual.
No specific criteria is stated in the law, however, the law does
state that accepted medical criteria must be utilized for the determination of brain death.
To specifically answer your questions, your first question was
"What criteria should be accepted in determining brain death?'' The
criteria utilized for brain death normally not only differs from
state-to-state, but from hospital-to-hospital. Although a majority
of hospitals still follow the original Harvard criteria for the determination of brain death, many institutions have adopted new
policies and procedures over the past 17 years. The basic concepts
for the determination of brain death have remained the same, but time
factors and confirmatory criteria have been changed. I am enclosing
a copy of the Guidelines for the Determination of Death, which was a
report to the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
Hopefnlly
this will give you some starting point as to what criteria could
possibly be utilized.
Your second question is, "Should brain death be accepted as
legal death?" This question is very simply answered as in over 35
states today who have passed the brain death law, brain death is the
legal death of the individual. I am enclosing a copy of the Pennsylvania Uniform Determination of Death Act, which states this in the
body of the law.
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Senator Ollie Speraw, Chairman
August 23, 1984
Page II
Question three: if we determine that brain death is, in fact,
death even though we can maintain the body on support systems, should
a local coroner have jurisdiction when such a body is transported
into California under medical supervision for transplantation? This
is a question I am sure that must be answered by your local coroners
association. Our experience in Pennsylvania in transporting patients
who have succumbed to brain death, but whose body functions are supported by mechanical means, have not fallen under the jurisdiction of
the local coroner, since the body will be returned to the location
where death was determined.
Question four: when brain death has been certified in another
state, should we require legal reaffirmation by California doctors
prior to harvesting any organs or tissues? Again, I can only speak
from our experience at the University of Pittsburgh on this particular question. We do not require our physicians to reaffirm brain
death, as long as the criteria utilized for the pronouncement of
brain death is acceptable and close to the criteria we utilize ourselves.
Brain death, if documented with certainty, is the legal death
of the individual in many states. I personally feel that if the
death of an individual can be documented through brain death, it is
wrong to maintain this person's vital organ functiornartificially,
unless the individual's family has agreed to organ donation. Many,
many patients in this country are needlessly and hopelessly maintained for prolonged periods of time simply because laws do not exist
stating that brain death is the legal death of that individual. This
not only causes great anguish and prolonged suffering for that patient's
family, but also wastes valuable hospital space and an enormous
amount of funds that could be utilized for other lifesaving purposes.
I hope that this information is of some use to you and wish you
well in your hearings.
Sincerely yours,

~a~C
Brian A. Broznick
Organ Procurement Coordinator
BAB:PNK
Enclosures
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SESSION OF 1982

Act 1982-323

1401

No. 1982-323
AN ACI'

SB 1092
Providing for determination of death.

The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hereby
enacts as foUows:
Section 1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Uniform Determination of Death Act."
Section 2. Uniformity of construction and application.
This act shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general
purpose to maki uniform the law with respect to the subject of this act
among states enacting it.
Section 3. Determination of death.
- Only an individual who has sustained either:
(1) itrev~rsible ces~tion of circulatory and respiratory functions;
or
(2) irreversible cessation of aH i"unctions of the entire brain,
including the brain stem;
is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with
accepted medical standards.
Section 4. Effective date.
This act shall take effect in 60 days.
APPROVED-The 17th day of December, A. D. 1982.
-

----------------·-------------

.::
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Special Communication

Guidelines for the Determination of Death
Report of the Med ical Consultants on the Diagnosis of Death to the President's Commission
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research

The ouodehnes set forth '" thos report represent the voews or the slgnatoroes as indivoduats.
they do ,,of necesaar oly reflect the policy of any instotution or proreseoonal assocoatoon with which
any sognatory is alhilated Although the practoce of individual signatories may vary slightly,
atonatot~ea agree on the acceptability of these guidelines: Jesse Barber, MD: Don Backer, MD,
Rochard B&hrman . MD, JO: Donald R Bennett, MD; Richard Beresford, MO. JO; Regonatd
Bocklord . MD; Wilham A Black . Jr. MD; Benjamon Boshes, MO. PhD; Philip Braunstein. MD, John
Burroughs . MO. JO. Russell Butler . MD; John Caronna . MD; SheHey Chou, MD, PhD; Kemp Clark.
MD; Ronald Cranford . MO; Mochael Earnest, MD; Albert Ehle, MD; Jack M. Feon, MD; Sal Fiscona.
MO, JO . Terranes G Furlow, MO, JO; Eli Gotdensohn, MD; Jack Grabow, MD; Phillip M. Green,
MD; Ak11 Grenvok . MD; Charl&s E. Henry, PhD, John Hughes, MD, PhD, OM; Howard Kaufman, MO.
Robert King, MD, Julius Korein, MD; Thomaa W Langfitt, MD; Cesare Lombroao. MD; Kevon M.
Mcintyre MO. JO: Rochard L. Masland, MD; Don Harper Mills, MD, JO: Gaetano Molinari, MO;
Byron C Pe¥ehouse , MO: Lawrence H. Pitts. MO. A Bemard Pleat, MD; Fred Plum . MD; Jerome
Posner. MO : Oavod Powner . MD; Richard Rovot, MD; Peter Safar, MD; Henry Schwartz, MD:
Edward Schlesong&r. MO; Roy Selby, MD; James Snyder, MO; Bruce F Sorenson, MD; Cary
Suter, MO. Barry Tharp, MO; Femando Torres, MD; A. Earl Walker, MD; Arthur Ward, MO; Jack
Whosnant. MO. Rob&rt Wilku&. MD; and Harry Zimmerman, MO.
The preparation of this report was lacolitated by the President's Commission but the
guidelines have not be&n passed on by the Commiseion and are not intended as matters lor
governmental revoaw or adoption .

THE AD\'EXT of effective artificial
cardiopulmonary support for severely
brain-injured persons has created
some coniusion during the past several decades about the determination
of death . Previously, loss of heart and
lung functions was an easily observable and sufficient basis for diagnosing death. whether the initial failure
occurred in the brain, the heart and
lungs, or elsewhere in the body. Irre-

For editorial comment
seep 2194.
versihle :'a ilure of either the heart
and lunl!5 or the brain precluded the
-rcrminueri- functiomng -of t-h ~ .
~ow, however, circulation and respiration can be maintained by means of
a mechanical respirator and other
medical i:nenentions. despite a loss
of all brain functions. In these circumstances, we recognize as dead an
indh·idu :•. whose loss of brain func·
tions i~ c·1mplete and irre\'ersible.
R•pr~ ..... rr-: .J~ttls to J : anr>e L Jnn MO . Asststar"1
C•rertC"r t-r • ·~d•Cal Srudu~s Pres•oent's Comm•s·
!i•'Jn • : r •t•.:. !.''-~ "Y or E!""•cat Prr t 1P.ms 1n Med•c rne
ant' B•()M•r : :a• ara Sehavtora l Research SUite
555 . C' _ c ~ ,. )t ~JW . Was" • nglo~ DC 20006

2184

~ : •,1A

tiona! Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, and the President's Commission for the Study of
·Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research
have proposed the following model
statute, intended for adoption in
every jurisdiction:
UNIFOR~l

DETERMINATION OF
DEATH ACT
An individual who has sustained either
(1) irreversible cessation of circulatory
and respiratory functions. or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire
brain, including the brain stem, is dead . A
determination of death must be made in
accordance with accepted medical standards.

To recognize reliably that death
has occurred, accurate criteria must
be available for physicians' use. These
This wording has also been endorsed
now fall into two groups, to be applied
by the American Academy of Neuraldepending on the clinical situation.
ogy and the American ElectroenWhen respiration and circulation
cephalographic Society.
have irreversibly ceased, there is no
The statute relies on the existence
need to assess brain functions diof "accepted medical standards" for
rectly. When cardiopulmonary funcdetermining that death has occurred.
tions are artificially maintained, neu-. The medical profession, based on
rological criteria must be used to
carefully conducted research and exassess whether brain functions have
tensive clinical experience, has found
ceased irreversibly.
that death can be determined reliably
.More than half of the states now
by either cardiopulmonary or neurorecognize, through statutes or judicial
logical criteria. The tests used for
decisions, that death may be deterdetermining cessation of brain funcmined on the basis of irreversible
tions have changed and will continue
cessation of a!T f unctions ofrt't~
e -~b~r;;:;a:rin;;-.-+t'lio~a:r.o;;-s"'o;;-"""'Jlltfi~Tf'hfi~>e--;;ar1dr.cv:-ae"'n"'t-ro•rr'---rn"'e"'\'.,..,- Law in the remaining states has not
research and technologies. The "Haryet departed from the older, commonvard criteria" (JA.\•1.-l 1968:20!1:337law \'iew that death has not occurred
3-tO) are widely accepted. hut aduntil "all vital functions" (whether or
vances in recent years ha ve led to the
not artificially maintained 1 have
proposal of other criteria. As an aid
ceased. The language of the :>tatutes
to thr implementation oi the prohas not heen uniform from state to
posed uniform statute, we prr11·ide
state, and the dh·ersity of propu,;ed
here one statement of current!~·
and enartPrl laws ha~ createrl ::ubaccepted mt!dical standards.
st.antial confusion. Con,;equen t ly . the
INTRODUCTION
American Bar Association, th~ .-\r.wrThe critt!ria that ph ysicians u,;P in
ican :\Ierlic:.d r\ssm·iation . the \' a-
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<l<>ll'rmining tht.t death has occurred
should Ill f!liminatE> errors in classi f~· inJ! a li\"ing indi\·idual as dead: (21
allow as ft-w errors as possiblE> in
c·la~~ifying a dE>ad hody as ali\·e; (31
allow a dt>termination to be made
without unrt-af"onahlt- cit> lay; I~ I htadaJ•~ahle to a Yariety of rlinical
~ituations: and 151 be explicit and
ac·c·l';:sible to \·erification.
Because it would be undesirable for
any guidelines to be mandated by
legislation or regulation or to be
inflexibly established in case law, the
proposed l"niform Determination of
Death Act appropriately specifies
only "accE-pted medical standards."
Loral, state. and national institutions
and professional organizations are
encouraged to examine and publish
their practices.
The following guidelines represent
a distillation of current practice in
regard to the determination of death.
Only the most commonly available
and Yerified tests have been included.
The time of death recorded on a death
certificate is at present a matter of
local practice and is not covered in
this document.
These guidelines are advisory.
Their successful use requires a competent and judicious physician, experienced in clinical examination and
the releYant procedures. All periods
of obsen·ation listed in these guidelines require the patient to be under
the care of a physician. Considering
the responsibility entailed in the
determination of death, consultation
is recommended when appropriate.
The outline of the criteria is set
forth below in boldface letters. The
lightface text that follows each heading explains its meaning. In addition,
the two sets of criteria (cardiopulmonary and neurological) are followed
by a presentation of the major complicating conditions: drug and metabolic
intoxication ._~ypothermia.
young age, and shock. It is of paramount importance that an:.·one referring to these guidelines be thoroughly
familiar with the entire document,
inrluding explanatory notes and complicating conditions.
THE CRITERIA
FOR DETERMINATION OF DEATH

:\n incih·idua l prE'S!'nting thP findinJ,:, in' ;'! ir• ,. 5E't': :on :\ frnrdi<•p:olmonar:; • n•· ~··l'tion E f. npur·<.!ogir:,]l is
JAMt.. r-.ov 13 . 1981-Vol 246

No

dead . In either section, a diagnosis of
si\·ity. Medical circumstances rna
death requires that both cessation of
require the use of confirmatory stuc
funrtions, as set forth in subsection 1,
ies such as an EEG or blood-flo•
study.
Clnrl irre\·ersibilitv, as set forth in
subsertion 2, be demonstrated .
b. brain stem functions are absent.
Reliable testing of brain stem r1
A. An indhidual "ith irre.\ersible cesflexE-s requires a percepti\'E' and t>Xpf
!iatiun uf circulator~ and respirator~·
functions is dead.
rienced physician using adequa1
1. Cessation is recognized by an
stimuli. Pupillary light, corneal. ocL
locephalic, oculo\·estibular, oroph~
appropriate clinical examination.
ryngeal, and respiratory 1apneaJ r1
Clinical examination will disclose
at least the absence of responsiveflexes should be tested. When the~
ness, heartbeat, and respiratory efreflexes cannot be adequately a!
sessed, confirmatory tests are recon
fort. ~1edical circumstances rna~· remended.
quire the use of confirmatory tests,
such as an ECG.
Adequate testing for apnea is ver
important. An accepted method :
2. lrrel·ersibility is recognized by perventilation with pure oxygen or a
sistent cessation of functions during an
appropriate period of obsenation and/or
o,.·ygen and carbon dioxide mixtur
trial of therapy.
for ten minutes before withdrawal c
the ventilator, followed b~· passh
In clinical situations where death is
flow of oxygen . (This procedut
expected, where the course has been
allows PaC0 2 to rise without hazarc
gradual, and where irregular agonal
ous h~·poxia. ) Hn>ercarbia adequate:
respiration or heartbeat finally
stimulates respiratory effort withi
ceases, the period of observation following the cessation may be only the
30 seconds when Paco: is greater tha
60 mm Hg. A ten-minute period c
few minutes required to complete the
apnea is usually sufficient to attai
examination. Similarly, if resuscitathis level of hypercarbia. Testing c
tion is not undertaken and ventricu ·
arterial blood gases can be used 1
lar fibrillation and standstill develop
confirm this le\·el. Spontane01:
in a monitored patient, the required
breathing efforts indicate that part c
period of obser\·ation thereafter rna~·
the brain stem is functioning.
be as short as a few mintues. When a
Peripheral nervous system activit
possible death is unobsen•ed, unexpected, or sudden, the examination
and spinal cord reflexes rna~· persh
after death. True decerebrate o
rna~· need to be more detailed and
repeated over a longer period, while
decorticate posturing or seizures ar
inconsistent with the diagnosis c
appropriate resuscitative effort is
death.
maintained as a test of cardiovascular
responsiveness. Diagnosis in indiddu 2. lrr~versibility is recognized whe
als who are first observed with rigor
e'·aluation discloses findings of a and
mortis or putrefaction may require
and c:
only the observation period necessary
a. The cause of coma is establishe
to establish that fact.
and is sufficient to account for the loss c
B. An indh·idua l with irreversible cesbrain functions, and .•.
sation of all functions of the entire brain,
Most difficulties with the determ'
including the brain stem, is dead. The
nation of death on the basis of neurc
"functions of the entire brain" that
logical criteria ha,·e resulted fror
are rele,·ant to the diagnosis are
inadequate attention to this basi
..ih..2Sf... that are clinically ascert.ailc_ __diagD.D.stic..pr.erequisite.Jn additian..t
able. Where indicated, the clinical
a carefu clinical examination an
diagnosis is subject to confirmation
investigation of history, rele,·an
·nowledge of causation rna~· b
by laborator~\' tests, as described in
the following portions of the text.
acquired by computed tomographi
Consultation with a ph~·sician experiscan, measurement of core tempera
enc·ed in this diagnosis is advisable.
ture, drug screeninr,r. EEG, angiogra
J. C1•ssatiun is reco:.:nized" 1en e1a u·
phy, or other proredures.
ation disclose!. findin::s of a and b:
b. the possibilit~ of reco,e r~ of a n
a. Cen•hral functions are absent, and
brain func tions i~ excluded. and ...
Th E> most important re·;f>rs ilole con
Tl: o·rt· mu~t h, dt.tl'jl c<•m ;,, that is.
ditions are ~t·<.L t inn, l'::: ;)ot!w r m i:J
c-en·h~ : .l unren'J•ti\·it ~ and llll rf'!']'On ·
nt•uromuscular h'nC'k3d t'. and :;:hork
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In

\1!!11:- l:a : t·ir, arn,;tanl't' 11 ht-re a
t ' ,l ll ~•·
rannot ht> estahli,_!:, -.:. trn ·· ··r-:ihili:~· ean Ill' rt>liai11.1·
ir:f, · :·:···~l .. nl~ :i!'tt•r extt•n,;in• t":aluatittt : :· .. r d ru:.: int .. \it·atiun ..•'l:tended
o\,,.,.~ ·. : uion . . tnd otlwr testin)!. :\
dt•lt'!"lllinatiun that bloorJ tlow tO thP
hrai 1 is ab:-:t>nt t·an he used to ciPmon"' r:d• · a ..,q !lic' it•n1 and il'rc'\"t'I"Sihlt•
1: •·

~lit! : ,·i,•nt

c. the ce!tsatiun of all brain functions
fur :m appropriate period of
oh!>tenation and/or trial of therapy.
Ewn when coma is known to ha\'e
started at an t>arlier time, the absence
of all brain functions must be establi.:hett h~ an expPrienced ph ysician
at the initiation of the observation
pt>riL'd. The duration of observation
periods is a matter of clinical judgmt:'nt. and some phrsidans recommend shortt'r or longer periods than
tho!'t' j!i vPn ht>re.
Except for patients with drug
intoxication . hypothermia, young age,
or shock, medical centers with substantial experience in diagnosing
tlea t h neurologically report no cases
of hrain functions returning following
a six-hour cessation, documented by
clinical examination and confirmatorr EEG. In the absence of confirmatory tests, a period of observation of
at least 12 hours is recommended
when an irreversible condition is well
established. For anoxic brain damage
where the extent of damage is more
difficult to ascertain, observation for
~.t hours is generally desirable. In
anoxic injury, the observation period
may hP reduced if a test shows cessation of cerebral blood flow or if an
EEG shows electrocerebral silence in
an adult patient without drug intoxication, hypothermia, or shock.
Confirmation of clinical findings by
EEG is dPsirable when objective documl!ntation is needed to substantiate
t ht· c inical fintlin)!s . Electrocerebral
silt•nt·t- verities irreversible loss of
~Ftie-al- funefions.-e;oeeept ffi pa-tientswith drug intoxication or hypothermia . l!mportant technical details are
provit!Prl in ":\linimal Technical Stan dartb for EEG Rt>cording in Sus(>t't'tl•d CerPbral neath" [Guidelines in
EE(; J:•.,IJ. Atlanta, American ElPct rnPnn•phalocraphic SociPty, 1980.
~·· l' t i.. r. ·1. pp 19-:!.t ].1 WhPn joinl'd
., it h tilt' clin it·al lindinf,!s of ahsenl
i·t· 11n - · Prn fu nl"l i••ns, elt:'etrot·t>rebr:d
. ;),.•:••· c·qnfirm:-: tht> cliaf,!no;:i:-;.
pcr'i~ls
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f\•n: l' lt'tt• ("l'~..;at i on of l' irc .::ation to
tht' no)rnwtht'rm it• adult h; ain i•Jr
nlllrl' th a n tt•n minutP;: i,; tnc·.,mpatih ,. 1•.it h ;:un·i,·al of bra :~. ti,;suC'.
nlll'll fl1 t•ntation ot' thi;: rirl'ulatury
failurP i~ tht>rt•for·p el·iclt•nt·t· qf dt•ath
()f thP t'ntire brain . Four-1·p,;~ .. intraaanial angiography is rlt'fir.l! il"e for
diagn .. ~inJ.! rt·ssatiun of' t·irru ation to
thl• t>ntire brain 1hoth cerebrum and
posterior· fo:>sat hut entails suh:>tantial practical difficulties anrl risks.
Tests are available that assess circulation only in the cerebral hemi:>pheres, namely radioisotope bolus
cerebral angiography and gamma
camera imaging with rad ioi:>otope
cerebral angiograph~· . Without complicating conditions, absent cerebral
blood flow as measured by these tests,
in conjunction with the clinical determination of cessation of all brain
functions for at least six hours, is
diagnostic of death.
COMPLICATING CONDITIONS

A. Drug and !\letabolic lntoxication.Drug intoxication is the most serious
problem in the determination of
death, especially when multiple drugs
are used. Cessation of brain functions
caused by the sedative and anesthetic
drugs, such as barbiturates, benzodiazepines, meprobamate, methaqualone, and trichloroethylene, may be
completely reversible even though
they produce clinical cessation of
brain functions and electrocerebral
silence. In cases where there is any
likelihood of sedative presence, toxicology screening for all likely drugs is
required. If exogenous intoxication is
found, death may not be declared
until the intoxicant is metabolized or
intracranial circulation is tested and
found to have ceased.
Total paralysis may cause unresponsiveness, areflexia, and apnea
that closely simulates rleath . Exposure to drugs such as neuromuscular
bl-oeking agents--or -ami-nogl;:cosideantibiotics, and diseases like myasthenia gravis are usually apparent
hy careful review of the histo ry . Prolone:Pd paral ysis after use of succinylehnline chloride and re lated drugs
requires e\"aluation for pst> ucl(•t:holinPst.•rase deficiPnc~· If thl're i:-; an~·
qu t>~ tinn, low-do,;e atropine "ti mulat i•.1n. ••lectrom yogram, Jll• ripheral
rwn·e "timulat iun, EEC; , t .. ~ t '> nr'
in t racranial cirC'ulation. or ... , :,.nclt>d

JAMA, Nov 13. 1981-Vo l 246 . No . 19

- 69-

,,h,_,., ... :t: l••n,

a~

indit':llt•d , w= li

m ;,i.,t-'

tht• d i.. ..!• i u ... j..; c lt•ar .

In

.!r·.~-indutt·d

cnm:i, EEf; al"ti·•irPt ::rn 0r !Jt ' r~ i "t wh :!t· tlw
pati,•nt J'l'rnain " llnr .. spon,;iH•. and
tht•n•!on· thP EE(; may he an imJJortant t''. a:uation a lonJ.! with e\ttnclt>d
oh,;t•n·ation . If the F.EG show~ l'lt>rt rol't•rc•hral :-.i l,•nt'l' , ,hor latl'llr ~ ~lll
ditor~· CJr somatosen!>ory-eYol.l'd pott•ntials may be used to test brain
stem funt:tions, since these potentials
are unlikely to be affected by drugs.
Some severe illnesses (eg, hepatic
encephaiopathy, hyperosmolar coma,
and preterminal uremia 1 can cause
deep coma. Before irreversible cessation of hrain funct ions can he determined,
metabolic
abnormalities
should be considered and, if possible,
corrected. Confirmatory tests of circulation or EEG may be necessary.
B. H~pothermia.-Criteria for reliable recognition of death are not
a\·ailable in the presence of hypothermia (below 32.2 oc core temperature).
The ,·ariables of cerebral circulation
in hypothermic patients are not sufficiently well studied to know whether
tests of absent or diminished circulation are confirmatory. Hypothermia
can mimic brain death by ordinary
clinical criteria and can protect
against neurological damage due to
hypoxia. Further complications arise
since hypothermia also usually precedes and follows death . If these
complicating factors make it unclear
whether an indi,·idual is ali\·p, the
only a\·ailable measure to resoh·e the
issue is to restore normothermia.
H:rpothermia -is not a common cause
of difficulty in the determination of
death.
C. Children.-The brains of infants
and young children hal"e incrPased
rPsistance to damage anrl rna~· reco,·er
substantial functions e\·Pn after exhibiting unresponsiYene:>s on nt?urological examination for longer periods
-com pared-------wi-th-adu-lts. -Fh ,\ si cia usshould be particularly cautious in
applying neurological criteria to determine rleath in ch ildren younger
than 5 ~·pars .
D. Shock.-Physicians should al:>o
he partieularl~· cautious in ap)'l~· ing
neut·olo)!ical criteria to dt>tt•rmint•
de :llh in patit->nts in s hock bt't':l ll"'' the
t'f' clu ction in cerPhr al circ ulat ion l'a n
r•·ndt•r l' i!n ic·all"\am ina inn a nd laho ralo1rY It'"'' unrt> liahlt->.
t~· m :.:.
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO
BERKELEY • DAVIS • IRVINE • LOS ANGELES • RIVERSIDE • SAN DIEGO • SAN FRANCISCO

SCHOOL OF MEL>ICINE
DEPARTMENT OF MEDICINE

SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94143

September 14, 1984

Ollie Speraw, Chairman
Senate Select Committee on Anatomical
Transplants
Room 4082, State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 95814

Dear Senator Speraw:
I received a copy of your letter and news release concerning Tuesday•s
hearing on brain death and organ donation from Joseph Spinelli, Director of
the UCSF Animal Care Facility. Frankly, I am quite disturbed that you find
the California Determination of Death Act 11 Vague and ill-defined 11 and a potential source of 11 error and confusion. 11
The current statute of the California Health and Safety Code (7180) reads
as fallows:
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation
of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem,
is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with
accepted medical standards .... "
11

This phrasing is identical to the uniform statute proposed by the President•s
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine, the American Bar
Association, the American Medical Association and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

-

-

The document of the President•s Commission entitled Defining Death
explains at length why this definition is adequate from an ethical and legal
point of view. Therefore, no further amendment should be undertaken at this
-ti-me-;- -As a member·---uf the President•s Comm1sslon, rrecommend this document
to you. You may obtain it from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Library
of Congress #81-600150.

~/Zf.l?.

4~t
cc: Oscar Salvatierra, M.D.
Lawrence Pitts, M.D.
Franklin Jacobson
Susan Hopper, RN, MSN
Joseph Spinelli, DVM
GenroP

Wil~nn

Mn

R. Jansen,
Professor of Ethics in Medicine
Chief, Division of Medical Ethics
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STANFORD UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER
STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 94305
THOMAS A. RAFFIN, M.D.
Assistant Professor of Medicine (Respiratory)
Assistant Chief of Medicine
Medical Director, Respiratory Therapy
Room C356 • (415) 497·6381

September 13, 1984

Senator Ollie Speraw
Chairman, Senate Select Committee
on Anatomical Transplants
California Legislature
Room 4082
State Capitol
Sacramento, CA. 95814
Dear Honorable Senator Speraw:
Dr. Lewis Wexler referred you to me concerning the question when does brain
death actually and legally occur? I have included for your information one
of the most important references in the medical literature and it is entitled
GUIDELINES FOR THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH: REPORT OF THE MEDICAL CONSULTANTS
ON THE DIAGNOSIS OF DEATH TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH. This
outstanding document reflects my opinions and is referenced frequently when
discussing this issue during the practice of medicine.
To briefly summarize: 1) The criteria in this article should be used to determine
brain death; 2) Brain death is legal death; 3) If a brain dead individual
is transported into the State of California for any reason (for example,
for consideration of use of one of his organs in a transplantation operation)
no governmental or judicial official should have any jurisdiction over the
body unless a crime has been committed. In other words, a local coroner
should absolutely have no jurisdiction when such a body is transported into
California. The physicians taking care of the patient should supervise the
proceedings. 4) When brain death has been certified in another state and
a patient is being transported into California, then clearly the California
physician must evaluate the patient and make sure the diagnosis is correct.
No legal reaffirmation involving any governmental or judicial body should
be invotved. Again, this is a straight-forward and normal activity for a
physician and bureaucratic meddling can only serve to complicate the process,
delay it, and possibly place a potential transplant recipient's life into
jeopardy. If a governmental or judicial official believes a crime is being
committed, then action should be taken.
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Senator Ollie Speraw
September 13, 1984
Page 2
I hope I have been of assistance to you. If you have any further questions
please don•t hesitate to get in touch with me. With warm regards.

Sincerely,

~f(ajf
Thomas A. Raffin, M.D.
Assistant Chief of Medicine
TAR/kls
Enc.
cc:

Lewis Wexler, M.D.
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Pacific Medical Center
·'

11 September 1984

Senator Ollie Speraw
Chairman
Senate Select Committee on
Anatomical Transplants
Room 4082
State Capitol
Sacramento, California 95814
Dear Senator Speraw:
Mr. Tom Harlan, our associate administrator at Pacific Medical
Center in San Francisco, has forwarded to me a copy of your
letter to him for comment.
I am a clinical neurologist and the chairman of the department
at Pacific Medical Center. The concept of brain death is, of
course, something I deal with on a constant basis and one with
which I am concerned as far as legislation goes.
At present, I think most neurologists are quite happy with the
California law on brain death.
It does not set criteria and
this is highly desirable.
In fact, the law has been praised in
medical journals for this very reason. The criteria for the
pronouncement of brain death have evolved over a period of
years. To some degree they will probably still evolve. It
would therefore not be desirable to lock into law criteria from
which we would then have to deviate as capabilities to accurately
recognize brain death change.
As an example, the Harvard criteria of 1968 were too rigid and
it was soon recognized that they could be liberalized. I think
in essence the present law is quite satisfactory and need not
--·-----·-------be- -Ghanged. ------------·-----------When brain death is pronounced, I think like any other pronouncement of death, it can be accepted as legal death.
I can't really comment on when a local coroner should have jurisdiction in a body that is transported over the state line. However, if brain death has been certified in another state by
competent physicians, I think that this should be acceptable to
the physician who is harvesting the kidneys. What they do need,
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Senator Ollie Speraw
9/11/84
Page 2
however, is a copy of the doctor's note which allowed him to
conclude that brain death was present.
If that is not satisfactory to the harvesting surgeon, then he should have a local
opinion obtained.
I hope this is of help to you in your hearings.
Sincerely,

--\-- J -( --

--r,~\:: ·-.c ·,

.

(

\~

· \ ;,_·__ -

Phiiip R. Callnchini 1
PRC:da
cc: Mr. Tom Harlan
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Dear Senator Sperow:
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Thank you for· the invitation to testify concerning California
legislation concerning brain death in the September 18th hearing.
Unfortunately, a prior commitment for this date precludes my
appearing to testify at this hearing.
·
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I am enclosing an article you may find available. As you can
see, brain death is a legal basis of declaring death by statute
in 25 states and based on court decisions in 7 additional states .
Medical criteria for brain death are well defined and accepted
now by all appropriate medical organizations. This would seem to
respond to your first two questions. In response to your third
and fourth questions, if death has already been pronounced and a
cadaver is transported to California for transplant surgery, the
cadaver is exactly that - a cadaver. I see no need for a local
coroner to have jurisdiction or for a California doctor to recertify
death unless the same is required for a cadaver shipped from another
state to California for burial.
Finally, Oscar Salvatierra, M.D., Chief of Transplant Surgery at
the University of California San Francisco, is expert in these
matters and would be an excellent resource person for your committee.

r:J:!JoqJL
David A. Ogden, M.D.
President
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Member of the National Health Council

-75-

CITATIONS
"flitch"
"Nations"

People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal 3d 641
People v. Nations (1980) 26 Cal 3d 176

See also People v. Mejia (1976) 56 CalApp 3d 574
Peoule v. Goss (1980) 109 CalApp 3d 457
(per Boyd Stevens)
"13owmun"

In re Bowman (1980) 619 Pac Rptr 2d 731

"Dority"

Dority v. Superior Court (1983) 145 Cal App 3d 273

- ---- -
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